




Breaking Al-Qaeda

Psychological and
Operational Techniques

Second Edition

Elena Mastors



CRC Press
Taylor & Francis Group

Breaking Al-Qaeda

Psychological and
Operational Techniques

Second Edition

Breaking Al-Qaeda

Psychological and
Operational Techniques

Second Edition

Elena Mastors



CRC Press

Taylor & Francis Group
Boca Raton London New York

CRC Press is an imprint of the
Taylor & Francis Group, an **informa** business

CRC Press
Taylor & Francis Group
6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300
Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742

© 2014 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

No claim to original U.S. Government works
Version Date: 20140203

International Standard Book Number-13: 978-1-4822-3012-3 (eBook - PDF)

This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the author and publisher cannot assume responsibility for the validity of all materials or the consequences of their use. The authors and publishers have attempted to trace the copyright holders of all material reproduced in this publication and apologize to copyright holders if permission to publish in this form has not been obtained. If any copyright material has not been acknowledged please write and let us know so we may rectify in any future reprint.

Except as permitted under U.S. Copyright Law, no part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publishers.

For permission to photocopy or use material electronically from this work, please access www.copyright.com (<http://www.copyright.com/>) or contact the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (CCC), 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978-750-8400. CCC is a not-for-profit organization that provides licenses and registration for a variety of users. For organizations that have been granted a photocopy license by the CCC, a separate system of payment has been arranged.

Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at
<http://www.taylorandfrancis.com>

and the CRC Press Web site at
<http://www.crcpress.com>

CONTENTS

Foreword	ix
Preface to the Second Edition	xi
Author	xv
I The Road to Breaking Al-Qaeda	I
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the Resilient Network	4
The Arab Spring and the Al-Qaeda Foothold	8
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Counterterrorism Initiatives	10
Bureaucratic Solutions: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)	11
The PATRIOT Act and Expansion of Government Power	12
The National Security Agency (NSA) and Domestic Spying Fears	13
Government Detention and Guantanamo	14
Beware of the Buzzing Drones	15
The Nature of International Cooperation	17
Intelligence Leaks	19
Ceding Ground to Terrorists	20
Challenging the Bureaucracy	24
Informational Strategies	25
Informational Influence	29
Chapter Outline	33
Notes	35
2 The Origination and Continuation of the Threat	43
The Failure of Bureaucracy	44
Unwinding the Puzzle: The Afghan–Soviet War	46
From Saudi Arabia to Somalia: The Mujahedeen Expands	48
World Trade Center One and Bojinka	48
Return to Afghanistan and the Fatwas	49
Joining Forces against the Jews and Crusaders, and Global Jihad	51
Pre-9/11 Attacks	53

CONTENTS

9/11: The Justification	54
9/11: The Immediate Response	56
Continuation of the Threat	56
Post-9/11 Attacks	56
Vilification, Degradation, and Iraq	61
Post-Iraq Implications	63
The Homegrown Threat	64
Learning Strategies	66
Concerns about Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)	67
The Terrorism–Criminal Nexus	67
Conclusion	69
Notes	69
3 The Mentality of the Threat	73
Are Terrorists Crazy?	74
Understanding Complex Motivation	76
Demographic Profiling	80
Vast Network of Propaganda	81
Uses of Propaganda	82
The Propaganda Message	83
The Enemy Defined	87
Tailored Propaganda	91
Information Dissemination	96
Swear Allegiance to Al-Qaeda	97
Magazine Jihad	97
Network Books	98
Video Productions	99
Edicts and Fatwas	99
Singing the Songs of Jihad	101
Point and Shoot: Killing the Kuffar	102
Propaganda Dissemination	104
Conclusion	108
Notes	108
4 The Business of Influence	115
Intelligence Collection	116
Psychological Influence Techniques	118

Operational Influence Techniques	123
Source Credibility and Delivery	126
Conclusion	129
Notes	129
5 Breaking Individuals	133
The Leadership Framework	134
Personal Characteristics	134
Operating Environment	135
Advisory System	135
Information Environment	135
The Case of Ayman Al-Zawahiri	136
Some Background and Early Traits	136
Quest for Relevance and Power	143
Influencing Al-Zawahiri	153
Conclusion	157
Notes	158
6 Breaking Groups	163
The Nature of Groups	164
Group Fissures	166
Fissure: Personal Conflict and Mistrust	166
Fissure: Substantive and Procedural Disagreement	171
Fissure: Deviants	174
Conclusion	179
Notes	179
7 Breaking Relationships between Groups	183
Relationships between Groups	184
Fissure Points	186
Diverging Goals and Ethnic Differences	186
Security Risks	192
Leadership and Authority	194
Competition over Resources	197
Other Exploitable Situations	199
Conclusion	200
Notes	200

CONTENTS

8 The Final Break	205
The Learning Process	206
The Final Piece	207
Hindering Change	208
Conclusion	210
Notes	211

FOREWORD

Since the al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11, our country has spent \$10 trillion and, most important, lost thousands of young, promising lives in battle—yet the Islamist terrorist threat remains. Despite our efforts, the radical ideology has spread like wildfire, ignited by globalization and technological advances in the information, financing, and social networking realms. Al-Qaeda is the most feared organization, but other international terrorist groups are poised to endanger our country, whether through direct engagement or circuitously through trafficking or financial corruption. Many of our challenges at home are also fed by modernized transnational crime, which, despite our countering efforts, is on the rise. Routinely underestimated, terror and crime groups operate with a level of sophistication previously only found in multinational corporations, exacerbating the problem.

Perhaps the persistence of al-Qaeda and its myriad splinter groups is due to joining forces with other groups and entities, despite differing ideologies or political goals. An example is the opposition force in Syria, initially labeled as moderate, yet later attracting extremists from at least four different terrorist groups in the region. Certainly, where groups are not actively working together, they are borrowing pages from each other's playbooks, adopting their proven funding, tactical, and communication methods. An established drug route is desirable to all groups and can easily be used to move bulk cash, humans, and weapons. This liaising of actors is extremely worrisome as their collective goals advance.

I have spent over two decades leading organizations. Some were high-performing, well-oiled machines and others dysfunctional and dying. I have learned that the size, type, and business of an organization are virtually irrelevant as to whether it fails or succeeds. All organizations share the basics: structure, culture, and environment. They all have customers, stakeholders, and products. Activities are the same, such as recruiting, retention, planning, and execution. Organizations are populated by human beings, all of whom are driven by the same basic instincts and needs. In fact, the rise of modern terrorist and criminal groups can be predicted when viewed through the lens of foundational organizational and sociological theories. Furthermore, viewing the lifecycle of the

groups—and how they start, thrive, and terminate—is extraordinarily helpful when discussing mitigation and engagement. It may be quite possible to inject game changers at the micro level that force groups to alter course and even implode from the inside—without ever firing a shot in anger or losing a life.

The rise and persistence of the radical threat must be viewed through a fusion of psychology, sociology, and organization development and human behavior theory. Unlike criminals who are driven by money and greed, terrorists are driven by ideology, which is more difficult to understand and counter. The modern terrorist threat is asymmetric, and as such, countering it requires an asymmetric approach. Traditional means of addressing national security threats, through a combination of diplomatic, economic, or military means, will likely not work against this enemy, which is global and operates without permission of a host nation-state.

Thought leaders now acknowledge that understanding the mind of a terrorist, his or her unique psychological and sociological framework, is a helpful tool when profiling or identifying possible triggers leading to the terrorist lifestyle. Those studying demographics and migration patterns are learning poverty, hunger, and a disheartened populace creates an environment ripe for planting the radical Islamist ideology, which offers redemption. We now do not overlook the importance of “soft power” engagement with failing states before they turn into a fertile breeding ground for terrorists and criminals who will certainly seize the opportunity to move in unopposed and take control.

However, there is a need for a very hands-on, up close, and personal engagement to dislodge the radical Islamist ideology once it takes root. Dr. Mastors’ work fills this gap between the psychological and tactical approaches to defeat al-Qaeda. Her experiences as an intelligence operator and conducting field research to interview those who were compelled to turn away from political terrorism well position her to offer insight and practical guidance to defeat the radical ideology. This book serves to educate those on the front line, as well as strategic planners and thinkers on the subject of *Breaking Al-Qaeda*.

Colonel Jennifer L. Hesterman
(United States Air Force, Retired)

Author of *The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, Organized Crime, and Terror Groups* (CRC Press, 2013)

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Since this book was completed in 2009 and first published in 2010 many startling changes have taken place throughout the world. Before then, U.S. President Barack Obama was still a relatively new president and there were still not a lot of definitive policies regarding counterterrorism coming out of the administration. The administration was getting its sea legs so to speak. Usama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda, was killed by U.S. forces in a covert mission, while living in a housing compound in a wealthy neighborhood in Abbottabad, Pakistan. This 2011 event was stunning given that most Americans were led to believe that Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri were deeply hidden, inside caves, instead of hiding in plain sight. Al-Zawahiri, who was named as Bin Laden's successor, described Bin Laden as tender, gentle, and kind. Seemingly as a move to expand his influence and operational control, al-Zawahiri named as his second-in-command Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

While the capture of Bin Laden was a coup for the United States, other events demonstrated the instability of North African countries and the will of the populace to change the leadership. Specifically, the world witnessed the "Arab Spring," sparked in Tunisia at the end of 2010, where citizens threw out leaders in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, and spread information about those events on social media. Muammar Gaddafi, the leader of Libya, was killed and Hosni Mubarak, the longtime leader of Egypt, removed from power and replaced with Muhammad Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Later, Morsi was removed from power by the military, another blow to stabilization. The cycle of protest, violence, and government backlash continued.

In the Middle East, the Syrian war ignited with the leadership of Bashir al-Assad remaining steadfast to keep control over the country. Over a hundred thousand people are reported dead and this civil war has included the horrifying use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government on its own population. Hezbollah fighters poured in from Lebanon

to support the regime. A myriad of resistance groups formed to combat the regime and another that operated in Iraq expanded its operations into Syria. Also in the Middle East, the Iraq drawdown occurred and al-Qaeda attacks continue. In South Asia, discussions over the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan became more firmly rooted. The Taliban and Pakistani Taliban continue to destabilize both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Obama Administration eventually became clearer about policies and procedures as it related to our counterterrorism efforts. The promise to close Guantanamo Bay was reiterated again, the PATRIOT Act was renewed, and a public diplomacy strategy released. Drone attacks on terrorists who earned a place on the “kill list” were stepped up. Targeting killing proved to be successful, but also highly controversial from an ethical and legal standpoint. Those arrested for acts of terrorism against the United States viewed as “homegrown” were being prosecuted and sentenced.

The al-Qaeda network is unfortunately still a force to be reckoned with. Some argue that the network’s threat has significantly dissipated. But as counterterrorism expert Joshua Sinai reminds us, “every time the threat is underplayed, it is invariably followed by a major attack.” Furthermore, he maintains that just because a major attack has not happened, does not mean one is not in the works. Catastrophic attacks take planning and money.¹

The network is a threat; it challenges our way of life and values. Network groups moved in to take advantage of circumstances such as instability due to regime change and civil war. Many groups changed or morphed. New ones emerged. Innocent people across the globe are killed in seemingly senseless violence. Not a day goes by where violence is not perpetrated by individuals and groups who dehumanize their enemy and wish to wipe them off the face of the earth. This includes acts perpetrated against Jews, Christians, “Crusaders” and apostate regimes, and even Sunni against Shia. What does this say about human nature? Was Thomas Hobbes correct that this is a “war of all against all?”

Through excellent counterterrorism efforts of law enforcement and intelligence bodies across the world, many plots were thwarted. But despite our best efforts, many were not. These groups learn, they adapt, and they get smarter about how to carry out attacks. Attacks with underwear bombs and the potential for breast implant bombs no longer seem far-fetched. Law enforcement and intelligence bodies adapt to the changing environment. One thing that stays constant is that Jihad was and is a global enterprise.

NOTE

1. Joshua Sinai, "Al Qaeda Threat to U.S. Not Diminished, Data Indicates," *JINSA*, March 11, 2013, <http://www.jinsa.org/fellowship-program/joshua-sinai/al-qaeda-threat-us-not-diminished-data-indicates> (accessed August 28, 2013).

AUTHOR

Elena Mastors, Ph.D., is currently vice president and dean of Applied Research at the American Public University System (APUS). She was formerly vice president and dean of the School of Security and Global Studies and program director of the Graduate Intelligence Studies and National Security programs.

Previous to her work with APUS, she was an associate professor in the National Decision Making Department of the Naval War College, and also held various senior intelligence and policy positions in the Office of Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Dr. Mastors is an expert on political psychology as it pertains to conflict, terrorism, and political leadership. She writes frequently on understanding leaders and group dynamics from a political-psychological perspective. She is also a frequent lecturer on the important role of individuals and group dynamics in armed groups.

Dr. Mastors is on the Board of Directors at the Institute for the Study of Intercommunal Conflict at Washington State University. Her professional affiliations include the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE), the International Studies Association (ISA), the International Society for Political Psychology (ISPP), and Women in Security (WIS).

Dr. Mastors has published on the subjects of conflict and armed groups. Her coauthored books include *Introduction to Political Psychology* (Psychology Press, 2010) and *The Lesser Jihad: Recruits and the Al-Qaida Network* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

1

The Road to Breaking Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda is a more dangerous enemy today than it has ever been before. It has suffered some setbacks since September 11, 2001: losing its state within a state in Afghanistan, having several of its top operatives killed, and failing in its attempts to overthrow the governments of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. But thanks largely to Washington's eagerness to go into Iraq rather than concentrate on hunting down al-Qaeda's leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world, where it has developed a large cadre of operatives, and in Europe, where it can claim the support of some disenfranchised Muslim locals and members of the Arab and Asian diasporas. Usama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign to make himself and his movement the primary symbols of Islamic resistance worldwide. His ideas now attract more followers than ever.

—Bruce Riedel¹

I fear the morning is coming when we will wake up in America to thousands of dead and a public that has drifted into such a mind-numbing ignorant bliss to the degree that when it happens it will have devastating effects. However, even more than this, I fear how this misinformed and ignorant public will whip back in such an intense emotional state with politicians driving along that knee-jerk, sound bite solutions will destroy years of progress within the counterterrorism community and not only not help to make the country safer but simply create illusions of safety when there is in fact none.

—Ben Venzke²

Roadside and subway bombings, cars driven into airports, assassinations, kidnappings, and beheadings—welcome to the al-Qaeda terrorist network. This network has a global reach, and commits terrorist acts against individuals and governments throughout the world. This network operates globally and knows no geographical boundaries.

Since there has not been another major attack on U.S. soil, it seems as though Americans have returned to their pre-9/11 mentality. They are once again complacent, but against this complacency is the reality of the world. In Iraq, the war against al-Qaeda, Sunni insurgents, and Shia elements is being fought “over there.” Americans are told that the United States is winning, that the surge in Afghanistan was working; but no one really knows what this means, and on some level, Americans do not care. The Taliban regained significant ground in Afghanistan, and Pakistan continues to destabilize. Terrorist acts are carried out by al-Qaeda members in Algeria and other African countries like Somalia and Mali are blips in the news. Attacks by the network around the world continue on a regular basis. But this blissful ignorance is how this mess began years ago. The United States is doomed to repeat history.

Many still say the threat from the network is not significant. They say the threat from terrorism is simply overblown. In their minds, it is all contrived and hyped to benefit anyone from corporations to the defense industry.

It seems that the only logical explanation is that information is being ignored. When individuals are staunchly attached to their beliefs, they tend to not seek information that challenges their beliefs. Even if they do come across conflicting information, it is likely to be summarily dismissed. A subset of them subscribes to conspiracy theories even in the face of ample disconfirming information. According to Van der Liden, “Conspiracy theories offer easy answers by casting the world as simpler and more predictable than it is.”³ And conspiracy theorists are more common than we think. For example, a 2013 poll indicated that “37 percent of Americans believe global warming is a hoax, 21 percent think that the U.S. government is covering up evidence of space aliens and 28 percent suspect a secret elite power is plotting to take over the world.”⁴ With regard to 9/11, conspiracy theorists argue that it was not a plane that hit the Pentagon but a missile. Another frequently referred to explanation is that the Israelis and even the U.S. government were behind the attacks.

As Lev Grossman articulated about the conspiracy theorists’ thinking about 9/11:

In almost every clip [on the attacks] you'll see little puffs of dust spurt-
ing out from the sides of the towers. There are two competing explana-
tions for these puffs of dust: (1) the force of the collapsing upper floors
raised the air pressure in the lower ones so dramatically that it actu-
ally blew out the windows. And (2) the towers did not collapse from the
impact of two Boeing 767s and the ensuing fires. They were destroyed in
a planned, controlled demolition. The dust puffs you see on film are the
detonations of explosives planted there before the attacks.

People who believe the second explanation live in a very different
world from those who believe the first. In world No. 2, al-Qaeda is not
responsible for the destruction of the World Trade Center. The U.S. gov-
ernment is. The Pentagon was not hit by a commercial jet; it was hit by a
cruise missile. United Flight 93 did not crash after its occupants rushed
the cockpit; it was deliberately taken down by a U.S. Air Force fighter.
The entire catastrophe was planned and executed by federal officials in
order to provide the U.S. with a pretext for going to war in the Middle
East and, by extension, as a means of consolidating and extending the
power of the Bush Administration.⁵

Al-Qaeda was responsible for 9/11—that is a fact. It was an airplane
that flew into the Pentagon—that is a fact. Yet the conspiracy seemed to
live on in the face of the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013. One noted
theorist, Alex Jones, tied the two together.

In discussing the attacks on the marathon, he reminded his audience
that two of the hijacked planes on 9/11 had flown out of Boston. Further,
he suggested the bombing could be a response to the sudden drop in the
price of gold or part of a government plot to expand the Transportation
Security Administration's jurisdiction to include sporting events.⁶

Even a New Hampshire state representative claimed on a conservative
talk radio program that she was suspicious that the Boston bombing was
contrived because video footage from a victim who lost legs in the bomb-
ings did not show the person "screaming in agony."⁷

In addition to those who do not face reality are other Americans who
do not take an interest in anything outside of their little slice of life. Like the
detractors, they are unlikely to change. However, even if Americans are
motivated to keep informed, they are also overworked and busy. It is hard
enough to manage daily life, let alone keep up with the news generated
by respectable sources. In the day and age of television, many Americans
default to media outlets to tell them the news. News, as television outlets
present it, is not examined in any great depth. If it is not a quick blip, then

it seemingly will not hold Americans' attention. It is here where those who seek good ratings control information. Therefore, they report what they believe Americans want to watch. In turn, Americans watch what the media outlets provide. Since it is believed that Americans do not want to know about pressing world issues, they remain uninformed. The Ferris wheel goes round and round. Thus, whether or not a company should have released a Chia Head of President Obama becomes headline news.⁸ Lindsay Lohan, *The Bachelorette*, and the royal baby are more newsworthy.

Ben Venzke, a terrorism expert and frequent commentator on national security issues, laments the journalistic abandonment of Americans.

The average American has been abandoned. Journalism in this country has always held a privileged role and rightfully so. There was a reason why a newspaper had certain rights and privileges that do not exist for a comic book publisher or a Hollywood studio or the people that make soap. It was a sacred duty of the media to inform the public. Something now only conveniently bandied about when a catchy scandal is breaking and "news: organizations sue to get access to government documents or say Paris Hilton, Michael Jackson or the Runaway Bride have an upcoming court appearance and well, the ratings on streaming that live ..."⁹

American journalism continues on this path, perpetuating the cycle of ignorance.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) AND THE RESILIENT NETWORK

After the attack by al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001, the United States quickly planned to destroy its base of operations in Afghanistan. In December 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was in full swing. Anticipating that the United States would retaliate, many network members fled the country but some remained. Many were captured or killed. Others ultimately escaped, including Usama bin Laden and his second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Even after the destruction of its base of operations in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda reconfigured and proved amazingly adaptable to the changes taking place. Many members of the network who escaped from Afghanistan were able to disperse and settle in different countries and continue their operations. Because of the 9/11 attack, the spirit of global jihad was invigorated. Another superpower was cut off at the knees.

Al-Qaeda is not a group but an interconnected network. "Al-Qaeda's ability to establish and manage links to other affiliated terrorist groups and facilitation networks is a key indicator of its organizational health. These links help bolster its operational and propaganda reach."¹⁰ Generally speaking, the groups that identify as part of the network adopt the overall philosophy of its original founders and may or may not act on its behalf, and also pursue their own strategies, tactics, and goals, especially with regard to the governments they seek to overthrow. For the purposes of this book, groups that in some capacity identify, associate, or collaborate with the larger al-Qaeda network fall under the al-Qaeda umbrella.

After their dispersal from Afghanistan, Bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri, and their close circle became known as the core of al-Qaeda. They continued to guide and support the core of the original al-Qaeda. This core group reconstituted along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and was referred to by some as "al-Qaeda Central."¹¹ This reconstitution afforded it a smaller scale base, although less secure as in Afghanistan.¹²

The core, led by Bin Laden and his deputy al-Zawahiri, was capable of replenishing its leadership losses by promoting network members. The leadership focused on strategy and operational priorities and Bin Laden continued to inspire his followers.¹³ Thus, while the core commented, gave advice, and submitted and funded operations, the wider network was beyond its total control. Simply put, while a threatening core was still in place, the al-Qaeda network remained a loosely affiliated and decentralized network filled with many groups. In May 2011, Bin Laden (Figure 1.1a) was killed by U.S. forces, found hiding in a compound in Pakistan. Al-Zawahiri (Figure 1.1b) was named as his successor. This has not changed in any fundamental name the nature of the core as described. Individuals are captured or killed, but the core lives on reinventing itself with different players.

Those groups that already cooperated with al-Qaeda before 9/11 continue to do so. Many groups that only had a country or regional perspective formally joined with al-Qaeda to pursue attacks in the spirit of global jihad. This is not to suggest that they abandoned their country or regional focus, but that attacks were not just confined to elements of the state but broadened to include other symbolic targets, including the United States. In statements, groups that once seemed confined to their own narrow goals are speaking in more global terms. Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group in Pakistan, emerged to fight India in Jammu and Kashmir. Professor Hafeez Saeed, the leader of Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan, claimed his enemy list



(a)



(b)

Figure 1.1 (a) Usama bin Laden. (Courtesy of the U.S. Department of Defense.)
(b) Ayman al-Zawahiri. (Courtesy of the U.S. Department of Defense.)

extends beyond India to include other evil forces such as Israel and the United States.¹⁴ The group recruits, trains, and houses fighters going to Afghanistan and collaborates with al-Qaeda.¹⁵ Even Boko Haram, a group in Nigeria, asserted that the successes gained in Nigeria demonstrated the group is strong enough to take on the United States.¹⁶

Further, new groups were created and affiliated with the network, or existed and formally affiliated later. This was true of elements within the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and Islamic Group (IG).¹⁷ In another example, the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) is a long-standing group in Algeria, but then merged with the al-Qaeda network, thus taking on a broader mandate than just overthrowing the Algerian regime. The group subsequently changed its name to al-Qaeda Organization in the Lands of the Maghreb (AQIM) and expanded its operations in Africa, with notable impact in countries like Mali. AQIM is led by Abdelmalek Droukdel, otherwise known as Abu Musab Abdul Wadud.

The network is also constantly changing—alliances come and go, cooperation and affiliations change, groups disintegrate and new ones are created, and the names of the groups change. An example is al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), or the Islamic State of Iraq, which was a new group that only formed after the U.S. invasion in 2003. In 2013, the group reportedly changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant to reflect its broader goals in the region, notably Syria.¹⁸ Another example is the Taliban, which once allowed Bin Laden a place to set up and plan operations in Afghanistan. The relationship between Bin Laden and Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, was not without strain. However, this did not change the fact that Bin Laden had a dominant presence in the country. It is interesting that in 2008 the Taliban announced that foreigners were welcome in Afghanistan if they fought on behalf of the Taliban, not another group. This was as if to say, do not come to Afghanistan with another agenda. As Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahed put it, “All mujahideen who come to Afghanistan to fight have to accept the principles and rules and regulations of the Emirate. They can fight on the side of the Taliban but they cannot give orders.”¹⁹

Al-Qaeda’s operators in Yemen also announced that they merged with the Saudi contingent under the name al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and operated primarily out of Yemen where the state cannot control large areas of the country.²⁰ In fact, the several Saudi members were former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) detainees. In August 2013, the United States put out a worldwide threat alert and closed almost two dozen diplomatic missions after intercepting communications among al-Zawahiri, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and other key network individuals, where al-Zawahiri ordered an attack to be carried out. In counterterrorism circles, al-Wuhayshi was being referred as al-Qaeda’s “general manager”²¹ and in other press reports as

al-Zawahiri's deputy. Either way, the titles demonstrated a more intimate relationship between the leader of al-Qaeda and one of its most active and influential satellites. Al-Zawahiri needed to exhibit control and AQAP is one of the most sophisticated and active of the network groups. What better way to gain power than to formally integrate the leader of the group into his core?

In other areas of the world, al-Shabab emerged in Somalia and the Pakistani Taliban formed in the lawless frontiers of Pakistan, both claiming they will bring Sharia law to their respective countries. Al-Shabab announced its formal alliance with al-Qaeda in September 2013. Jabhat al-Nusra, which is operating in Syria, pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda in April 2013 amid a contentious relationship over the expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant into Syria. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Algerian native, who was a key operational leader for AQIM, reportedly left the group in 2013 due to internal conflicts, forming an affiliated group called the Khaled Abu al-Abbas Brigade.

THE ARAB SPRING AND THE AL-QAEDA FOOTHOLD

Clearly, network groups are thriving in failed, weak, or conflict-ridden states. For this reason, policy makers are paying close attention to countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria that were part of the so-called Arab Spring uprisings, but ultimately remain unstable. In these countries, protestors took to the streets, seeking the removal of their authoritarian leaders, yet there was no permanent political stabilization. These countries are a continuing cause for concern in that the ongoing instability provides an opportunity for extremist elements to gain a foothold.

In Egypt, for example, protests over the authoritarian nature of the regime led to the removal of existing president Hosni Mubarak and the holding of new elections in the spring of 2011. These elections brought to power the Muslim Brotherhood's Peace and Justice Party led by Muhammad Morsi. The Muslim Brotherhood was banned by Abdul Nasser in 1956 and remained so through Mubarak's reign. However, in Egypt the military continued to play a dominant role viewing itself as the caretaker of Egypt, resulting in Morsi's removal from power in July 2013, who they contended was not running an inclusive government. Egypt descended into chaos with supporters of Morsi taking to the streets and a subsequent military response resulting in the deaths of many. Al-Zawahiri

accused the Americanized military, crusaders, and secularists of conspiring with American and Gulf money to overthrow Morsi.²²

Events in Tunisia followed in an unfortunate similar pattern. The spark that ignited events in Tunisia, the country that set off revolutionary zeal in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, can be traced to the self-immolation of a Tunisian fruit-cart vendor named Muhammad Bouazizi at the end of 2010. Bouazizi's act was one of desperation over finding a job and indicative of the corruption rampant in Tunisia, led by President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.²³ Journalist Rania Abouzeid explained the situation that led to Bouazizi's self-immolation.

His livelihood was threatened when a policewoman confiscated his unlicensed vegetable cart and its goods. It wasn't the first time it had happened, but it would be the last. Not satisfied with accepting the 10-dinar fine that Bouazizi tried to pay (\$7, the equivalent of a good day's earnings), the policewoman allegedly slapped the scrawny young man, spat in his face and insulted his dead father.

Humiliated and dejected, Bouazizi, the breadwinner for his family of eight, went to the provincial headquarters, hoping to complain to local municipality officials, but they refused to see him. At 11:30 A.M., less than an hour after the confrontation with the policewoman and without telling his family, Bouazizi returned to the elegant double-storey white building with arched azure shutters, poured fuel over himself and set himself on fire. He did not die right away but lingered in the hospital till Jan. 4.²⁴

The outcry over his death sparked the resignation of the president's 23-year reign on January 14, bringing the moderate Islamist Ennahda party to power. But the Ennahda party is clashing with the countries secularist parties and opposition leaders were assassinated. Calls for the dissolution of the government are taking place. Extremist elements are added to the mix as the military continues to do battle with al-Qaeda affiliated groups.

Libya was another country caught up in the Arab Spring. The removal of the ruling dictator Muammar Gaddafi after a 42-year rule was facilitated by a NATO-led military intervention in 2011. The government is run by the Muslim Brotherhood's Justice and Construction Party, but just like in Egypt, is facing challenges by the opposition. Further, AQIM has a foothold in the country.

The Syrian Baathist regime, led by Bashir al-Assad, is engaged in efforts to quell the ongoing state of civil war since March 2011, which reportedly, to date, claimed over 100,000 lives.²⁵ Battles rage between the

Syrian regime and opposition forces, which is composed of many groups with different goals, including those that are democratic in nature. Among them are groups associated with al-Qaeda such as Jabhat al-Nusra, led by Abu Muhammad al-Julani, which came into play in late 2011.²⁶ Al-Nusra claims the goal is for a wider goal of a borderless Umma of Muslims. Many fighters of al-Nusra were drawn from Syrians who worked with the Zarqawi network in Iraq,²⁷ and who were now returning to fight in Syria. Al-Nusra purportedly resisted being enveloped by the Iraqi al-Qaeda group,²⁸ which sought to expand its influence in the country. The rift explained al-Nusra's decision to declare allegiance to al-Qaeda.

After 9/11, the United States and other countries were on a heightened state of alert and more proactive in their counterterrorism strategies. Around the world, many active plans were disrupted, and unfortunately many were not despite the best efforts of the United States and its partners and allies. Attacks continue to take place on a daily basis in a broad array of countries across the globe. The network continues to recruit and plot against its stated enemies. Without a doubt, the network is a serious national security threat to the United States. The reality is that the United States and other countries are spending a great deal of money to ensure the safety of citizens both at home and abroad. Law enforcement, intelligence, and a variety of other agencies work around the clock to disrupt the activities of those who would like nothing more than to kill their enemies. And still, the attacks continue.

COMBATING TERRORISM: U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVES

September 11, 2001, was a real wake-up call for the United States. Something needed to be done to compensate for the inability of the United States to stop the 9/11 attacks from happening in the first place. To complicate matters, there was not just one country or one leader, or even one place that could be pointed to when it came to al-Qaeda. The threat from the network comes from everywhere, even inside U.S. borders. Operation Enduring Freedom was the tip of the counterterrorism iceberg. Protecting the United States at home and abroad became an imminent concern of the George W. Bush Administration. Given the perception that something needed to be done, the United States pursued changes on many fronts. Unfortunately, U.S. counterterrorism efforts were hindered from being

fully effective given the ongoing issues of bureaucratic inertia and turf wars. Policies also evolved and changed, and some existing policies remain very controversial.

BUREAUCRATIC SOLUTIONS: DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS) AND OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (ODNI)

Post-9/11, two major initiatives were undertaken by the Bush Administration. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) were formed.

In October 2001, the Office of Homeland Security was created. It had a budget responsible for four policy initiatives: emergency preparedness and response; weapons of mass destruction countermeasures; border and transportation security; and information analysis and infrastructure protection.²⁹ In the summer of 2002, President George W. Bush announced the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the “National Strategy for Homeland Security.” DHS quickly brought together 22 government agencies and 170,000 employees, thus creating an entirely new organization focused on the homeland.³⁰ Homeland Security was eventually elevated to executive-level standing equivalent to the National Security Council.

The government also realized that the intelligence system was wrought with major difficulties especially with regard to intelligence sharing. A key recommendation from the 9/11 Commission Report was the need to solve this information-sharing problem.³¹ To address this serious issue, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was created. In its vision, the ODNI stated that it will be a “globally networked and integrated intelligence enterprise” and that its strategy was to “integrate foreign, military, and domestic intelligence capabilities through policy, personnel and technology actions to provide decision advantage to policy makers, operators, homeland security officials and law enforcement personnel.”³² ODNI was charged with the oversight of originally 16, now 17, different intelligence agencies, each with a different mission and capability.³³ Much to the chagrin of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the director of ODNI became the primary official that reported to the president. One of its priorities was to solve the reticent problem of intelligence sharing, where information is power. Intelligence sharing

was an issue not only between intelligence agencies, but also extended to and between law enforcement bodies.³⁴

Within the ODNI is the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), whose mission is to “lead our nation’s effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.”³⁵ Partner organizations include the Central Intelligence Agency; Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation; Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security; and other entities that provide unique expertise such as the Departments of Energy, Treasury, Agriculture, Transportation, and Health and Human Services, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the U.S. Capitol Hill Police. The NCTC also forged relationships with foreign partners.³⁶ Whether the creation of the DHS and ODNI was the best solution and whether they are effective remains the subject of debate.

THE PATRIOT ACT AND EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENT POWER

In addition to these initiatives, policies were enacted that are the subject of ongoing controversy. A few examples are mentioned in the following, beginning with the PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001), which was drafted in response to the 9/11 attacks. The PATRIOT Act was the Bush Administration’s effort to strengthen the domestic ability to fight domestic terrorism and bolster federal authorities with regard to intercepting communications, corruption of financial institutions, and border control.³⁷

There are differing views on the effectiveness and fairness of the PATRIOT Act. Some believe it has gone too far, while others not far enough.³⁸ In 2003, for example, the American Civil Liberties Union voiced their concerns about the ramifications of the act arguing that it treaded on fundamental freedoms by accessing tax records, books read, and secret home searches.³⁹ Those who counter this perspective see the PATRIOT Act as necessary and prudent to combat terrorism by removing the obstacles put in front of law enforcement and intelligence.⁴⁰ In 2011, President Barack Obama signed into law a renewal of the act for another four years,

citing that “it’s an important tool for us to continue dealing with an active terrorist threat.”⁴¹

THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) AND DOMESTIC SPYING FEARS

After 9/11, the National Security Agency (NSA) continued to collect valuable information. However, the agency became immersed in its own scandal when Americans learned the NSA was able to listen in on conversations that involved U.S. citizens. Government explanations were that the NSA was abiding by strict guidelines and that following links between those in the United States and terrorists abroad was crucial to the war on terrorism. Still, many Americans were outraged because of the implications regarding their civil liberties. As a newspaper account in May 2006 maintained, “The firestorm sparked by disclosure of the National Security Agency project mirrors a debate that dates to the nation’s founding, and before, over balancing the interests of the government with the rights of individuals.”⁴² Later in March 2008, another story on the NSA and its role in domestic intelligence efforts was published. The article argued that “the central role of the NSA has come to occupy in domestic intelligence gathering has never been publicly disclosed. But an inquiry reveals that its efforts have evolved to reach more broadly into data about people’s communication, travel, and finances in the United States than the domestic surveillance programs brought to light since the 2001 terrorist attacks.”⁴³

The NSA had a short reprieve from front-page news before another scandal exploded. In 2013, Edward Snowden, a defense contractor employee assigned to the NSA, revealed to the British newspaper *The Guardian* top-secret information on NSA “domestic spying” capabilities. Since the original story broke Snowden continued to release information. The NSA program, code named “Prism,” revealed the NSA capability to search e-mails, file transfers, and chats of U.S. citizens. Further exposed was a relationship forged between the government and Google, Facebook, Apple, and other companies to access their data.⁴⁴ Using the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) as its authority, the government can also carry out warrantless searches of communications. In one such instance, the government amassed the phone records of millions of

Verizon customers.⁴⁵ The Obama Administration defended this practice in the release of two white papers, and in particular, cited the PATRIOT Act.⁴⁶

As with any counterterrorism policy, critics and supporters lined up with views about the program. Detractors brought up the trampling of privacy, and the Orwellian nature of the program. Supporters claimed that the alarm, and the extent and nature of the power of the program was overblown. One thing was certain: the information Snowden revealed was highly damaging to the NSA, revealing sources and methods, and politically to the Obama Administration. The extent of the damage done by Snowden is not fully known. Forensic investigations revealed the great extent to which he tried to cover his digital footprint.⁴⁷

GOVERNMENT DETENTION AND GUANTANAMO

One of the outcomes of Operation Enduring Freedom was the establishment of the enemy combatant detention operation at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO).⁴⁸ The detainees were initially characterized as “unlawful enemy combatants” to be tried in military tribunals, not U.S. civilian courts. The challenge for criminal investigators was to gather legally admissible evidence and testimony. Intelligence agencies were also collecting intelligence that served their purposes of preventing future attacks. The courts also continued to grapple with what was legally permissible for a facility that was American, but located in Cuba. At first, the argument was that detainees would not be subject to federal courts. The Supreme Court disagreed and in 2008, *The Economist* noted that “the court recognised the inmates’ right to seek their freedom before a federal judge.” Yet, greater clarity is necessary. The court “did not pronounce on the legality of the military commissions the standard of proof required to be held in detention, the admissibility of evidence obtained under duress, and what access prisoners will have to secret information.”⁴⁹

Detainee charges of torture and mistreatment compounded legal issues. Not all were tortured, but there was evidence that some were. However, whether the allegations were legitimate, the mere suggestion of torture served to once again enhance anti-Americanism and feed into the network’s propaganda machine. GTMO is an ongoing public relations nightmare.

Unfortunately, all of these serious issues overshadowed what went right at GTMO. For instance, detainees at Guantanamo provided

information that contributed to the United States understanding of the al-Qaeda network and its leaders and members. Additionally, psychologists, who teamed with other medical professionals, had an unprecedented opportunity to assess detainee personalities and behavior and devise ways to question them based on an understanding of their culture.⁵⁰ Furthermore, due to the community nature of detention center, socialization dynamics were also studied and analyzed.

In January 2009, a new administration came to office under President Obama. His administration had its own ideas about how to prosecute the war on terror. In fact, the terms “Global War on Terror or the Long War” were no longer acceptable. Rather, the administration preferred the term “Overseas Contingency Operation.”⁵¹ One of President Obama’s first acts was to issue an Executive Order to close GTMO within a year.⁵² Similar calls were made in 2013, four years later. Yet, GTMO remains open and functioning, seemingly still a political hot potato for the president, including a hunger strike and the resultant force feeding of prisoners. Tribunals were halted and then started again. Many detainees have gone back to their homes in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. As of yet, the problem of where over 150 detainees would go is not solved. In May 2013, President Obama lifted a moratorium on releasing detainees back to Yemen and said they would be reviewed on a “case-by case-basis.”⁵³ Chinese Uighurs held at the facility were not transferred back to prison, but some to Palau for a tune of \$200 million and others to Bermuda for an undisclosed amount of money.⁵⁴ The ability of the Yemeni and other governments to ensure there will not be recidivism on the part of detainees remains an important concern. Further, as already mentioned, several Saudi detainees went straight back to terrorism, planning further attacks against the United States. In fact, the ODNI claims the recidivism rate of detainees is 27.0 percent.⁵⁵ Finally, the cost of running GTMO is said to be over \$2 million per prisoner per year.⁵⁶

BEWARE OF THE BUZZING DRONES

Another counterterrorism program is using drones in the targeted killing of terrorists. In 2002, in a highly publicized case, a predator drone launched a Hellfire missile at a car traveling in Yemen, allegedly carrying six al-Qaeda members. Among them was U.S. citizen Kamal Derwish. Subsequent drone attacks abroad claimed the lives of U.S. citizens, adding

fuel to an already controversial counterterrorism tactic. Both the Bush and Obama administrations defended the use of targeted killings via the drone program and in fact, under the Obama Administration, operations were ramped up. The Obama Administration released a 16-page legal memorandum outlining when this tactic can be used against a U.S. citizen in a foreign country.⁵⁷ The ground rules for using the tactic include:

- The determination by an “informed, high-level official of the U.S.” that the “targeted individual poses an imminent threat to the U.S.”
- Capture is not feasible and if such an operation poses “undue risk” to U.S. forces.
- The use of force is “consistent” with “fundamental principles” of international law regarding the use of force.

Not only is this a controversial program for the aforementioned reasons, but it also raises questions about sovereignty in countries where the United States operates and carries out attacks. While considered successful in wiping out certain individuals on the target list, the impact of drones on the psychology of the population also has far-reaching implications. A 2012 comprehensive study titled “Living Under Drones,”⁵⁸ chronicled the impact on the population in Pakistan where the drone program is widely used. The authors maintain that drones “hover” over the northwest region 24 hours per day and without warning hitting homes, vehicles, and public spaces, terrorizing residents and inflicting trauma. Those living in the community feel they are unable to protect themselves. Doctors and mental health workers point to the preponderance of depression, anxiety, and other mental health issues. Beyond mental health issues, the strikes have serious cultural, social, and economic impacts. The authors further explain that

the US practice of striking one area multiple times, and evidence that it has killed rescuers, makes both community members and humanitarian workers afraid or unwilling to assist injured victims. Some community members shy away from gathering in groups, including important tribal dispute-resolution bodies, out of fear that they may attract the attention of drone operators. Some parents choose to keep their children home, and children injured or traumatized by strikes have dropped out of school. Waziris told our researchers that the strikes have undermined cultural and religious practices related to burial, and made family members

afraid to attend funerals. In addition, families who lost loved ones or their homes in drone strikes now struggle to support themselves.⁵⁹

Further, of the thousands of strikes carried out in Pakistan, there are a great number of civilian casualties, including children. Counterterrorism officials need to consider that drone attacks can and will lead to further radicalization of the population and, in fact, breed more anti-Americanism, not less. Another concern brought about in homeland security circles is that the practice could be turned on the United States by adversarial countries because of the technological proliferation and murky U.S. laws that form the basis for justifying the targeting killing program.⁶⁰

THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The United States simply cannot tackle terrorism alone. The network is global. After 9/11, the United States stepped up cooperation such as information sharing and joint training and material support to its partners and allies. This is exceedingly important to the country for several reasons. First, providing aid to vulnerable countries such as Pakistan is a step toward stomping out al-Qaeda and stabilizing the country. Second, supporting efforts abroad, which continue to disrupt the network's activities, benefits the United States and its partners. Plans hatched in one country can be used in an attack on another. Collaborating with allies and partners comes in many forms such as training, exchanging of information, sharing of collection capabilities, and joint operations.⁶¹

The United States has many fruitful relationships with foreign partners and allies. Key among them is an intelligence sharing history and trust with Great Britain. When it comes to counterterrorism, the British provide information that thwarted plots or aids in investigations. Further, when it comes to communication spying, GCHQ, Britain's NSA equivalent, has a somewhat symbiotic association with the United States. Documents revealed by Snowden point to a relationship influenced by U.S. government money and NSA demands for information, although there is some reciprocation because of Britain's collection capabilities. The United States also shares its technical knowledge and intelligence information with Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.⁶²

But disagreements with European allies over U.S. policies do take place. The use of rendition by the United States caused significant

problems in 2003 when the CIA kidnapped an Italian citizen, bringing him to a third country for interrogation. As a result, an Italian magistrate formally indicted and convicted over a dozen CIA agents.

Other relationships are more strained. For example, a key relationship in U.S. counterterrorism efforts is Pakistan, where militants live, train, recruit, plan, and carry out terror attacks, not only in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but worldwide against the United States, its partners, and allies. After 9/11, "given Pakistan's geo-strategic position, its strong linkages with the Taliban, and the presence of dozens of armed militant groups in the country, it was called upon to play an 'important role' in destroying the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine—a situational turnaround in U.S.–Pakistani relations from what prevailed through the 1990s."⁶³ Since this pledge, however, the actions of Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISID) left much to be desired. Links between ISID, the Taliban, and other militant groups were exposed, including evidence that ISID was providing sanctuary to Taliban fighters, leading to the deterioration of relationships between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Pakistan and the United States. Al-Qaeda members continue to find sanctuary there too, the regime unable to control vast areas of land governed by tribes. The inability to find Usama bin Laden and other key al-Qaeda members was a major sticking point. If there were ever a nail in the coffin regarding the U.S.–Pakistani it was when Bin Laden was found hiding in a compound in Pakistan. It confirmed what many counterterrorism officials suspected all along and those are the same officials that continually pressed Pakistan to engage in a transparent relationship focused on truly breaking al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Instead, the Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban continue to grow in strength, other militant Pakistani groups step up their efforts against countries such as India and against Shia Pakistani citizens, and the overall security situation in Pakistan continues to deteriorate. To be sure, Pakistan's counterterrorism approach is complex, balancing on multiple fronts to serve the country's interests. Pakistani commentator and writer Ayesha Siddiqi notes that Pakistan's counterterrorism strategy is wrought with contradictions because it is "caught between an inclination to fight militant forces and yet having to partner with some to strengthen its future bargaining position."⁶⁴ She maintains that Pakistan's unclear policy and objectives is born from its several strategic requirements including "its need to remain engaged with the United States, to save itself from the Taliban attacking the Pakistani state, and to fight India's growing presence in Afghanistan."⁶⁵

The approach is a military one, rather than delving into the difficult program of solving the socioeconomic crisis driving terrorism.⁶⁶ One thing is for certain: the survival of the Pakistani regime is paramount given that it is a nuclear state.

The United States also has a history of strained relations with Russians over many policy issues. This did not change coming out of the Cold War. In 2013, Snowden asked and was granted temporary asylum in Russia, on the heels of a visit to Russia by Obama, which the president subsequently cancelled. Further, in the wake of the Boston Marathon bombings, the FBI claimed it asked for further information from Russia on Tamerlan Tsarnaev, one of the bombers, but did not receive it. In addition, U.S. authorities did not share information internally with regard to information being gleaned from their Russian counterparts, pointing to the ongoing issue of intelligence cooperation within the U.S. government.⁶⁷ What is certain is that the Russians have a lot of counterterrorism experience and information to share, especially because of their knowledge of Chechnya and terrorist groups in Central Asia and areas around the world where they have growing interests.

As some of the aforementioned examples indicate, it is important that the United States not bully our allies and partners, or act unilaterally and then ask for forgiveness later. Even Great Britain, a strong ally, raised concerns about the relationship, citing fears that it could not keep up with U.S. demands with regard to technical intelligence collection.⁶⁸ Fruitful cooperation means that it may be necessary to concede to other ways of doing things for the greater good.

INTELLIGENCE LEAKS

There is an unfortunate inability in the United States to secure the most sensitive of intelligence information. When leaked, the fallout for the United States, its partners, and allies is great. The existence of WikiLeaks and the information it exposes about countries around the world is a case in point. In August 2013, Bradley Manning, an Army private, was sentenced to 35 years for his role in leaking classified information to WikiLeaks. Further, the continual leaking of information to the press from policy makers and current and ex-intelligence officers is a serious threat to intelligence sources and methods. The damage done to the National Security Agency (NSA) by Edward Snowden is irreparable.

CEDING GROUND TO TERRORISTS

There is some evidence to suggest that countries may be conceding ground to terrorists, resulting in the ability of the groups to continue activities and win on the propaganda front. Concessions occur because network affiliates promulgate fear and intimidation, and countries bend to them because they fear they are going to be the next target.

The 2004 Madrid bombings were one such example. In this attack, bombs were set off on commuter trains killing 191 and wounding more than 1,800. According to the perpetrators from the affiliate Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (MICG), the reason behind the attacks was that Spain was collaborating with the United States in Iraq. Spain subsequently held already scheduled elections, and the current party in charge was defeated. The next prime minister announced he was withdrawing Spanish troops from Iraq.⁶⁹ In turn, the network took credit for influencing the outcome of elections in Spain. This was another coup for al-Qaeda's propaganda machine. There are significant problems with these types of concessionary responses because it demonstrates that through threat, the network can bring others into submission.

There is a strong presence of al-Qaeda networks in Europe⁷⁰ and this type of infiltration has not plagued the United States, but there are lessons to be learned especially in light of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. Countries in Europe are for the most part stable and democratic, and because of this, they gave political asylum and citizenship to many terrorists running from their own countries. These extremists set up camp and broadened their network, taking advantage of lax laws and political will, and government welfare, while blatantly claiming that they desired to overthrow the existing democratic government. And in turn, the governments seem to bend over backward to accommodate these terrorists who are plotting against them.

One example of this accommodation is the case of Egyptian born Abu Hamza al-Masri who operated out of London's North London Central Mosque (Finsbury Park Mosque), situated in the mainly Bangladeshi community. Al-Masri was notorious for his sermons promulgating anti-Western views and for his contribution to al-Qaeda recruitment on British soil. While carrying on his activities, he and his family collected welfare. In this case, terrorism was committed at the expense of British taxpayers.

The story of al-Masri begins at the North Central Mosque, which was constructed with the funds of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. In the 1990s,

the climate changed at the mosque, having been overtaken by militant extremists. "At this stage a mediator appearing in the unlikely form of one Abu Hamza, an Egyptian-born former engineering student and nightclub bouncer, who had lost an eye and an arm in Afghanistan and sported a hook instead of a hand, and who was henceforth allowed to preach at the mosque."⁷¹ As time progressed, al-Masri would become one of the most notorious promulgators of terrorism in Europe, with links to plots such as the *USS Cole* in Yemen. His "Supporters of Shariah" Web site served as propaganda for the Armed Islamic Group⁷² operating in Europe. His mosque put up notorious terrorists such as Richard Reid, the "shoe bomber"; Ahmed Ressam, the Millennium bomber; and the 9/11 hijacker imprisoned before the attack, Zacarias Moussaoui, among others.⁷³ And despite all of this, it was not until 2003 that authorities finally stormed the Finsbury Mosque because of an investigation into a ricin poisoning plot. "Critics say that Abu Hamza's arrest came too late, and that the British government's tolerance of his activities and rhetoric exemplified a naïve leniency toward Islamic radicals."⁷⁴ Previous attempts to evict him from the mosque resulted in violence.⁷⁵

In several other notable cases, clerics were receiving government benefits while simultaneously calling for the destruction of Great Britain. These included Omar Bakri, leader of al-Muhajiroun in London; and Sayful Islam, leader of al-Muhajiroun in Luton, among others.⁷⁶ This issue was recently brought to bear even in the United States in the wake of the Boston Marathon bombings whereby the Tsarnaev family received welfare benefits totaling more than \$100,000 between 2002 and 2012.⁷⁷

There are two parallel societies: one democratic and the other run by terrorists. Integration has never been achieved, nor will it be. The terrorists do not recognize Western law and function by their own set of rules based on Shariah law (Islamic law) based on their interpretation of the Koran and the Hadiths. These rules include taking part in activities such as the maiming and murder of women. When confronting spousal abuse, police likely believe they are intruding on cultural phenomenon, and therefore, they do not have the right to intervene.⁷⁸ Actions such as these violate the prevailing laws no matter what culture individuals embrace.

Those who speak out against terrorists do so at their own peril. A case in Denmark illustrates this fact. Theo Van Gogh was a Dutch filmmaker and newspaper columnist who, with a woman named Hirsi Ali, put together a short film about the mistreatment of women in Islamic cultures. In 2004, he was gunned down by Muhammad Bouyeri, a Dutch-born

Moroccan who was a member of a radical Muslim network. Hirsi Ali was a Somali-born Dutch citizen who at that time was a member of Dutch Parliament. She faced ongoing threats against her life because she spoke out against the treatment of women. The Dutch government claimed that it could not protect her. She ultimately fled to the United States.⁷⁹ Another example is Tawfiq Hamid, a former member of the Islamic Group (IG) in Egypt. He was also forced to leave a Western country because of threats from terrorists. His crime—he spoke out against radical Islam.⁸⁰

The French, it seems, were the exception to the rule when it came to hardline counterterrorism policies. As French official Lorenzo Vidino put it:

This is considered by some to be an attack on the liberty of individuals and I agree totally. But it stops the bombs. There has to be a balance between individual liberty on the one hand and the efficiency of the system to protect the public on the other. In an ideal world, I would choose the first, but this is not an ideal world, and when dealing with Islamic extremists we have to be brutal sometimes.⁸¹

Earlier, it was pointed out that returning GTMO detainees to their home countries was a cause of concern because of the potential for recidivism. In France, they were detained and charged. This is in contrast to other European countries. For instance, the Swedish government helped a detainee sue the United States for his detention and the British welcomed their detainees back with open arms.⁸²

Several countries have approached terrorists in another way—the bags of cash approach. In other words, countries pay individuals to gain support for their initiatives against terrorists or to stop terrorists from engaging in terrorist activity. For instance, in an effort to broker a peace deal, the Pakistani government paid over \$800,000 to four tribal leaders working against the government in its effort to hunt foreign fighters in Waziristan.⁸³ In another example, Qatar's emir until June 2013, Shaykh Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Thani, was rumored to pay protection money to al-Qaeda to stave off attacks in the country.

The real lesson from all of this is that governments that accommodate terrorists are actually contributing to greater instability later on. Appeasing terrorists by allowing them to grow inside borders or buy temporary loyalty is a failed approach. The outcome is instability and death. Those who are victims of terrorism are at the wrong place at the wrong time. The al-Qaeda network gives no warnings and is not concerned with killing civilians. Before an attack, groups that carry a vitriolic

hatred of the West are not going to stop and interview potential victims to ask if they supported letting them violate Western law and agreed with the country's method of appeasement. They will not ask whether victims defended them in Guantanamo Bay or protested against the creation of the facility. They are not going to ask if they protested against globalization in Seattle or support liberal causes. No matter who individuals are or what they believe, al-Qaeda views all who do not subscribe to its way of thinking as *kuffar* (infidels). And infidels are to be killed.

To this end, the al-Qaeda network dehumanizes its enemies. This means that al-Qaeda views its enemies as subhuman and will do what is necessary to wipe them off the face of the earth. Al-Qaeda envisions a world populated and run by al-Qaeda. That al-Qaeda can somehow be reasoned with is extremely naïve because it knows no common ground. Changing the name of the U.S. approach to Overseas Contingency Operation is fruitless because the bottom line is that the United States is in a war with terrorist groups, and no matter what the country does, it will be hated for its activities abroad.⁸⁴ For example, the much-heralded negotiations with Taliban affiliates in the tribal areas of Pakistan known as the Swat Valley let Islamic law be established there in exchange for an end to hostilities. The outcome was good for the Taliban and not Pakistan. Thus, "Instead, Swat has become a major militant base since the accord was struck in February [2009], and Pakistani officials estimate there are now 8,000 militants in the valley."⁸⁵ The Taliban operating in Afghanistan repeatedly stated that it will not stop until an extreme form of Islamic law is established. Why would anyone think that negotiations could permanently solve the issue? Furthermore, even if the Taliban claimed it is willing to negotiate, it does so if it results in getting closer to dominating Afghanistan. The perspective that militant Islam does not compromise was illustrated with the following account written by oft-quoted Egyptian Sayyid Qutb,⁸⁶ a revered symbol of terrorists:

It is not the function of Islam to compromise with the concepts of jahiliyya⁸⁷ which are current in the world or to coexist in the same land together with a jahili system. This was not the case when it first appeared in the world, nor will it be today or in the future. Jahiliyya to whatever period it belongs, is jahiliyya; that is, deviation from the worship of One Allah and the way of life prescribed by Allah.⁸⁸

No matter how much the world desires to see al-Qaeda network members as crazy, they are not. They adapt, they grow, and they try to outsmart

us. At the end of 2009, tragedy struck the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when seven officers were killed by a suicide bomber at Forward Operating Base Chapman. The bomber was given access seemingly with the belief that he was a source of information. U.S. and coalition forces know all too well that men that stood by them in the Afghani Army later turned against them in suicide attacks. Terrorists know what they want and are bent on achieving it. We need to run ahead, not behind, to break the network.

CHALLENGING THE BUREAUCRACY

The counterterrorism measures that were highlighted and adopted by the United States contributed to managing the threat. The United States has made great strides since 9/11, but unfortunately, many of these measures were wrought with significant problems. For example, one needs only to sit down and talk with individuals in the counterterrorism business from various agencies, and they can still provide examples regarding the lack of information sharing.⁸⁹ This was pointed out again in the earlier discussion of the Boston Marathon bombings. If counterterrorism initiatives are to succeed, of which interagency cooperation is a central part, then policy makers need to take a serious look at the problems inherent in their own government agencies. Even though political appointees in charge of agencies interact with heads of other agencies, and in turn proclamations of cooperation are issued, the reality is that cooperation requires that their own bureaucracies fall into place. And sometimes they just don't. Leaders come and go, but bureaucrats are entrenched. A good example was in the Pentagon where many admitted that they were just biding their time before Donald Rumsfeld left.⁹⁰

Many bureaucrats seem to ignore what they are told even when they are directed to cooperate. Their organization, their position in it, and their selfish pursuit of the limelight are more important than sharing with others for a greater purpose. Furthermore, simply cobbling together agencies does not necessarily lead to automatic cooperation and information sharing. This is because individuals are assigned to a foreign entity and can still have loyalty to their own agencies. In other words, they are not fully vested in their assigned agency. For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation retain their own counterterrorism centers despite the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center.

Access to other agencies' databases does not mean unbridled access to their information. Agencies do share information, but bureaucrats can still use their own discretion when withholding knowledge they deem too sensitive or want to covet.⁹¹ In addition, a lot of information does not make it into the reporting system from those who have a wealth of knowledge from a variety of experiences and sources. Ultimately, "knowledge is power" is still alive and well. To be fair, many do not want to share due to the issue of leaks. Security is another area where the United States needs significant improvement.

Further, while the operating environment of intelligence agencies is foreign, and for law enforcement it is domestic, the lines are often blurred. The interconnectivity of the network demonstrates that foreign and domestic information on terrorism is often intertwined. As 9/11 illustrated, plots hatched overseas were implemented in the homeland. Every agency dealing with counterterrorism must work together to ensure that everyone is informed.

The government cannot continue to do business this way. To get agencies to cooperate, cultures need to be broken. Those who refuse to cooperate, including senior and middle managers within the organization, simply have to move on. Given that government is a place where almost no one is fired, incompetence runs amok.

The United States should be ashamed that all these years after 9/11, agencies still suffer from bureaucratic inertia and conflict. What is even more exasperating is that they do so at the expense of U.S. national security.

INFORMATIONAL STRATEGIES

Another way to combat terrorism is through the use of information to influence the behavior of others—to win "hearts and minds." To this end, truthful information is used in an overt fashion. This is often referred to as the "white world" of influence. In the United States, this effort is called public diplomacy. Public diplomacy "addresses ongoing questions of a nation's image and credibility in the world, as well as tracks, monitors, and builds upon the government and nongovernmental contracts, transactions, and influences that shape the opinions, attitudes and behaviors of global politics."⁹² U.S. public diplomacy was a key component to fighting the Cold War against the Soviets, but dissipated during the Clinton Administration due to a new focus on "commercial engagement and

markets.”⁹³ After 9/11, U.S. diplomacy became an imperative part of winning the “war on terrorism,” and likely even more important than in the Cold War where the playing field seemed more clearly defined.

A 2007 document, the “U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication,” laid out the Bush Administration’s public diplomacy strategy as one of promoting democracy and battling extremists:

- I. America must offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is rooted in our most basic values.
- II. With our partners, we seek to isolate and marginalize violent extremists who threaten the freedom and peace sought by civilized people of every nation, culture and faith. We can achieve this goal by:
 - Promoting democratization and good governance as a path to a positive future, in secure and pluralistic societies
 - Actively engaging Muslim communities and amplifying mainstream Muslim voices
 - Isolating and discrediting terrorist leaders, facilitators, and organizations
 - De-legitimizing terror as an acceptable tactic to achieve political ends; and
 - Demonstrating that the West is open to all religions and is not in conflict with any faith.
- III. America must work to nurture common interests and values between Americans and peoples of different countries, cultures, and faiths across the world.⁹⁴

These were meant to be a guide for others engaged in their dealings such as direct communication, public statements, and so forth. As is natural in any transition, the Obama Administration laid out its own strategy and views.

For example, based on the desires of the White House, the State Department is responsible for U.S. public diplomacy efforts under the leadership of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Currently,

The mission of American public diplomacy is to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and Government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world.⁹⁵

On September 9, 2011, the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) was created “to coordinate, orient, and inform government-wide foreign communications activities targeted against terrorism and violent extremism, particularly al-Qaida and its affiliates and adherents.”⁹⁶

The most recent document on public diplomacy is found in the 2012 release of “Public Diplomacy Strengthening U.S. Engagement in the World: A Strategic Approach for the 21st Century.” The document begins with the mission statement noted earlier. With regard to “competing influences,” extremists are considered important in that they “have developed sophisticated media strategies and are increasingly adept at shaping the narrative and recruiting new followers.”⁹⁷ Further, “combating violent extremism” is among a series of “complex global challenge.”⁹⁸ The “strategic imperatives” include the following:⁹⁹

- Shape the narrative
- Expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships
- Combat violent extremism
- Better inform policy-making
- Deploy resources in line with current priorities

Furthermore, the “tactics” involved to achieve the strategic imperatives with regard to combating violent extremism are to “rapidly respond to extremist messages; proactively shape the narrative that has allowed extremists to disseminate misinformation and recruit new followers” and “empower credible voices within societies to undermine violent extremists’ messages.”¹⁰⁰ With regard to the former, the administration is looking to counter misinformation through new and traditional media. More specifically, they will,

aggressively harness new and traditional media to communicate U.S. perspectives and counter misinformation. Develop targeted media engagement plans in key geographies allowing for quick response to those who speak for al Qaeda; expand the role of media hubs and enhance their role as digital engagement centers to play a larger role in regional dialogues; bolster International Information Program’s capabilities to leverage media platforms for participating in new conversation spaces and disseminating information.¹⁰¹

The latter focuses on tools, platforms, and leveraging relationships. These are described in more detail as:

Provide tools and platforms for independent voices to expand their reach. Facilitate linkages between post contacts to create stronger civil society networks to advocate more effectively; provide access and training in social media to create broader platforms for local voices; equip post contacts with useful information and resources to deepen their impact.

Leverage partnerships to train religious and secular leaders with local influence in issues of development, health, and education. Expand programs to work with local leaders to equip them with relevant skills and knowledge for strengthening their communities, expanding economic opportunity, and improving living conditions. Enhance the capacity of participating leaders to: share information on critical topics with members of the communities they serve; act as conduits for relaying community needs and expectations; serve as catalysts for activities in their own communities.¹⁰²

Public diplomacy is obviously essential for any country, and with regard to counterterrorism, the public diplomacy effort lays out some lofty goals. However, problems are still inherent in the world of truthful information with different messages coming from all parts of the government, and while one body presumes to give some a voice, the actions of other parts of the government complicate or contradict that message.

Thus, all the while, anti-Americanism is getting worse. Those skilled in the psychology of influence argue that to be effective the source of the message must have standing. In other words, it does no good to have a well-crafted message if the source is not credible. The United States does not have standing with the Muslim world, and this albatross will continue to sit comfortably on the back of the country. An example of this is an effort implemented by the European Combatant Command (EUCOM)¹⁰³ that launched a Web site that talked about the positive aspects of Africa. The Web site had great information, but it also had an undeniable U.S. footprint and therefore the credibility factor was lacking.

There is also hypocrisy in the U.S. message. In 2005, for example, there was widespread media reporting that the U.S. military was paying for pro-American newspaper, radio, and television reports in the Iraqi press.¹⁰⁴ Unfortunately, this blatantly contradicted to the U.S. principle of democracy called freedom of the press. Other contradictions are readily apparent. The United States rails against other countries such as China and Russia for their role in cyber attacks, yet played a part in Stuxnet, a hacking operation against the Iranian government. Another instructive example is past support by the United States of

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who was known for his repressive ways. Why? If free and fair elections were held, the likely outcome was that the Muslim Brotherhood would come to power. The United States ultimately chose dictatorships over democracies, while simultaneously claiming to stand for democracy. After the Egyptian uprising against Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood did indeed come to power in 2011.¹⁰⁵ Then the United States decided not to support Mubarak yet could not fully get behind the Muslim Brotherhood. Once Morsi was removed by the military, the administration criticized both the military for removing Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood for attacking Christians. There was no clear picture of what the United States stood for. Finally, in the last example, the admitted and justified use of torture of detainees by the United States demonstrates the inconsistency between U.S. values of freedom, democracy, and human rights.

There is a further issue, one that continues to plague the United States: conflicting messages from the government. Chemical weapons were used in Syria against citizens in late August 2013. As noted earlier, the country is embroiled in a civil war, with many factions vying for influence, including those tied to al-Qaeda. After the attack, and in the midst of thinking about a response, already noting that the use of chemical weapons was a “redline” for intervention, President Obama “concluded” that the regime was the perpetrator. Yet, the intelligence community indicated it was not so sure and that questions still remained. The attacks could not definitely be tied to President Assad or his officials. Another scenario could be that “rogue” elements in the regime were responsible.¹⁰⁶ The State Department also could not provide a definitive answer although stated Assad was ultimately responsible for their use.¹⁰⁷

INFORMATIONAL INFLUENCE

Although using information to try to influence the behavior of others is nothing new, there is another type of deceptive influence that is used as opposed to truthful influence as outlined in public diplomacy plans. Sometimes trying to influence others with completely truthful information or activities so public that they are exposed as hypocritical is not the most effective way to combat terrorists. Instead, other creative and deceptive uses of information are necessary. These black world practices are part of intelligence operations known as “covert action.”

The approach advocated in this book, herein called “informational influence,” technically falls into this black world and is therefore markedly different from public diplomacy. Furthermore, the informational influence campaign is different from others in that, to succeed, it needs to be proactive, broad, and sustained. The informational campaign must also be driven by careful planning and consideration, and put together by those with a bit of deviousness and above all creativity.

The informational influence campaign has three main aspects: individuals, groups, and relationships between groups. Knowledge of psychology is necessary to understand the basis for how individuals, groups, and the relationships between groups function.¹⁰⁸ These three main aspects (Figure 1.2) are referred to as the breaking points of the network. For an information influence campaign to be effective, all the breaking points need to be simultaneously targeted. However, each of these breaking points has its own set of fissures, and exploiting them is central to dismantling the network. Specifically, this comprehensive informational influence campaign uses the operational tool of black propaganda to influence these fissures. Furthermore, psychology also contributes to the understanding of effective influence techniques that can also be used against terrorist groups.




Figure 1.2 Breaking points.

In addressing the breaking points—individuals, groups, and inter-group relations—examples are used to demonstrate the exploitation of the fissures found in these three breaking points. The examples provided are not meant to be specific guidance to others with regard to the exploitation of fissures. These are merely used for illustration purposes only and denote what may be possible in an influence campaign. In addition, the reality is that the network changes, including the nature of cooperation and the names of groups. Thus, while certain groups are mentioned, they may have already become outdated.

Effectively breaking al-Qaeda with an informational influence campaign requires that the United States use unsettling types of activities that may not sit well with some. However, the country needs to fight on the same level as al-Qaeda; that is, in the mud. The United States has to be on the same level as the network because it knows no bounds. Where national security is at stake, there is no room for those who say it just can't be done or it is just too hard.

Because information influence operates in the black world, utmost secrecy is required. Therefore, it cannot be carried out under the scrutiny of the public. Going public with classified strategies does not make sense. It will inform the enemy of intentions and actions. Take, for example, a newspaper story run in April 2009, which addressed U.S. operations against the Taliban:

The Obama Administration is starting a broad effort in Pakistan and Afghanistan to prevent the Taliban from using radio stations and Web sites to intimidate civilians and plan attacks, according to senior U.S. officials. As part of the classified effort, American military and intelligence personnel are working to jam the unlicensed radio stations in Pakistan's lawless regions on the Afghanistan border that Taliban fighters use to broadcast threats and decrees. U.S. personnel are also trying to block the Pakistani chat rooms and Web sites that are part of the country's burgeoning extremist underground. The Web sites frequently contain videos of attacks and inflammatory religious material that attempts to justify acts of violence.¹⁰⁹

This characterization of U.S. operations was well articulated, but that is not the point here. This article informed the Taliban of ongoing and admittedly classified operations. Is it honestly the perspective that informing the enemy is a good thing or that somehow because they are terrorists they do not have access to information, particularly about U.S. activities against them? Was the need for accolades so important that they took precedence over secrecy?

It is time to go full force after the network, not wait for the network to attack. The United States is stuck in a pattern of preventing the next attack, and significant time and energy is not being put in place to put the network on the defensive. The United States is too reactive in its dealings with al-Qaeda. Consequently, the United States is perceived as much too passive, and this only serves to further embolden the network.

The CIA is best equipped to take the lead on an informational influence campaign. CIA operators are the action force of the agency responsible for planning and implementing covert operations. But to succeed, the CIA must have cooperation from other agencies engaged in counterterrorism that may have to provide assistance. The CIA also needs current and accurate information from not only the intelligence machine but also from the different agencies that focus on counterterrorism. This job also cannot be done without significant guidance from those who have the creativity, experience, and understanding of covert operations.¹¹⁰ Yet to be successful the CIA is in need of reform. Internal reports criticized the agency's leadership for being poor managers, with lack of accountability for it, leaving to a brain drain of the best and brightest.¹¹¹ Other criticisms levied against CIA bosses were lack of communication and risk taking.¹¹²

Furthermore, to be truly effective, the CIA needs a significant bolstering of resources for intelligence collection and operations. In the face of this are budget cuts and the glaring problem of waste and duplication. All agencies distribute money to their various bodies, which are earmarked for certain tasks. After 9/11 a substantial amount of money was available for those engaged in counterterrorism efforts. It was not hard for these agencies and the bodies within them, which were not doing anything related to counterterrorism, to now claim they too did counterterrorism. For many, it was not about the mission but competition for resources. In addition, everyone wanted to be in the game because terrorism was a visible hot topic. The result was that there was (and is) so much duplication across agencies with regard to counterterrorism. To make matters worse, there still is an enormous amount of money being spent on studies by contractors, academics, and others. This invites more duplication because these frequently are not shared with all government bodies. Contractors and think tanks are also happy to churn out studies on subjects that at times analysts have already covered on a classified level because others, unaware of the classified studies, contracted them. And finally, and worst of all, agencies need to spend all their money by the end of the fiscal year because they are afraid of budget cuts the following year. The

solution right before the fiscal year ends is to spend the remaining money on tasks that were not important in the first place. The bottom line is that the United States has to refocus its counterterrorism resources on its most important tasks and stop unnecessarily wasting taxpayer money on fruitless endeavors. It is time to close the counterterrorism skive. There is no excuse for why the CIA does not have the resources available to do its job. This must change.

Most important, it is essential the CIA be given the mandate to act. At times, operators are unfortunately subordinate to policy makers who are risk adverse or those who do not fundamentally understand the intelligence community and what it takes to break the network.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Going forward, this book is about informational influence and exploiting fissures evident in the three breaking points. To that end, Chapter 2 gives an overview of the evolution of the threat and argues that the inability to stop 9/11 and the current threat posed by the al-Qaeda network does not make sense unless it is put into historical context. In this discussion, the interconnectedness of the network is evident. Usama bin Laden's statements warned the United States of the attacks to come. Ultimately, it is clear that the network continues to threaten U.S. national security.

Chapter 3 argues that in order to effectively plan an informational influence campaign against the network, the mentality of those in the network needs to be fully understood. This involves understanding their mental state, motivation, demographics, how they define and perceive their enemies, and the tactics the network uses to manage the perceptions of recruits, members, and passive supporters. Furthermore, determining what venues information is being disseminated and shared is necessary because during an information campaign products are developed that not only have to be realistic with regard to tone, style, language, dialect, and themes, but also need to be placed in frequently used and realistic venues. Also, any information disseminated as part of an information campaign against these terrorists needs to feed into the beliefs of the target. Existing translations were used for the documents provided and they were left in their original form, including word choice, grammar, and punctuation.

Chapter 4 first addresses information collection and analysis, and then provides an overview of the business of informational influence.

Here the focus is on how the United States gets information for the information campaign and the actors in the influence game. Next, how to influence is addressed. There are several psychological influence techniques such as consistency, social proof, likeability, scarcity, and authority. Many other authors who write about influence essentially mentioned the same basic principles, although they may call them different names or use them in different contexts. The psychological literature on influence only provides half of the puzzle. Therefore, this literature is blended with widely used operational techniques, in particular black propaganda, an element of covert action.

Chapter 5 examines the first of three breaking points: individuals. How psychology can be used to understand and then exploit individuals in the network is demonstrated. Understanding individuals is a necessary first step on the path to finding their fissure points. There is not one psychological approach that explains all that is needed to know about how to first understand individuals, and second, with that understanding, to identify particular fissure points. Thus, a framework was devised that draws heavily on different aspects of psychology. The four key elements are (1) personal characteristics, (2) operating environment, (3) advisory system, and (4) information environment. This framework can be used to understand behavioral patterns and to identify and exploit fissures. This is illustrated with a case study of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda.

Chapter 6 focuses on the second breaking point: groups. The psychological literature on intragroup conflict explains the nature of groups and also identifies fissure points that derail the functioning of groups. For the purposes of this book, these fissures are referred to as the following: (1) personal conflict and mistrust, (2) substantive and procedural disagreement, and (3) deviants. A variety of examples from different groups in the network to demonstrate these fissures is provided.

Chapter 7 looks at the relationships between groups in the network, the third breaking point. Specifically the discussion focuses on the relationships between the core of al-Qaeda and other groups. Psychology provides the basis from which to examine intergroup behavior and explains that mere categorization of groups creates an in-group/out-group dichotomy. From there several fissures between groups in the network that can be exploited are explored. These include (1) diverging goals and ethnic differences, (2) security risks, (3) leadership and authority differences, and

(4) competition over resources. Each of these fissures is illustrated with specific examples.

Chapter 8 looks back on the discussion in previous chapters and advocates moving forward with a comprehensive informational influence campaign. The bottom line is that the United States needs to be proactive and go after the network, not wait for the network to attack.

NOTES

1. Bruce Riedel, "Al Qaeda Strikes Back," *Foreign Affairs*, 86, May/June 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070501faessay86304/bruce-riedel/al-qaeda-strikes-back.html> (accessed April 20, 2008).
2. Ben Venzke, "Abandoned in America, the Death of Awareness," *Big Medicine*, July 18, 2008, http://bigmedicine.ca/benvenzke.htm#Abandoned_in_America_The_Death_of_Awareness (accessed July 18, 2008).
3. Sander van der Linden, "What a Hoax," *Scientific American Mind*, September/October 2013, 41.
4. Ibid.
5. Lev Grossman, "Why the 9/11 Conspiracy Won't Go Away," *Time*, September 3, 2006, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1531304,00.html> (accessed December 2, 2007).
6. Van der Linden, "What a Hoax," 42.
7. Southern Poverty Law Center, "Boston Bombings Produce Conspiracy Theories, Violence," *Intelligence Report*, Fall 2013, 6.
8. Reported on CNN *Headline News*, April 7, 2009.
9. Venzke, "Abandoned in America."
10. Ted Gistaro, "Remarks by Mr. Ted Gistaro, National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Transnational Threats," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, Washington, DC, August 12, 2008. Mr. Gistaro was appointed NIO in November 2006, after nearly two decades of service with the Central Intelligence Agency. His speech discussed the current state of al-Qaeda as well as the current threats facing the United States homeland, see http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20080812_speech.pdf (accessed September 15, 2008).
11. Craig Whitlock, "The New Al Qaeda Central," *Washington Post*, September 9, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/08/AR2007090801845.html> (accessed September 12, 2007).
12. Gistaro, "Remarks by Mr. Ted Gistaro."
13. Ibid.
14. A. S. Sekhon, "Lashkar-E-Taiba: A Threat beyond the India-Pakistan Equation," *The Counter Terrorist*, October/November 2011.

15. Ibid.
16. Patrick Goodenough, "Nigerian Group Boko Haram Designates U.S. as a Terror Target," August 13, 2013, <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/nigerian-terror-group-boko-haram-designates-us-terror-target> (accessed August 17, 2013).
17. In November 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri released a recording claiming that the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) merged with al-Qaeda. A statement by Abu Layth al-Libi, who worked closely with the network, was also on the recording. For a detailed discussion see Maggie Michael, "Al-Qaida's No. 2 Threatens Libya," *Yahoo News*, November 3, 2007, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap_on_re_mi_ea/al_qaida_libya, (accessed November 3, 2007). A similar announcement was made by elements of the Islamic Group (IG) in Egypt. For more information, see "Al Zawahiri: Egyptian Militant Group Joins Al Qaeda," *CNN*, August 5, 2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/08/05/zawahiri.tape/index.html> (accessed September 21, 2007).
18. Liz Sly, "Al-Qaeda Expands in Syria via Islamic State," August 12, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-12/world/41335229_1_syria-islamic-state-foreign-fighters (accessed August 16, 2013).
19. "Reflecting on the Taliban," *The Economist*, March 28, 2009.
20. Prasanta Kumar Pradhan, "Growing al-Qaeda Threat in Yemen," *IDSA*, April 15, 2009, <http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/PrasantaPradhan150409.htm> (accessed April 22, 2009).
21. Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, "Qaeda Leaders to Yemen Affiliate Said to Prompt Alert," *New York Times*, August 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/06/world/middleeast/qaeda-chiefs-order-to-yemen-affiliate-said-to-prompt-alert.html?_r=0 (accessed August 10, 2013).
22. "Al Qaeda Head Ayman al-Zawahiri Accuses U.S. of Plotting Removal of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt," *The Telegraph*, August 3, 2013, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/10220281/Al-Qaeda-head-Ayman-al-Zawahiri-accuses-US-of-plotting-removal-of-Mohammed-Morsi-in-Egypt.html> (accessed August 16, 2013).
23. Rania Abouzeid, "Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire," *Time*, January 21, 2011, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html> (accessed August 16, 2013).
24. Ibid.
25. Mariam Karouny, "Insight: Syria's Nusra Front Eclipsed by Iraq-Based Al-Qaeda," *Reuters*, May 17, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/17/us-syria-crisis-nusra-idUSBRE94G0FY20130517> (accessed August 16, 2013).
26. Noman Benotman and Roisin Blake, "Jabhat al-Nusra," *Quilliam Foundation*, <http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jabhat-al-nusra-a-strategic-briefing.pdf> (accessed August 16, 2013).
27. Ibid.

28. Karouny, "Insight: Syria's Nusra Front Eclipsed."
29. "The Department of Homeland Security: Goals and Challenges," *NTI*, April 2003, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_29a.html (accessed November 26, 2007).
30. "Bush Signs Homeland Security Bill," *CNN*, November 26, 2002, <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/11/25/homeland.security/index.html> (accessed November 25, 2007).
31. The 9/11 Commission Report is available at <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>.
32. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, <http://www.dni.gov/mision.htm> (accessed August 1, 2008).
33. The agencies that comprise the Intelligence Community within the ODNI are the Central Intelligence Agency (www.cia.gov); Defense Intelligence Agency (www.dia.mil); Department of Energy (Office of Intelligence & Counterintelligence) (www.doe.gov); Department of Homeland Security (Office of Intelligence & Analysis) (www.dhs.gov); Department of State (Bureau of Intelligence & Research) (www.state.gov); Department of Treasury (Office of Intelligence & Analysis) (www.treasury.gov); Drug Enforcement Administration (Office of National Security Intelligence) (www.dea.gov); Federal Bureau of Investigation (National Security Branch) (www.fbi.gov); National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (www.nga.mil); National Reconnaissance Office (www.nro.mil); National Security Agency/Central Security Service (www.nsa.gov); United States Air Force (www.af.mil); United States Army (www.army.mil); United States Coast Guard (www.uscg.mil); United States Marine Corps (www.marines.mil); United States Navy (www.navy.mil). Web sites were provided for further information on these agencies.
34. Derek Reveron, "Counterterrorism and Intelligence Cooperation," *Journal of Global Change and Governance*, Summer 2008, 2–3.
35. National Counterterrorism Center, <http://www.nctc.gov/> (accessed August 1, 2008).
36. *Ibid.*
37. Charles Doyle, "The USA PATRIOT Act: A Sketch," *Congressional Research Service*, April 18, 2002, <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21203.pdf> (accessed May 18, 2009).
38. *Ibid.*
39. "The Patriot Act," *ACLU*, <http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/17343res20031114.html> (accessed April 22, 2009).
40. Andrew M. McCarthy, "The Patriot Act under Siege," *National Review Online*, <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/mccarthy200311130835.asp> (accessed April 22, 2009).
41. Jim Abrams, "Patriot Act Extension Signed by Obama," *Associated Press*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/27/patriot-act-extension-signed-obama-autopen_n_867851.html (accessed August 10, 2013).

42. Susan Page, "NSA Secret Database Report Triggers Fierce Debate in Washington," *USA Today*, May 11, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-11-nsa-reax_x.htm (accessed November 24, 2007).
43. Susan Gorman, "NSA's Domestic Spying Grows as Agency Sweeps Up Data," *Wall Street Journal*, March 10, 2006.
44. Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, "NSA Prism Program Taps into User Data of Apple, Google and Others," *The Guardian*, June 6, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data> (accessed August 12, 2013).
45. Glen Greenwald, "NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily," *The Guardian*, June 5, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order> (accessed August 12, 2013).
46. Spencer Ackerman, "Obama Publishes Legal Background to Surveillance—But Much Is Still Unclear," *The Guardian*, August 9, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/obama-legal-background-surveillance-nsa> (accessed August 12, 2013).
47. "Edward Snowden's Digital Maneuvers Still Stumping U.S. Government," *CBS News*, August 25, 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57600000/edward-snowdens-digital-maneuvers-still-stumping-u-s-government/ (accessed August 26, 2013).
48. For further information on GTMO, see the following Web sites: <http://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/gitmo/> and <https://www.cnic.navy.mil/Guantanamo/index.htm> (accessed January 1, 2009).
49. "Bending the Rules: The High Cost of Guantanamo Bay," *The Economist*, July 19, 2008.
50. Individuals that had expertise in these techniques wrote a document titled "Interviewing and Interrogating Militant Islamists: A Perspective for Law Enforcement Personnel." This was released by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). The authors determined that a long-term rapport-based approach, as opposed to an aggressive one, resulted in eliciting more truthful and reliable information. They also provide more detail on how to execute such an approach. For a more detailed account of this and other findings, see Michael G. Gelles et al., "Interviewing and Interrogating Militant Islamists: A Perspective for Law Enforcement Personnel," Naval Criminal Investigative Service, 2003. Contributing to the work were Scott Shumate, Psy.D.; Joseph Krofcheck, M.D.; Ali Soufan; Thomas Neer; James Fitzgerald; Russ Palarea, Ph.D.; Steve Doyan; and Robert Fine, Ph.D.
51. Scott Wilson and Al Kamen, "Global War on Terror Is Given New Name: Bush's Phrase Is Out, Pentagon Says," *Washington Post*, March 25, 2009.
52. Amanda Ruggeri, "President Obama's First Day: Reversing Key Bush Policies on Detainees, Information Access," *U.S. News and World Report*, January 22, 2009, <http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/obama209/01/president-obamas-first-day-reversing-key-bush-policies> (accessed April 8, 2009).

53. Jennifer Griffin, "Obama Standing by Decision to Lift Moratorium on Releasing Guantanamo Bay Prisoners Back to Yemen," *Fox News*, August 8, 2013, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/08/08/obama-standing-by-decision-to-lift-moratorium-on-releasing-guantanamo-bay/> (accessed August 10, 2013).
54. J. S. Mill, "Self-Inflicted Wounds," *The Counter Terrorist*, October/November 2012.
55. Jennifer L. Hesterman, *The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus* (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2013).
56. "What the Guantanamo Hunger Strikers Achieved," *The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jared-del-rosso/guantanamo-hunger-strikers_b_3720244.html (accessed August 10, 2013).
57. "Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qai'da or an Associated Force," http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf (accessed August 10, 2013).
58. "Living under Drones," September 2012, http://www.livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Stanford_NYU_LIVING_UNDER_DRONES.pdf (accessed August 17, 2013).
59. *Ibid.*, 11.
60. Dan Verton, "Will America's Drone Wars Come Back to Haunt Us?" *Homeland Security Today*, May 2013.
61. Derek Reveron, "Counterterrorism and Intelligence Cooperation," *Journal of Global Change and Governance*, Summer 2008, 4.
62. Nick Hopkins, Julian Borger, and Luke Harding, "GCHQ: Inside the Top Secret World of Britain's Biggest Spy Agency," August 1, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/aug/01/gchq-spy-agency-nsa-edward-snowden#part-four> (accessed August 12, 2013).
63. Shanthie D'Souza, "U.S. Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Dynamics and Challenges," *Strategic Analysis*, 1, 2006, 1.
64. Ayesha Siddiq, "Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies," *Washington Quarterly*, 34, 2011, 149, <http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11wintersiddiq.pdf> (accessed August 12, 2013).
65. *Ibid.*
66. *Ibid.*, 149–150.
67. Elena Mastors, "Case Study: 2013 Boston Bombings," *The Counter Terrorist*, 6, 2013, 16–27.
68. Nick Hopkins, Julian Borger, and Luke Harding, "GCHQ: Inside the Top Secret World of Britain's Biggest Spy Agency," August 1, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/aug/01/gchq-spy-agency-nsa-edward-snowden#part-four> (accessed August 12, 2013).
69. Elena Mastors and Alyssa Deffenbaugh, *The Lesser Jihad* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).
70. Lorenzo Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe* (New York: Prometheus, 2006).

71. Melani Phillips, *Londonistan* (New York: Encounter Books, 2006), 15–16.
72. At that time, the premier terrorist group in Algeria was the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). This would change over the years when the group morphed and was renamed.
73. Phillips, *Londonistan*, 15–16.
74. Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe*, 191.
75. Phillips, *Londonistan*, 16.
76. Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe*, 192–93.
77. Elena Mastors, “Case Study,” 20.
78. Bruce Bawer, *While Europe Slept* (New York: Doubleday, 2006).
79. Ibid. Bawer also discusses similar examples.
80. Discussion with author, March 2008.
81. As quoted in Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe*, 113–14.
82. Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe*, 114–15.
83. Owais, Tohid, “Cash Weans Tribes from Al Qaeda,” *Christian Science Monitor*, February 16, 2005 (accessed August 10, 2013).
84. See the discussion in this chapter below on the credibility of sources.
85. Matthew Rosenberg and Zahid Hussain, “Fight Escalates between Pakistan Military, Taliban,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 28, 2009.
86. For further discussion, see Chapter 3.
87. Pre-Islamic Pagan era of disbelief and ignorance.
88. Sayyid Qutb, “The Right to Judge,” in *The Jihad Fixation: Agenda, Strategy, Portents*, ed. Arthur Monteiro (New Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2001), 111.
89. This is based on the author’s experience and conversations held with individuals from a wide variety of agencies.
90. Conversations with author.
91. For example, as John Deutch and Jeffrey H. Smith explain about sharing between the FBI and CIA, “Law enforcement’s focus is to collect evidence *after* a crime is committed in order to support prosecution in a court of law. The FBI is reluctant to share with other government agencies the information obtained from its informants for fear of compromising future court action. On the other hand, the CIA collects and analyzes information in order to forewarn the government *before* an act occurs. The CIA is reluctant to give the FBI information obtained from CIA agents for fear that its sources and methods for gaining that information will be revealed in court.” For further information, see John Deutch and Jeffrey H. Smith, “Smarter Intelligence,” *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2002.
92. Nancy Snow, “U.S. Public Diplomacy,” Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, eds., *Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006), 226.
93. Ibid., 233.
94. *U.S. National Strategy*, 2007, 3.
95. Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, <http://www.state.gov/r/> (accessed August 12, 2013).

96. Center for Strategic Terrorism Communications, <http://www.state.gov/r/csc/index.htm> (accessed August 12, 2013).
97. U.S. State Department, "Public Diplomacy Strengthening U.S. Engagement in the World: A Strategic Approach for the 21st Century," http://uscpublic-diplomacy.org/pdfs/PD_US_World_Engagement.pdf (accessed August 12, 2013), 6.
98. *Ibid.*, 7.
99. *Ibid.*, 8.
100. *Ibid.*, 16.
101. *Ibid.*
102. *Ibid.*
103. Military operations of this type are referred to as Information Operations.
104. Jonathan Landay, "U.S. Pays Iraq Media for Spin," *Inquirer Washington Bureau*, 2005, http://articles.philly.com/2005-12-01/news/25422094_1_iraqi-journalists-iraqi-media-iraq-media (accessed April 15, 2006).
105. The Muslim Brotherhood is a long-standing Islamist organization with popular support in Egypt.
106. Deb Riechman and Kimberly Dozier, "Obama: Syrian Government behind Chemical Weapons Attack, No Decision on Action," *Associated Press*, August 28, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/28/us-syria-conflict_n_3827964.html (accessed August 29, 2013).
107. Elias Groll, "State Dept Admits It Doesn't Know Who Ordered Syria's Chemical Strike," *Foreign Policy*, August 28, 2013, http://thecable.foreign-policy.com/posts/2013/08/28/state_dept_admits_it_doesnt_know_who_in_the_syrian_govt_ordered_chemical_strike (accessed August 29, 2013).
108. The basis for this discussion is psychology. When psychology is used to understand the political world of which terrorism is a part, it is referred to as political psychology. For the purpose of simplification, the term *psychology* is used throughout the book.
109. Yochi J. Dreazen and Siobhan Gorman, "Pentagon Jams Web, Radio Links of Taliban," *Wall Street Journal*, April 18, 2009.
110. During conversations with the author, former CIA operators lamented that their agencies seem to have become operationally paralyzed, and they see a serious lack of creativity among the young operators.
111. Ken Dilanian, "Bad Management Drives Talent from CIA, Internal Report Suggests," *LA Times*, July 29, 2013, <http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/29/nation/la-na-cia-management-20130730> (accessed August 16, 2013).
112. *Ibid.*

2

The Origination and Continuation of the Threat

Yesterday's attacks in New York and in Washington are a declaration of war against the entire civilized world. This kind of terrorist violence—the arbitrary annihilation of the lives of innocent human beings—calls into question the fundamental rules of any civilization. It poses an immediate threat to the principles of human coexistence in freedom and security that have developed over generations. We will not allow these values to be destroyed, be this in America, in Europe, or anywhere else in the world.

—German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder¹

Certainly it's a much more dangerous organization today than it was in 2001. Just from the perspective of where we had to focus, we in the West, in Europe and in the United States. Before 9/11 most of the activities that were directed against us came out of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Today we have them coming from there, but we also have them coming out of Yemen, out of Iraq, out of the Levant, out of Somalia and out of North Africa. So the platforms from which people are being directed toward us have grown considerably.

—Michael Scheur²

On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda struck on U.S. soil with the unprecedented use of airplanes as weapons. Two planes crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City and one struck the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Still another, Flight 93, crashed into a field in Pennsylvania when

passengers realized the fate of the other planes and tried to stop those who commandeered the plane. Had it not, another U.S. target would have been attacked, presumably the U.S. Capitol building or the White House.

September 11 was not the beginning of the al-Qaeda threat. Rather, it was the beginning of the stark realization that the United States needed to demonstrate the political will to act in order to effectively fight the threat. Al-Qaeda attacked the United States before, and our partners and allies certainly were not immune either. September 11, the threat posed by the al-Qaeda network, and the inability to stop attacks does not make sense unless it is put into historical context. Briefly examining what happened before 9/11—the evolution of the threat—demonstrates the nature of the serious threat. Furthermore, through a series of proclamations and attacks, Usama bin Laden and his associates clearly told the United States they were at the forefront on the list of enemies. Unfortunately, on 9/11, just like in Afghanistan with the Soviet invasion, a superpower was severely injured, but even so, the attacks did not stop. In fact, by wounding yet another superpower, the attacks invigorated the existing network. Some groups shifted in focus to include the United States on the target list. The attack was also a symbolic green light to others that it was indeed possible to organize and confront the infidel. In other words, jihad was imperative because ultimately they would be victorious over their enemies.

THE FAILURE OF BUREAUCRACY

Before September 11, 2001, the majority of Americans never even heard of Usama bin Laden, let alone al-Qaeda. But as we know, this was not al-Qaeda's first attack on the United States. As the Twin Towers collapsed and the Pentagon burned (Figure 2.1a,b), the American public was literally forced to recognize that it faced a real threat from a network of groups they did not understand.

Why this happened to the United States was dealt with in great detail in a variety of books, studies, and personal accounts. Mentioned here are a few. The intricacies of the Islamic terrorist network, including Bin Laden's participation in it, were already evident well before 9/11.³ The fact that it did not take long for the U.S. government to figure out who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks says a lot about our intelligence collection capability with regard to the group. The reality was that significant information existed about the group. The bottom line was that those who saw



(a)



(b)

Figure 2.1 Images from the World Trade Center (a) and the Pentagon (b) immediately following the attacks. (Courtesy of FEMA.)

the threat argued that they were ignored or pushed aside. The United States was unable to bring together information from law enforcement and intelligence agencies to fight their common enemy. Certain agencies did not share information that put together pieces of the long and winding puzzle. Bureaucratic turf wars prevailed over U.S. national security.⁴ Politics prevailed over security threats.⁵ This only served to help, not hinder, the network. According to Robert Baer, a former CIA case officer, terrorists “don’t care about institutions and egos.”⁶ When the United States did respond to certain attacks, it was, to say the least, indicative of their low threat perception. Ultimately, our agencies failed the American people. As Baer stated:

When the world as most of us knew it began to fall apart on the morning of September 11, 2001, I was at my home in Washington, DC, not many blocks from the United States Capitol. If United Airlines Flight 93 had been allowed by its passengers to fly on to its intended destination, I would have heard it crash into the White House. If the target had been the Capitol, and it might have been, I would have felt the crash as well.

For me, the irony of the situation was hard to miss. After two decades in some of the earth’s true hellholes, I had returned only recently to the heart of the most powerful nation on earth, protected by a military force such as the world has never known, watched over by domestic and foreign security services that number in the hundreds of thousands. And what had saved the city I was living in? Not the CIA. Not the FBI. Not the air force or navy or marines or army. But the raw courage and determination of a fistful of average Americans ... All of us have a right to expect more from those in who we vest such power.⁷

The remainder of this chapter highlights in more detail the breadth, depth, and interconnectedness of the network since Bin Laden’s “defeat” of the Soviets. Bin Laden, as it will become clear, never hid the fact that we were put on his list of enemies.

UNWINDING THE PUZZLE: THE AFGHAN-SOVIET WAR

After the 9/11 attacks, Americans demanded explanations from the government for why this happened on American soil. When Americans were reintroduced to Usama bin Laden, the man who provided leadership and guidance to al-Qaeda and directed the attacks, they listened. Uncomfortable things about the background of al-Qaeda and Bin Laden

came to light. Al-Qaeda was, in fact, formed in 1988. Usama bin Laden, a Saudi, was a central figure in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union, which invaded the country in 1979.

During the Afghan war, the Cold War was also firmly in place, and the United States engaged the Soviet Union not directly but through many proxy wars. Afghanistan was such a place. Fighters swarmed to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. These fighters were called the *mujahedeen*—the strugglers for Allah. Some of these individuals were already members of groups that wanted to overthrow the regimes in their own countries. Others, with their new training and confidence, organized to return to their countries and fight the regimes. At that time, Bin Laden was perceived to be anti-Soviet, and therefore a useful tool against the Soviets in the greater Cold War. The United States government, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), supported the efforts of the *mujahedeen* with arms and intelligence to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan—a place where many players with different interests operated. While working in the Afghanistan–Pakistan border area, Bin Laden teamed up with Abdullah Azzam, his former professor from Saudi Arabia. They created Makhtab al-Kahdimat (Afghan Services Bureau). The purpose of the organization was to raise money and recruit fighters for the war against the Soviets. Even so, not all was well with Bin Laden and Azzam, where Azzam wanted to focus on Afghanistan and then on liberating former Muslim lands, Bin Laden wished to carry out jihad in Saudi Arabia, “apostate” regimes, and even the United States. After a 10-year battle, the Soviets began to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989. In the eyes of the *mujahedeen*, a superpower was defeated and Azzam was dead, killed by a car bomb in Afghanistan.⁸

Unfortunately, the United States did not foresee that Bin Laden would later become a formidable enemy. The assortment of individuals and groups operating in Afghanistan in the early 1990s posed a developing threat to the stability and future of Afghanistan and ultimately to U.S. national security. The United States had a “hands off” policy with regard to Afghanistan from 1992 through late 2001. During this period, the United States did not have a policy for Afghanistan. Because of America’s indifference in the region after Soviet withdrawal, those led by Bin Laden were able to build an infrastructure from which to attack the United States.⁹ His fortune, amassed through the family construction business, was the key to building his jihadi empire. Bin Laden established al-Qaeda, the base.

FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO SOMALIA: THE MUJAHEDDEEN EXPANDS

With his success in Afghanistan against the Soviets, Bin Laden proved that he, with a small group of dedicated fighters (mujahedeen), could effectively challenge a superpower and win. In the subsequent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Bin Laden went to the Saudi government with his plan for the defense of the Saudi Kingdom. He wanted to use his fighters to defend Saudi Arabia against impending Iraqi aggression. However, his help was refused. Instead, the Saudis chose the Americans to defend them in the first Gulf War.

This decision did not sit well with Bin Laden, and he turned on Saudi Arabia and the United States. The Saudis, Bin Laden concluded, were a corrupt Arab regime supported by the United States, a country that he believed was responsible for all that was wrong with the Muslim world. In 1991, Bin Laden was expelled from Saudi Arabia and went to Sudan to set up his base of operations. In 1993, al-Qaeda was also connected to the killing of 18 soldiers in Somalia, what is widely referred to as "Black Hawk Down."

WORLD TRADE CENTER ONE AND BOJINKA

In 1993, the World Trade Center in New York was also bombed. The lead planner in the attack was Ramzi Yousef, who studied electrical engineering at the Swansea Institute in Wales.¹⁰ Yousef is the nephew of the operational planner, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM). Those involved with Yousef were also associated with the wider network.¹¹ Thus, Yousef was indeed the lead planner, but he did not act alone. What came to light was that his co-conspirators were followers of Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman, also known as the "Blind Shaykh." He was born in Egypt and became blind as a child due to diabetes. The Blind Shaykh was also imprisoned with Zawahiri in Egypt during a roundup of known extremists after the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat. Rahman is in prison in the United States. Calls for his release are heralded throughout the terrorist community.

Both Yousef and KSM would also become busy planning an operation that involved simultaneously blowing up U.S. commercial airliners over the Pacific that left from Asian countries. This was scheduled for early 1995. The "Bojinka Plot," as it is referred to, was thwarted with the arrest of Yousef and other members of his cell in the Philippines.

RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN AND THE FATWAS

With pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia, the Sudanese government asked Bin Laden to leave. His next stop was Afghanistan, which was now under Taliban rule. Under the Taliban, Bin Laden was able to set up another base of operations. Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups set up training camps to groom fighters that were sent to places such as Chechnya and Bosnia to help their Muslim brothers fight jihad. Some participated to satisfy their obligation of jihad. Others would go on to become the next generation of skilled terrorists.

In August 1996, Bin Laden released a *fatwa* (religious edict) called the "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places."¹² In it, Bin Laden laid out his beliefs for all to see. He clearly expressed his hatred for the United States, Israel, and Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This fatwa was also important because it provided a detailed discussion of his thinking on many matters and indicates how he used the Koran (holy book) and the Hadiths (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) as justification for his actions. The fatwa, which reads like a long treatise, also warned the United States of what was to come. Sadly, this did not seriously impact U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Given the length of the fatwa, the main ideas are only referenced here. But, it is worth reading in full to gain a more better understanding of the complex thinking that fueled his argument and the type of language used that commanded the support of so many followers, which ultimately led to a prolonged and bloody confrontation with the United States, its partners, and allies.

First and foremost, Bin Laden noted his dedication to his religious calling. "Who ever been guided by Allah will not be misled, and whoever has been misled, he will never be guided. I bear witness that there is no God except Allah—no associates with Him—and I bear witness that Muhammad is His slave and messenger."¹³ Bin Laden then clearly laid out those that suffered at the hands of the Zionist-Crusaders including Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, the Philippines, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia. The United States, he maintained, conspired through the United Nations to prevent these "dispossessed people" from obtaining arms and defending themselves.

Yet in Bin Laden's view, the people of Islam recognized the hypocrisy, with the Zionist Crusader alliance seeking to silence its detractors, including the killing and arresting of truthful Ulama, and going in so far as

killing Abudullah Azzam.¹⁴ He then explained that he had not addressed Muslims on this injustice as he had been prevented from doing so because of being pursued in Pakistan, Sudan, and Afghanistan. But alas, he found safe haven in the Hindukush mountains in Khurasan.¹⁵ His return to Afghanistan was fortuitous considering this was the place where the superpower was first defeated by the mujahedeen. This is the base from which the mujahedeen can defeat the Zionist–Crusader alliance.

Railing against Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden hailed the Khobar Towers¹⁶ bombing, and claimed it was a warning that the situation in Saudi Arabia is analogous to a volcano on the verge of eruption because of the “severe depression, suffering, excessive iniquity, humiliation and poverty.”¹⁷ How can this exist, he asked, in a country with such immense oil exports? The answer, he claims, is in the corruption of the ruling family, one that does not follow Shariah law,¹⁸ allows the occupation of the country by Americans, and denies citizens their rights.¹⁹ Many have tried to advise the kingdom of its ill ways, but to no avail. Among those are groups of scholars asking for him to change the situation. These include the letter of Shawwaal in 1991 and the Memorandum of Advice in 1992. According to Bin Laden, the memorandum outlined the following nine transgressions.

1. The intimidation and harassment suffered by the leaders of the society, the scholars, heads of tribes, merchants, academic teachers and other eminent individuals.
2. The situation of the law within the country and the arbitrary declaration of what is Halal and Haram (lawful and unlawful) regardless of the Shariah as instituted by Allah.
3. The state of the press and the media, which became a tool of truth hiding and misinformation.
4. Abuse and confiscation of human rights.
5. The financial and the economical situation of the country and the frightening future in the view of the enormous amount of debts and interest owed by the government.
6. The miserable situation of the social services and infrastructure, especially the water service and supply, the basic requirement of life.
7. The state of the ill-trained and ill-prepared army, and the impotence of its commander in chief despite the incredible amount of money that has been spent on the army.
8. Shariah law was suspended and man-made law was used instead.

9. And as far as the foreign policy is concerned the report exposed not only how this policy has disregarded the Islamic issues and ignored the Muslims, but also how help and support were provided to the enemy against the Muslims.

Bin Laden's solution was to confront the Zionist-Crusader alliance, to push them from the Holy Land. He harkened to the writings of Islamic scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah to provide ample justification for his plan; to unite and go after the major threat, as opposed to a minor one. It is the duty of Muslims to fight. "Utmost effort should be made to prepare and instigate the Ummah against the enemy, the American-Israeli alliance—occupying the country of the two Holy Places and the route of the Apostle (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him) to the Furthest Mosque (Al-Aqsa Mosque)."²⁰ Driving home the point about the need for unity, he reminded Muslims not to fight amongst themselves, otherwise there would be grave consequences such as the depletion of economic and financial resources, destruction of infrastructure and oil industries, and the dividing of the land of two holy places and the annexation of the northern part by Israel.²¹

Bin Laden continued that it was not acceptable to have crusaders in the Holy Land even if only temporarily and further notes that crusaders certainly should have never been left to deal with Iraq. Rather, the more acceptable outcome would be the use of an Islamic force.

He further outlined the duplicity of the Americans and the British before them in Palestine. The call to arms then harkens the *mujahedeen* and others to support them in his quest. He personally addressed the United States Secretary of Defense and outlined American failures including Beirut in 1983 where 241 soldiers were killed and where two explosions caused the United States to pull out of Aden. Bin Laden considered Somalia a disgrace. All of this is indicative of the impotence and weakness of the United States, according to Bin Laden.

The 1996 fatwa was just the beginning.

JOINING FORCES AGAINST THE JEWS AND CRUSADERS, AND GLOBAL JIHAD

Bin Laden was never alone in his views given the significant interaction of groups and individuals in Afghanistan. In February 1998, this

was driven home when the “World Islamic Front” released a statement titled “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.” This announcement contended that Bin Laden formally joined forces with Ayman al-Zawahiri (and others).²² Al-Zawahiri was the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (IJ). Since its inception, the IJ wanted to overthrow the Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamist government. During the war against the Soviets, al-Zawahiri worked in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Therefore, although both men knew each other for quite some time and there was obvious interaction and similar thinking between them, they did not formally solidify their partnership until this announcement when al-Zawahiri merged his group with al-Qaeda. Other signatories were connected too. This announcement glaringly said do not forget we have a formidable alliance. In part, the February proclamation once again called for jihad against the United States and its allies to include civilians.

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, “and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and “fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah.”

This is in addition to the words of Almighty Allah: “And why should ye not fight in the cause of Allah and of those who, being weak, are ill-treated (and oppressed)?—women and children, whose cry is: ‘Our Lord, rescue us from this town, whose people are oppressors; and raise for us from thee one who will help!’”

We—with Allah’s help—call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan’s U.S. troops and the devil’s supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.

Almighty Allah said: “O ye who believe, give your response to Allah and His Apostle, when He calleth you to that which will give you life. And know that Allah cometh between a man and his heart, and that it is He to whom ye shall all be gathered.”

Almighty Allah also says: “O ye who believe, what is the matter with you, that when ye are asked to go forth in the cause of Allah, ye cling

so heavily to the earth! Do ye prefer the life of this world to the hereafter? But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the hereafter. Unless ye go forth, He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others in your place; but Him ye would not harm in the least. For Allah hath power over all things." Almighty Allah also says: "So lose no heart, nor fall into despair. For ye must gain mastery if ye are true in faith."²³

With this new marriage, al-Zawahiri formally took his place as second in command of al-Qaeda. Al-Zawahiri brought many trusted Egyptians with him who rose to central leadership positions in the group. Al-Qaeda was hierarchically organized, and the senior leadership at the top made decisions and then passed them down to low-level operatives.

In case the United States was still not clear about what Bin Laden was threatening, he released another statement also published February 1998 calling for jihad to liberate Muslim lands. Here again, the United States and Israel figured prominently.²⁴ Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri frequently used these types of proclamations in their effort to incite global jihad. They continued to tell the United States what they were going to do and why.

PRE-9/11 ATTACKS

On August 7, 1998, two attacks were carried out within minutes of each other at the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. In response to the embassy bombings, President Bill Clinton ordered a limited response. Cruise missiles struck the El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries factory in Sudan, and al-Qaeda compounds and training facilities in Afghanistan. The limited U.S. response did not deter al-Qaeda. Again, on October 12, 2000, in Aden, Yemen, two men drove an explosive-laden boat into the *USS Cole*, a U.S. Navy destroyer in which 17 American sailors were killed. Even during this time, al-Qaeda was not perceived as a fundamental threat to the U.S. homeland. But this attack came after another attempt months earlier. In January 2000, a boat loaded with explosives was launched against the *USS The Sullivans*. However, the boat sank before it could damage the ship.

In late 1999, Ahmed Ressay, the "Millennium Bomber," was caught coming across the Canadian border with nitroglycerin and four timing devices concealed in his rental car. Five days later, in Vermont, authorities arrested Lucia Garofalo, of Montreal, and Bouabide Chamchi, of Algeria, with a fake French passport, after their car alerted a bomb dog.²⁵ In court

documents, prosecutors said Garofalo and Ressay were members of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which was blamed for some of the bloodiest attacks in Algeria's civil war.²⁶ And as is known, network connections run deep. Ressay was convicted in April 2001, and only then did Ressay reveal his target. According to journalists and national security commentator Peter Bergen:

For a year and a half after his arrest, Ressay remained resolutely silent about his intended target. But after he was convicted of terrorism in April 2001 and found himself facing a possible sentence of 130 years, he began cooperating with authorities, telling them he had planned to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport. U.S. officials have linked this plot to contemporaneous efforts by al-Qaeda to bomb a U.S. warship in Yemen and various targets in Jordan.²⁷

Then came 9/11.

9/11: THE JUSTIFICATION

In October 2001, Bin Laden boldly told the world that he was indeed pleased by these heinous acts on 9/11. The sickening reality of his hatred of the United States and of its perceived partners and allies was publicized for all to see. Bin Laden reminded the United States of previous successful attacks. The war against the United States was not over even after the success of 9/11. Bin Laden then took credit for the attacks, reiterating his view that Muslims have been humiliated at the hand of Americans and Israel.

The previous section illustrated attacks involving the United States because the focus of this chapter was on what happened before 9/11 and that aside from lone individuals, the United States ignored the threat, which ultimately led to 9/11. However, what also needs to be briefly noted is that many other countries were dealing with the network affiliates for years. Remember, Afghanistan was the place where many of these individuals were trained, fought, and interacted. The world was not lacking in groups that sought to establish Islamic regimes fashioned in their own extremist eyes. For example, France dealt with bombings in both 1995 and 1996 by the GIA. The Algerian government was also the target of the GIA and the groups that subsequently evolved from it. Egypt suffered the wrath of both the Islamic Group and the Islamic Jihad. The same holds true for other North African groups. Islamic groups were also created to overthrow the Soviet backed Uzbek government.

EXCERPTS FROM BIN LADEN'S POST-9/11 STATEMENT

What America is tasting now, is something insignificant compared to what we have tasted for scores of years. Our nation has been tasting this humiliation and this degradation for more than 80 years. Its sons are killed, its blood is shed, its sanctuaries are attacked, and no one hears and no one heeds ... Millions of innocent children are being killed as I speak. They are being killed in Iraq without committing any sins and we don't hear condemnation or a fatwa from the rulers. In these days, Israeli tanks infest Palestine ... and other places in the land of Islam, and we don't hear anyone raising his voice or moving a limb. When the sword comes down, after 80 years, hypocrisy rears its ugly head. They deplore and they lament for those killers, who have abused the blood, honour, and sanctuaries of Muslims. The least that can be said about those people is that they are debauched. They have followed injustice. They supported the butcher over the victim, the oppressor over the innocent child ... After this event ... they have come out in force with their men and have turned even the countries that belong to Islam to this treachery, and they want to wag their tail at God, to fight Islam, to suppress people in the name of terrorism. When people at the ends of the earth, Japan, were killed by their hundreds of thousands, young and old, it was not considered a war crime, it is something that has justification. Millions of children in Iraq is something that has justification. But when they lose dozens of people in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Iraq was struck and Afghanistan was struck. Hypocrisy stood in force behind the head of infidels worldwide, behind the cowards of this age, America and those who are with it. These events have divided the whole world into two sides. The side of believers and the side of infidels ... Every Muslim has to rush to make his religion victorious ... The winds of change have come to eradicate oppression from the island of Muhammad ... To America, I say only a few words to it and its people. I swear by God, who has elevated the skies without pillars, neither America nor the people who live in it will dream of security before we live it in Palestine, and not before all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad...²⁸

9/11: THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE

Usama bin Laden could gloat all he wanted after 9/11, but the American sleeping giant was finally awake. In December 2001, most Americans did not even blink an eye when U.S. coalition forces struck back at the heart of the network in Afghanistan with Operation Enduring Freedom. Americans wanted someone to pay for the attacks, and those who had to pay, they were told, were in Afghanistan. Americans watched as the United States bombed the faraway country of Afghanistan, the place where Bin Laden settled under the hospitality of the Taliban and plotted against the United States. Training camps were destroyed and those operating in the country dispersed. Al-Qaeda lost its operational base in Afghanistan. Many key leaders were captured or killed. But despite the best efforts of the United States, Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri escaped and remained free, ultimately thought to have regrouped in the Pakistan–Afghanistan border region. The Taliban also managed to recuperate and continued to pose a serious threat to the stability of Afghanistan, to the United States, and to coalition troops. And the worldwide attacks continued. However, it is important to realize that many attacks were also prevented given the increased counterterrorism vigilance of countries throughout the world.

CONTINUATION OF THE THREAT

After 9/11, numerous attacks on the United States and other countries continued. Attacks by one group invigorated them to conduct more attacks while in turn invigorating other groups to act. Only a handful of these attacks are discussed here that demonstrate the global breadth of the network. Simply put, there are just too many attacks to chronicle.

Post–9/11 Attacks

In April 2002, a truck exploded next to a synagogue on Djerba, an island off the coast of Tunisia, killing 15 and wounding 20. Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility. Numerous attacks in Algeria took place against Algerian and Western targets by the extremely active group al-Qaeda Organization in the Maghreb (AQIM). For example, in April 2007, AQIM detonated three car bombs near a government building killing 23 and wounding 152. This attack was coordinated with another where a bomb was detonated at a

police station killing 8 and wounding 50. As noted in Chapter 1, AQIM took on a prominent role in destabilizing North African countries, notably Mali. The group continues to grow and recruit members, engaging in kidnappings; attacking security forces, utilities, and workers; and assassinating officials.

A few months later in October 2002, the network affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) detonated two bombs in Bali, Indonesia, killing 202 people, many of whom were Westerners. Again in August 2003, the group detonated a car bomb outside the Jakarta Marriot killing 13 and injuring 150 people, and in 1994 they detonated a bomb outside the Australian Embassy that killed 9 people.

Attacks in Afghanistan by the Taliban and Pakistani groups—using the names Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JEM), and Harakat ul-Mujahidin—occur on a regular basis. For example, in November 2008, gunmen from Lashkar-e-Taiba perpetrated an attack on police and civilians in Mumbai, India. Pakistani terror groups emerged to fight Indians in Kashmir. Pakistan stands accused of supporting these groups due to the ongoing issues with India over the territory.²⁹ To add fuel to the fire, elements within the Pakistani intelligence services support al-Qaeda and the Taliban.³⁰

In November 2002, a month after the Bali attack, an attempt was made to shoot down an Israeli civilian airliner leaving Mombasa, Kenya. That same month, three suicide bombers attacked an Israeli-owned hotel killing 13 and wounding 80. Al-Qaeda affiliates in Mauritania murdered four French tourists on Christmas Eve in 2007. Al-Ittihad in Somalia threw their hat in the ring to take advantage of a country without a state.

In 2002, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) official Lawrence Foley was assassinated in Amman, Jordan. Jordan was hit in August and November 2005. In the November 2005 attack, three hotels were bombed, killing 60 people including members of a wedding party. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian and leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, perpetrated the attacks. In November 2003, two coordinated attacks were perpetrated in Turkey killing 11 and injuring roughly 450 people. In April 2004, a car bomb was detonated near the British ambassador's residence. Only one person was injured.

In May 2004, Moroccan affiliates calling themselves Salafiyah Jihdiyah launched a series of suicide bombings in Casablanca. Forty-five people died, including the 12 bombers. In March 2004, the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (MICG) detonated 10 bombs on commuter trains in

Madrid that killed 191 people and wounded more than 1,800. During rush hour in July 2005, four coordinated explosions on metro buses and trains took place in London.

Saudi Arabia would also feel the wrath of al-Qaeda. A group referring to itself as Saudi al-Qaeda (later called Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP]) perpetrated many attacks. For example, in May 2003, the group attacked three foreign housing compounds in Riyadh in which 35 people were killed. In June 2004, an American defense contractor was gunned down in Riyadh. Four days after this, another U.S. defense contractor was shot and killed. In August 2009, another bold attack occurred in Jeddah, this time during an "open meeting" with Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Muhammad bin Nayef. A terrorist noted his intention to give himself up to Nayef. Instead, he blew himself up. Fortunately, the prince only had minor injuries. AQAP proved to become a formidable group, involved in many attacks including those against the United States. In a 2013 call, Adam Gadahn, an American-born member of the group, called on wealthy Muslims to offer rewards for killing ambassadors in the region. The previous year, the group offered gold for killing the U.S. ambassador and money for U.S. soldiers in the country.³¹

Egypt, which was no stranger to terrorism, endured car bombs in resort towns in October 2004 and July 2005. Israelis frequented these tourist destinations. In March 2009, four South Korean tourists and their guide were killed in a bombing in Yemen by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

On November 26, 2008, members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani group, landed by boat in Mumbai. After separating into groups, they launched several attacks on sites in Mumbai including the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus train station, the Leopold Café, Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, the Oberoi Hotel, and the Chabad House Jewish Community Center. At each location, they gunned down their victims. By the time their killing spree was done, 173 people were dead and some 300 injured.

In January 2009, a Taliban suicide bomber hit the German Embassy in Afghanistan and killed four civilians and a member of the U.S. military. In June 2008, al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing of the Danish Embassy in Islamabad in which six people were killed and 20 wounded.

During September 2012, at least 26 people were killed in coordinated attacks that targeted Shia neighborhoods and security forces. In July 2013, a series of coordinated bombing and shooting attacks were perpetrated

by al-Qaeda in Iraq throughout the country, killing at least 103 people and wounding at least 200 others. These attacks are just a few examples of the types of atrocities committed across Iraq on a regular basis.

Another serious blow to the United States occurred on September 11, 2012, in Benghazi, Libya, on the anniversary of 9/11. There the U.S. diplomatic compound was attacked. The next day, another compound was attacked and four people were killed in addition to Ambassador Christopher Stevens. The CIA was heavily criticized for failing to prevent the attack.

Attacks continued in 2013. For instance, a car bomb, set by al-Nusra in February, exploded near the Baath Party offices in Syria, which killed 61 people and injured more than 200 others. Boko Haram, a group in Nigeria, entered a mosque in August 2013, killing at least 44 people. Although the group mainly targets Christians, it also focuses on Muslims they believe do not adhere to Shariah law or those they suspect collaborate with Nigerian forces.

In late September 2013, the Somali group al-Shabab inflicted terror in Kenya. The group claimed this was in retribution for the presence of Kenyan troops in Somalia. The group entered a shopping mall and engaged in a shooting rampage in which at least 68 people died and over 175 were injured.³² Among the perpetrators were Americans and a British citizen.

The aforementioned attacks are some of many thousands that occur around the world year after year despite the efforts of military and police counterterrorism efforts. The Global Terrorism Index measures the impact of terrorism on 158 countries, including the number of incidents, fatalities, injuries, and property damage. According to the 2012 report there were 22,678 incidents of terrorism between the years 2002–2011. The key findings were as follows, mirroring the themes mentioned thus far in this book, even those mentioned by Usama bin Laden in his fatwas!

- The number of terrorist incidents and the number of successful attacks has steadily increased over the last decade.
- In 2011, 91 percent of terrorist attacks were successful.
- From 2002 to 2011 over one-third of all victims killed in terrorist attacks were Iraqi.
- In 2011, there were 4,564 terrorist incidents globally resulting in 7,473 deaths and 13,961 injuries.
- Most terrorist attacks occur in the context of a wider conflict situation.

- Although religious terrorism often gets widespread coverage, there is a significant level of terrorism from nonreligious groups.
- Western Europe experiences many more terrorist incidents than the U.S. having also suffered 19 more fatalities than the U.S.
- Over the period 2002–2011, terrorists were most likely to target private citizens and property, government, police, and business. The trends for these attacks have been increasing as a percentage for all targets since 2002. Military installations and personnel were only targeted in 4 percent of incidents.
- Global incidents, fatalities, and injuries are dominated by events in lower middle-income countries. Seven of the 10 countries most affected by terrorism are from the lower middle-income bracket. Low-income countries are much less likely to suffer from terrorism than lower middle-income countries. This suggests that poverty is not a prime driver of terrorism.
- The majority of global incidents, fatalities, and injuries occur in countries with hybrid regimes, and account for 46 percent of incidents, 54 percent of fatalities, and 60 percent of all injuries.
- Terrorism correlates with low political stability, low intergroup cohesion, human rights violations, and high levels of group grievances.
- From 2002 to 2011, North America was the least likely region to suffer from a terrorist attack, followed by Western Europe.³³

The top 10 countries most affected by terrorism are Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, Thailand, Russia, and the Philippines. As the year 2013 comes to a close, it will be interesting to see the change from 2011 to 2013 in terms of most affected countries. The Global Terrorism Index also notes that incidents reported as international news tend to be large-scale attacks, yet there is a preponderance of small-scale attacks.³⁴ Perhaps this is the reason why we do not understand the breadth of terrorism occurring around the world.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 only served to exacerbate hatred of the United States and other governments that were part of the coalition. Eventually, countries would leave the coalition because of the threat of more terrorist attacks against them. After the Madrid attacks, Spain scheduled elections, and the ruling Populist Party was defeated. The Socialist Party came to power, and Jose Rodriguez Zapatero became the next Spanish prime minister. He withdrew 1,300 troops from Iraq. Al-Qaeda was able to claim that it influenced the outcome of the elections. It was

right. But the United States, which was committed to creating a “democratic state,” was losing on every front with one scandal after another.

The United States in Iraq was a public relations nightmare from the beginning. First, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a new group, was created. Other Sunni and Shia groups also wanted to purge the United States from Iraq. U.S. troops were accused of engaging in crimes against Iraqis. In 2004, a systematic problem was brought to light involving the Abu Ghraib prison. Complete with pictures, evidence of detainee mistreatment and abuse was publicized for all to see. Time and time again, the world was shown pictures of naked detainees piled on top of each other, detainees on leashes, and detainees being threatened by dogs. Several military members were reprimanded and prosecuted.³⁵ In 2005, the world was told that the Interior Ministry run by the Shia government, which the United States supported, was torturing Sunnis in a secret prison.³⁶

VILIFICATION, DEGRADATION, AND IRAQ

Finding explanations for why people engage in inhumane and degrading treatment and torture is addressed in psychological research. Understanding this literature provides additional insight into why the United States acted with less than a democratic response. Perhaps the most telling study on this subject came from Phil Zimbardo in what became known as the Stanford Prison Experiment, which took place in 1971.

In that experiment, Zimbardo provided some enlightening information about the behavior of individuals in prison situations.³⁷ In his study, the subjects (participants) answered an ad to study the psychological effects of prison life. The subjects were each screened to eliminate those with psychological problems. All the subjects were males, and half were assigned as guards and the other half as prisoners. The guards were given no training. The prisoners were subjected to a surprise arrest, were blindfolded, and brought to jail where they were searched, stripped naked, and made to believe they had germs or lice. Heavy chains were put on their feet, and they were put in a “dress” and were given an ID number and stocking cap. The guards woke up the prisoners at 2:30 A.M. for counts and used push-ups as punishment. On the second morning of the experiment, there was a prisoner rebellion, and the guards used fire extinguishers, broke into each cell, stripped the prisoners, punished the leaders of the rebellion with solitary confinement, and began a campaign of harassment. The guards (one of whom was called John

Wayne) then turned to psychological tactics. They created a privilege cell for those least involved in the rebellion, they mixed good and bad prisoners to create distrust, and they controlled every aspect of behavior of the prisoners, including going to the bathroom. Less than 36 hours into the experiment, a prisoner had an emotional break. The guards, however, escalated their behavior. Three types of guards were observed in this experiment: (1) tough but fair, (2) good guys, and (3) hostile, arbitrary, and inventive. The prisoners coped with their circumstances in a variety of ways. There were those who rebelled and fought with the guards, some broke down emotionally, and others became model prisoners. Zimbardo recalled that on the fifth day of the experiment, he was approached by parents visiting their sons and asking him to contact a lawyer. The lawyer did come to the prison the next day to represent the prisoners, but he was also aware it was an experiment. Zimbardo recognized it was time to stop the experiment when they found that some of the guards were escalating their abusive behavior in the middle of the night with no supervision and outside the scope of the experiment, and when a recent Stanford Ph.D. who was conducting interviews with the guards and prisoners objected to the abusive behavior. What was supposed to be a two-week experiment ended after only six days.³⁸

This experiment illustrated that when individuals are put in these types of situations, some act unconscionably. So while explanations such as “a few bad apples” perpetrate these acts are promulgated, there is a more sound systemic explanation for this type of behavior. As Zimbardo further explained:

The design of the Stanford Prison Experiment made it evident that initially our guards were “good apples,” some of whom became soured over time by powerful situational forces. In addition, I later realized that it was, I, along with my research team who was responsible for the System that made that situation work so effectively and so destructively. We failed to provide adequate top-down constraints to prevent prisoner abuse, and we set an agenda and procedures that encouraged a process of dehumanization and deindividuation that stimulated guards to act in creatively evil ways. Further, we could harness the System’s power to terminate the experiment when it began to spin out of control and when a whistleblower forced recognition of my personal responsibility for the abuses.³⁹

Zimbardo also had thoughts on what happened at Abu Ghraib prison, which was portrayed as the work of a few “bad apples,” or as General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff put it, a few “rogue soldiers.”⁴⁰ Based on his previous research, Zimbardo did not buy

the government's explanation. In his view, this promulgated perspective overshadowed and detracted from the failure of the system.

POST-IRAQ IMPLICATIONS

Our engagement in Iraq served to put our military at risk, exacerbate hatred, and increase the network's recruitment. It also took precious resources necessary to fight al-Qaeda worldwide. Attacks continue, and even with ramped up counterterrorism efforts worldwide, all of them simply cannot be stopped. Of course the argument can be made that the United States has not suffered from an attack since 9/11, but the truth is, several attacks have occurred. The recent Boston Marathon bombings where two brothers, inspired by events in Chechnya, planted two bombs near the finish line of the marathon were able to strike fear and cause a reactive security situation in the United States is just one such example. Further, many more were thwarted. For instance, Jose Padilla (Figure 2.2) fell in with Egyptian extremists in Florida, traveling to Egypt for further inspiration. From Egypt he traveled to a training camp in Afghanistan, convinced by al-Qaeda leaders that he should return to the United States and carry out a mission to blow up an apartment building, and there was also talk of creating a "dirty bomb" although this never seemed to have gone beyond the thinking stage. In May 2002, he boarded a flight in Zurich, Switzerland, and due to good intelligence work was apprehended upon his arrival. Luckily then, the United States, through good policing and intelligence work, and with the support from our allies and partners, has managed to thwart many attacks in the country.

But there will come a day when we are not there to catch it. A case in point is Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to blow up a Detroit-bound plane on Christmas Day in 2009. The bomb, hidden in his underwear, earned him the name the "Underwear Bomber." While a humorous characterization, his intentions were not humorous in the least. Instead of igniting, the bomb burst into flames. The FBI determined that he was inspired by al-Qaeda, in particular Anwar al-Awlaki, the infamous member of AQAP later killed by a U.S. drone strike. In his quest to participate, Abdulmutallab actively sought out the organization.⁴¹ This attempt was eerily reminiscent of the attempted plot carried out by Richard Reid, the "Shoe Bomber." Reid, a British citizen who fell in with terrorists operating out of the Finsbury Park Mosque in London under the leadership of Abu Hamza al-Masri, boarded an American Airlines flight from Paris, France,

JOSE PADILLA

Jose Padilla (Figure 2.2) was born in Brooklyn in 1970 and is of Puerto Rican descent. His family moved to Chicago and he joined the Maniac Latin Disciples gang. He spent years in prison for various crimes, and when he was 21 he moved to Florida. He went to prison again for firing a weapon at a motorist's windshield. After his release in 1992, he went to work for Taco Bell. He married a Jamaican. His boss there was a Muslim and he started attending mosque and converted to Islam. In 1993, he got a job at a country club and started attending various mosques. He left his wife in 1998 presumably to study religion and married an Egyptian and had two children. He went to Afghanistan for al-Qaeda training and was arrested in 2002 in the United States.




Figure 2.2 Jose Padilla, also known as Abdullah al-Muhajir or Muhajir Abdullah, was convicted in federal court of aiding terrorists. (Courtesy of the U.S. Department of Justice.)

to Miami. In flight, he attempted to light his explosive-laden shoes on fire but was subdued by alert passengers (see Figure 2.3a,b).

THE HOMEGROWN THREAT

Homegrown terrorism in the United States is a reality. Homegrown terrorism is defined as “terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States.”⁴² Homegrown terrorism in the United States is still not alarming as the numbers are relatively small. Brian Michael Jenkins reports that between 9/11 and the end



Figure 2.3 (a) Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. (Courtesy of the U.S. Federal Government.) (b) Richard Reid. (Courtesy of the U.S. Marshalls Office/EPA.)

of 2009, there were 46 cases.⁴³ Thirteen of these were in 2009. The author elaborated further the difference among the jihadis and the move from apprehension to prevention on the part of authorities.

Most of the would-be jihadists were individuals who recruited themselves into the terrorist role. Some provided assistance to foreign terrorist organizations; some went abroad to join various jihad fronts; some plotted terrorist attacks in the United States, usually with very little success because of intervention by the authorities. The threat of large-scale terrorist violence has pushed law enforcement toward prevention rather than criminal apprehension after an event.⁴⁴

Emerson Begolly, for example, pled guilty to “soliciting others to engage in acts of terrorism within the United States and to using a firearm during and in relation to an assault on FBI agents.” He posted a document with information such as how to set up a lab and manufacture explosives.⁴⁵ In 2010, five men from Northern Virginia were convicted on terrorism charges after they traveled to Pakistan with the intent of working with terrorists against U.S. troops in Afghanistan.⁴⁶ Nidal Malik Hasan, an Army major and psychiatrist, went on a shooting spree at Fort Hood in Texas in 2009, killing 13 people and wounding 43 others. In August 2013, he was convicted of 32 counts of attempted premeditated murder and 13 counts of premeditated murder. Hasan was born and raised in the United States and was the son of Palestinian immigrants.⁴⁷ Prior to the attack he was in contact with AQAP member Anwar al-Awlaki. Another significant U.S. case was Omar Hammami who was the son of a nonreligious Syrian father and Christian mother. Hammami went on a quest to discover his religion and eventually joined the Somali group al-Shabab.

Another study examined a selection of 20 cases of individuals inspired but unaffiliated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and who sought to perpetrate terrorist acts on U.S. soil. For example, in 2002, Egyptian born, permanent resident Hesham Muhammad Hadayet shot and killed two people at the El Al counter at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). In July 2006, seven men from Miami were indicted on several terrorism related conspiracy counts. Naveed Haq was convicted for a shooting spree in the Seattle Jewish Federation Building.⁴⁸

We should also not forget the case of John Walker Lindh, who was from an upper middle-class family, and went to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Author George Michael discussed Lindh's alienation at a young age and descent into radicalization.

By age 15, he exhibited a considerable degree of alienation from his peers and immersed himself in the study of Islam. By age 16, he had dropped out of school and started attending various Islamic centers in California. Eventually, he enrolled in an Arab-language school in Yemen. From there he made his way to Pakistan and eventually Afghanistan, where he attended al-Qaeda training camps and actually met Osama bin Laden who reportedly thanked him for taking part in jihad.⁴⁹

American forces picked up Lindh during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Again, numbers are small, but at the same time the number of cases increased rather than declined.⁵⁰ The reality is recruitment in the United States will continue to grow, posing an increasing challenge to law enforcement bodies that rely on intelligence collection as well as cooperation with the Muslim community and those family and friends who are concerned with the radicalization of those around them. But as Jenkins notes, none of this is foolproof and "there will, on occasion, be bloodshed."⁵¹ It is also important to remember that the network is busy focusing on activities abroad, taking pride in attacks that are also aimed at fighting the United States through proxy wars around the world and claiming that with every attack, they are striking a blow to the United States, its partners, and allies. In essence, the United States, its partners, and allies are losing against global jihad.

LEARNING STRATEGIES

While agencies and governments wrangle over information sharing, terrorists seem to have no problem doing so and even posting how-to

instructions. Terrorists indeed learn from each other and tactics used by some are adapted by others. For example, gruesome beheading videos were the staple of Chechen groups well before they were used in Afghanistan. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are used across groups and pressure cooker bombs touted on the Internet. Training camps are another way to share tactics, with individuals from different groups intermixing and learning about ways to kill their enemies.

CONCERNS ABOUT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

The networks use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a great concern, although they do not need it for promulgating terror. It is nice to have and the use of WMD would add to their prestige. The most likely scenario is the development of biological weapons or chemical weapons and with that a rudimentary method of dispersal. They can always access unsecured chemical or biological weapons. It is possible but less likely for them to acquire a nuclear weapon on the black market and deliver it, for example, on a barge.

Al-Qaeda has always had an interest in WMD. This was evidenced during the discovery of items at the Darunta Camp in Afghanistan, including experiments with chemicals on dogs. Tarnak Farms, another camp in Afghanistan, had a biological warfare lab. The *Encyclopedia of Afghanistan Resistance* was found in Jalalabad that “contained formulas for manufacturing toxins, botulinum, and ricin and provided methods for dissemination.”⁵² Also, as previously mentioned, the British foiled a ricin plot in London in 2003. Later, in 2009, several members of AQIM died at their training camp from the bubonic plague.⁵³ AQI also used chlorine in vehicle-based improvised explosive devices against U.S. troops in Iraq in 2006, although the casualties were due to bomb blasts.⁵⁴ But with all methods of terrorism, terrorists are constantly testing and refining their methods, and the motivation to use chemical and biological attacks will be part of that toolbox.

THE TERRORISM–CRIMINAL NEXUS

Much is written about the terrorism–criminal nexus and rightfully so. The connections between these groups should be a great concern. Often these

groups have the same operating environment and their relationships are mutually beneficial. For example, Peter Lilley writes about the movement of money and the participation on criminal activities to finance terrorism.

What is clear that terrorist groups have learnt a lot very quickly from the dirty money moving experiences of Organized Crime Inc. More crucially, Terror Finance Inc. has harnessed the power of the internet and other technologies in an awesome and frightening manner. Equally there exists the real possibility in the future that organized criminals and terrorist groups may further exploit and develop mutual cooperation to create a criminal/terrorist continuum. To a certain extent this already happens: more traditional terrorist groupings have long used crime to finance their activities. Terrorist groupings have frequently been implicated in the international narcotics trade.⁵⁵

Mokhtar Belmokhtar is a good example of using crime to finance terror activities, using kidnapping for ransom, and smuggling cigarettes, arms, drugs, and stolen cars. The Taliban traffics in heroin to finance its activities. Going back to 1998, a cooperative relationship between al-Qaeda and the Mafia existed with regard to human smuggling. In another incident, a member of the mafia was caught trying to sell missiles to al-Qaeda (the presumed al-Qaeda member was an FBI agent).⁵⁶

Terrorist and criminal groups need money to operate and they participate in the same enterprises. "The terrorist financing nexus demands that funds, however generated, are pushed to frontline terrorists, used to foster terrorism, or kept out of reach of authorities."⁵⁷ Fundraising occurs through the use of charities and zakat (charitable giving), a Muslim obligation. Other avenues include smuggling, retail crime, intellectual property crime, identity theft, scams, and mortgage fraud.⁵⁸ For example, a case of mortgage fraud in the United States was tied to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the then leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. In that case, Sharif Omar transferred at least \$40,000 to an account in Jordan. The money was meant for Sharif Omar's brother who was an associate of al-Zarqawi.⁵⁹ In another case, Tarik Hamdi, a member of the U.S.-based charity International Institute of Islamic Thought, was charged with mortgage fraud.⁶⁰

Moving money is another criminal enterprise. Hawalas, an informal banking method that is very difficult to trace, is widely used. Terrorists also exploit commodities such as gold, gems, precious stones and metals, as well as launder money; create front companies, shells, and offshore accounts; and exploit e-gambling and e-gaming that aid in this practice.⁶¹

CONCLUSION

This chapter provided a detailed discussion of how the al-Qaeda threat evolved. Furthermore, despite what Bin Laden and others were blatantly telling the United States all these years and despite the best efforts of those who saw the threat, 9/11 and other attacks throughout the world were not prevented. All the while, al-Qaeda members made statements reminding us why the United States, its partners, and allies were being targeted. For example, in August 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri released a videotaped statement that was aired on Al Jazeera. In it, he warned the Americans and the British that more attacks were coming. Referring to September 11 he stated, "Our message is clear—what you saw in New York and Washington and what you are seeing in Afghanistan and Iraq, all these are nothing compared to what you will see next." With regard to attacks that took place in London during the previous month, al-Zawahiri said, "to the British, I am telling you that Blair brought you destruction in the middle of London and more will come, God willing."⁶² Al-Zawahiri was right. Given the expansion of the network and the heightened sense of anti-American and anti-Western sentiment because of the Iraq war, the network was not hard pressed for new recruits. Attacks around the world were highlighted, demonstrating the increasing threat, including those on U.S. soil.

Understanding the nature, breadth, depth, and capability of threats is the first step toward building an informational influence campaign. The next step is to understand the terrorist mentality and environment, which also contributes to building an effective campaign. This includes their mental state, motivation, demographics, beliefs, and how they are being influenced.

NOTES

1. Gerhard Schröder, "Statement to German Bundestag," September 12, 2001, <http://www.patriotresource.com/wtc/intl/0912/germany.html> (accessed April 28, 2009).
2. "Al-Qaeda Is a Bigger Threat Today Than 10 Years Ago, Says Terrorism Expert," *DW*, July 10, 2010, <http://www.dw.de/al-qaeda-is-a-bigger-threat-today-than-10-years-ago-says-terrorism-expert/a-6087974> (accessed August 22, 2013).

3. Former CIA case officer Robert Baer clearly indicates from his personal experience, that Islamic terrorist groups planned and carried out attacks throughout the 1990s and beyond. It was evident that these numerous terrorist groups and individuals, including Bin Laden, collaborated with one another on an ad hoc basis. Terrorists continued to plan and attack, and they certainly were not concerned with the Washington turf wars taking place. See Robert Baer, *See No Evil* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2002).
4. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, both of whom worked on counterterrorism issues for the National Security Council, provided insight into how the U.S. government attempted to counter the threat from al-Qaeda before and after the 9/11 attacks. However, they also discussed the ways in which the U.S. government failed to acknowledge the seriousness of al-Qaeda prior to 9/11. For further discussion, see Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2003) and Baer, *See No Evil*.
5. According to Robert Baer (*See No Evil*), the organization in the best position to understand and operate against terrorist groups was paralyzed by politics. Human collection was not deemed important. CIA case officers did not want to rock the boat or conduct activities that would threaten their well-being.
6. Baer, *See No Evil*, 269.
7. Ibid., 268.
8. George Michael, *The Enemy of My Enemy* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2006).
9. Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 170–185.
10. Michael, *The Enemy of My Enemy*.
11. For further detail see John Miller, Michael Stone, with Chris Mitchell, *The Cell* (New York: Hyperion, 2002).
12. Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia.
13. "Jihad against Jews and Crusaders," <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm> (accessed January 1, 2010).
14. Revered figure in Afghanistan. See Chapter 3 for more details.
15. Mountain range in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.
16. Housing compound in Saudi Arabia bombed in 1996.
17. "Jihad against Jews and Crusaders."
18. Islamic law.
19. "Jihad against Jews and Crusaders."
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. The announcement was signed by Shaykh Usama Bin-Muhammad Bin-Laden; Ayman al-Zawahiri, amir of the Jihad Group in Egypt (Islamic Jihad); Abu-Yasir Rifai Ahmad Taha, Egyptian Islamic Group (IG); Shaykh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan; and Fazlur Rahman, amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. There were many disagreements and splits taking place in the Egyptian groups, and only a portion of

- the members went with them. Furthermore, Taha, the leader of the Islamic Group, later contended he was not part of this alliance.
23. "Jihad against Jews and Crusaders."
24. "Al-Qaeda's Fatwa," *PBS*, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html (accessed December 24, 2009).
25. "U.S. Linking Jailed Couple to Terrorists from Algeria," *New York Times*, December 24, 1999, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9506E2DF1339F937A15751C1A96F958260> (accessed April 20, 2008); "Prosecutors Link Border Arrest with Terrorism," *Associated Press*, December 24, 1999, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4179/is_19991224/ai_n11733163 (accessed April 2, 2008).
26. "FBI 'Terrorism' Swoop," *BBC News*, December 30, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/584144.stm> (accessed April 20, 2008).
27. Peter Bergen, *Holy War Inc.* (New York: Free Press, 2001), 140.
28. "Text Bin Laden's Statement," *Guardian*, October 7, 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/07/afghanistan.terrorism15> (accessed November 24, 2007).
29. Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
30. Rahul Bedi, "Vital Intelligence on the Taliban May Rest with Its Prime Sponsor—Pakistan's ISI," *Jane's*, October 1, 2001, http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/misc/janes011001_1_n.shtml (accessed April 8, 2009).
31. "American Al-Qaeda Terrorist Urges Attacks on U.S. diplomats," *YNet News*, August 18, 2013, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0%2C7340%2CL-4419192%2C00.html> (accessed August 28, 2013).
32. Ishan Tharoor, "Terror in Nairobi: Behind Al-Shabab's War with Kenya," *Time World*, September 23, 2013, <http://world.time.com/2013/09/21/terror-in-nairobi-behind-al-shabaabs-war-with-kenya/> (accessed September 25, 2013).
33. "Global Terrorism Index Fact Sheet," *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2012, http://www.visionofhumanity.org/pdf/gti/Global_Terrorism_Index_Fact_Sheet.pdf (accessed August 16, 2013).
34. "Global Terrorism Index," *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2012, <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/about-gti> (accessed August 16, 2013).
35. See Phil Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect* (New York: Random House, 2007), 325–326, and Phil Zimbardo, "The Stanford Prison Experiment," 1971, <http://www.prisonexp.org/> (accessed August 4, 2007).
36. Catherine Philip, "U.S. Uncovers Secret Prison in Iraq," *Baghdad Times Online*, November 15, 2005, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article590500.ece> (accessed on April 6, 2009).
37. Zimbardo, "The Stanford Prison Experiment."
38. *Ibid.*
39. Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect*, 329.
40. *Ibid.*, 325–326.

41. Scott Lewis, "Exclusive: FBI Agents Reveal Underwear Bomber Abdulmatallab Wore Explosive Underwear for Three Weeks," September 27, 2012, http://www.wxyz.com/dpp/news/local_news/investigations/fbi-agents-underwear-bomber-abdulmatallab-wore-underwear-for-3-weeks (accessed August 16, 2013).
42. Jerome P. Bjelopera, "American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat," CRS, November 15, 2011, 1.
43. Brian Michael Jenkins, "Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Radicalization in the United States since September 11, 2001," RAND, 2010, iii.
44. Ibid.
45. Jerome P. Bjelopera, "American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat," CRS, November 15, 2011, 75.
46. Bjelopera, "American Jihadist Terrorism."
47. Ibid.
48. Dean C. Alexander, "Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Inspired, Homegrown Terrorism in the United States," *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 6, 2011, 467–482.
49. Michael, *The Enemy of My Enemy*, 102.
50. Jenkins, "Would-Be Warriors."
51. Ibid., ix.
52. Jennifer L. Hesterman, *The Terrorist–Criminal Nexus*, 289.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Peter Lilley, *Dirty Dealing* (London: Kogan Page, 2006), 135.
56. Hesterman, *The Terrorist–Criminal Nexus*.
57. Lilley, *Dirty Dealing*, 144.
58. Hesterman, *The Terrorist–Criminal Nexus*.
59. Ibid., 185.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. "Al Qaeda Threatens More UK, U.S. Attacks," CNN, August 4, 2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/08/04/zawahiri.london/index.html> (accessed August 1, 2007).

3

The Mentality of the Threat

The new terrorist is not some bomb throwing Russian anarchists of 19th century or a desperate Indian independence fighter. We are not dealing with political opponents using misguided means for a sometimes-justified cause. Today's terrorists are products of modern society and all its ills. Most are simply psychopathic criminals hiding in political and religious clothing. They are sick individuals. The lunatics really have escaped the asylum and created political parties and religious movements. They are mentally ill people with hi tech weaponry.

—Stephen Morgan¹

I don't see Islam as our enemy. I see that motivation is occupation and those who hate us and would like to kill us, they are motivated by our invasion of their land, the support of their dictators that they hate.

—Ron Paul²

The previous chapter demonstrated the need to understand the overall threat from the network by examining the breadth and type of attacks. Established is that the network is a national security threat and would like nothing more than to destroy the United States. However, in order to effectively plan an informational influence campaign against the network, the micro view of the threat—the mentality of those in the network that declared war on any country that does not subscribe to its way of thinking—needs to be fully understood. This is the focus of Chapter 3. Thus, it begins with the age-old question: Are terrorists crazy? Another question is: What motivates individuals to join? Is there a demographic profile of a recruit? What do they believe, and how are these beliefs portrayed?

To truly understand the reasoning of individuals in the network to get into their heads, it is imperative that their writings or other ways of disseminating information be read.³ As evidenced in the previous chapter with the 1996 and 1998 fatwas, frequently these readings are verbose and extremely detailed, but in them their arguments are well laid out. These fatwas as well as the writings of other network members need to not only be read, but also analyzed and understood.

Knowing how network propaganda defines its enemies and the types of products it uses to perpetuate these beliefs is also imperative. Furthermore, determining what venues information is disseminated and shared is necessary because the information campaign needs for information to be placed in frequently used and realistic venues. Looking at these also serves another important purpose: For any information campaign against terrorists to flourish, it is imperative that the same tone, style, wording, language/dialect, and themes are replicated. This can only be known by examining original compositions released by individuals and groups in the network. Any information disseminated as part of an information campaign against these terrorists needs to feed into the wider way of thinking. If it does not, then the information can be construed as inconceivable and therefore false. As noted in Chapter 1, existing translations were used for speeches, audio recordings, video recordings, and so forth were left in their original form, including word choice, grammar, and punctuation.

ARE TERRORISTS CRAZY?

A fundamental question regarding the “sanity” of those in the network remains a debate. And this is obviously a subject disseminated through media outlets. For every article describing terrorists as ordinary individuals, there are those that claim the exact opposite. The quote at the beginning of this chapter was one such example of the terrorists-are-crazy school of thought. Another was a statement made by Strobe Talbott. After the 9/11 attacks, Talbott argued the following:

As the mug shots and bios of the suicide pilots emerged, it became apparent that for the most part they did not come from the ranks of the worlds desperate and aggrieved. Their fanaticism, like bin Laden's, was nurtured in privilege and in individual madness.⁴

This type of thinking extends beyond portrayals in media outlets. Academics continue to debate the question. In the psychological literature in particular, the psychoanalytical school promotes this line of thinking. The psychoanalytic approach can be traced to the work of Sigmund Freud and others. More specifically, according to Martha Cottam and colleagues:

Freud introduced the idea that the mind is like an iceberg, in that only a small part of the iceberg is visible floating above water, and around 90% is under water and unobservable. Similarly, people are conscious of only a small part of the mind. The majority of the mind's operation is like the portion of the iceberg under water. It is unconscious. Freud viewed the personality as an energy system drive by aggressive and sexual drives. People are motivated to satisfy those drives, a force Freud called the pleasure principle. Behavior is a product of these drives and the unconscious efforts by individuals to suppress and channel the desire to act out in search of satisfaction. Living in society, from Freud's perspective, requires people to deny the pleasure principle, and the consequences are pathologies such as anxiety, obsessions and defense mechanisms.⁵

Terrorists are but one of the many types of individuals studied by the psychoanalytical school. The thinking at this time was that those engaged in terrorist activity could be psychologically distinguished from the general population. These differences were considered pathological attributes. Many studies were conducted focusing on pathologies. For example, Cooper⁶ and Pearce⁷ maintained that terrorists were sociopaths. Others such as Crayton focused on narcissism as a key attribute.⁸ Thus, as Michael Taylor specifically addressed the mental health aspect of these types of studies in his summation of the earlier literature on terrorism:

The notion that the terrorist is in some sense mentally ill is one that has wide currency. The acts committed by the terrorist are in a sense extra normal. They are unusual in our society, although not unique. However, the nature of violence, and its expression against symbolic rather than individual targets greatly influences our view, and we feel that the terrorist is not just extra-normal but abnormal. We see his behavior as pathological and therefore he is in some sense mentally ill. By taking this perspective, we also tend to place the terrorist within a clinical context, because in our society this is how we conventionally deal with mental illnesses.⁹

Many other psychologists challenged the assertions of the psychoanalytical school and by default the claims in media outlets. On the one hand, the methodology employed by the psychoanalytical school was challenged. Critics of this approach note that there was a high reliance

on secondary sources such as autobiographies, press interviews, and other sources of information. Obviously the problem was that clinicians traditionally make diagnoses without access to “patients.” Thus, making claims from secondary sources or at a distance was a question of the reliability of the findings. The psychoanalytical school still continues its work on terrorists. As in earlier accounts, there are those in the psychoanalytical school that subscribe to the terrorists-are-crazy line of thinking.

As more academics continued to study terrorists, different conclusions emerged. Andrew Silke explained, “Research on the mental state of terrorists has found that they are rarely mad or crazy; very few suffer from personality disorders.”¹⁰ He also added, “but the body of research confirming this state of affairs has not prevented a steady and continuing stream of ‘experts,’ security personnel, and politicians from freely espousing and endorsing views to the contrary.”¹¹ In his book on terrorist networks, Sageman looked at individuals in al-Qaeda and did not find any evidence of paranoid personality disorders.¹² In his work on Northern Ireland, Ken Heskin did not find evidence of psychopathology or other clinical problems,¹³ and Corrado, in his examination of the Italian Red Brigades, did not find evidence to support the claims of the psychoanalytical approach.¹⁴ Furthermore, Clark McCauley noted that those with serious psychological issues are not even ideal members of terrorist groups. Group members would not want to entrust their lives to someone mentally unbalanced. As he argues, “Imagine yourself a terrorist, living an underground existence cut off from all but the few who share your goals. Your life depends on others in your group. Would you want someone in your group suffering from some kind of pathology?”¹⁵

Even so, despite evidence to the contrary, dismissing members as crazy is still an ongoing theme in media outlets and among academics. It is much harder to come to terms with the fact that the United States is dealing with individuals just like ordinary Americans, but who join groups that believe in something fundamentally different. Most important, counterterrorism strategies cannot be built on the argument that terrorists are crazy or part of a nefarious cult that reprograms the brain to get individuals to engage in violence.

UNDERSTANDING COMPLEX MOTIVATION

In addition to the psychological state of terrorists, there is another important aspect to studying terrorism: What motivates individuals to join

terrorist groups in the first place? Albert Bandura and others attempt to answer this question by focusing on the attraction to violence. He articulated the notion of “moral disengagement” and argued that individuals have high moral standards, which are a product of socialization. These standards are what prevent inhumanity toward others. Nevertheless, individuals can disengage from this morality resulting in inhumane acts.¹⁶

Others seek to explain the processes involved in radicalization and highlighted in this approach are many concepts discussed so far in this chapter. Through a series of psychological processes, Fathali Moghaddam explains radicalization as a narrowing stairway. “As people climb the stairway, they see fewer and fewer choices, until the only possible outcome is the destruction of others, or oneself, or both.”¹⁷ Although there are several floors, two are relevant to motivation. On the ground floor is the perception of fairness, and when there is a perception of being unjustly treated individuals look for ways to address their grievances. On the second floor are perceived possibilities of personal mobility and perceptions of procedural justice, two psychological factors that affect behavior. In his work, Randy Borum focuses on “pathways to terrorism,” stages denoted as it’s not right, it’s not fair, it’s your fault, and negative stereotyping.¹⁸ In their study of motivation, Simon Cottee and Keith Hayward maintain that terrorists are motivated by three things: the desire for excitement, the desire for ultimate meaning, and the desire for glory.¹⁹

Other authors such as Elena Mastors and Alyssa Deffenbaugh take a more in-depth view on motivation and argue that the reason why many Muslims and Muslim converts turn to terrorism is due to the reality of their current situation. Thus, examining the personal stories of al-Qaeda network members before recruitment indicated they join the network for a variety of social, political,²⁰ economic, and personal reasons.²¹ The stories and the story leading up to motivation provide a richer and more complex understanding of motivation. Further, these motivations, depicted in Table 3.1, are not mutually exclusive, and combinations of these motivations are also possible.

In the authors’ view, motivation is “the push” to join.²² In fact, these motivations are mundane and the same explanations for joining are found in any group. This in fact bolsters the aforementioned arguments by psychologists regarding the mental state of individuals.²³

Looking at Table 3.1, there are clearly several subcategories of motivation. This list of these subcategories is by far not exhaustive, but they were based on stories of motivation collected from many cases over the years.

Table 3.1 Examples of Motivations

Personal	Social	Economic	Political
Absent fathers	Alcohol abuse	Criminal activity	Acts by enemy
Academic performance	Conscription	No employment motive	Cultural imperialism
Alleviate boredom	Cultural alienation	Financial difficulties	Government policies
Camaraderie	Drug abuse	Underemployment	Oppress identity group
Desire to fit in	Social pressure	Unemployment	Support against enemy
Difficult family	Society alienation		
Disputes with parents	Wanting a cause		
Fame			
Family influence			
Lack of purpose			
Marital problems			
Parental divorce			
Peer pressure			
Job performance			
Seeking adventure			
Status/recognition			
Traumatic event			
Vengeance			

For example, an aspect of social motivation is cultural alienation. Some Muslims who emigrate from other countries do not feel that they are fully a part of existing society. They exist in the gray area. Often they suffer from serious discrimination. The case of Zacarias Moussaoui, who, before his capture by U.S. authorities, was to be a pilot in the 9/11 attacks, illustrated this motivation well. Moussaoui’s brother recounted their childhood in France in a housing project full of other North Africans. One Alsatian family in particular referred to them as “dirty niggers,” making no distinction between blacks and Arabs.

This cultural alienation was also felt at school where the school cafeteria served pork and there was no cultural sensitivity to Muslims that did

not eat pork and they were told "Oh for heaven's sake, can't you Muslim people be like everybody else?" Incidents such as these were part and parcel to them feeling under attack and not being able to find a comfortable feeling about their cultural identity. As Abd Samad Moussaoui illustrated:

One day a pea and bacon dish was on the menu. When I protested, one of the kitchen staff took my plate, stabbed furiously at the bits of bacon and handed the plate back to me, grumbling, "You're not going to bug us over a few bits of bacon." A classmate who was not a Muslim snapped back at him, "And how would you like it if someone put a few ounces of shit in your plate?" Once again we felt under attack. In fact, we were just confused. We couldn't recognize ourselves either in the all-French model, or in the North African model.²⁴

Additionally, Abd Samad Moussaoui explained, North African students were not encouraged to pursue schooling outside of vocational training.

Cultural alienation was not the only issue in Zacarias Moussooui's life. He also faced significant personal hurdles in that his mother, during times she was unable to care for him and his siblings, put them into foster care. Even when his mother was living with them, they had no parental supervision or support, and this resulted in feelings of resentment from Zacarias. One incident in particular was very telling. As his brother illustrated:

It was the day that Zacarias was to take his practical exam for the vocational diploma. He had to be at school by 7:30 A.M. for registration. But the bus didn't come that early. So Zacarias asked our mother to drive him, and she agreed. On the fateful day, Zacarias got up early and got himself ready. Not a sound in the house. After a while, seeing what time it was, he went and knocked on our mother's bedroom door. No answer. He knocked louder, and called her name. Nothing. He went in. Aicha opened an eye. He said to her, "Mum, hurry up, I'm going to be late." She looked at him and said, "I'm tired. Get yourself to school. Let me sleep." And she turned to the wall. He went on at her. She screamed at him, "Get yourself to school, leave me in peace!" Zacarias was beside himself. He flew out of the house, slamming every door, hitchhiked and got to school forty-five minutes late. At the end of the exam he still hadn't finished his paper. In a fit, he chucked it into the wastebasket. A teacher took pity on him, retrieved his exam paper and handed it in. Thanks to him, Zacarias got his diploma.

He never forgave our mother for what she did that day. He was forever saying, "I knew she wouldn't do a thing to help me, but I didn't know she was capable of doing something to hurt me."²⁵

The background of other recruits point to different motivations. The perpetrator of the failed Times Square bombing in New York City in 2010, Faisal Shahzad, is a Pakistani who immigrated to the United States and became a U.S. citizen. He parked his SUV containing an incendiary device near Times Square, but luckily it did not explode and was taken care of by police after a vendor observed smoke coming from the car.²⁶ According to FBI sources, Faisal was upset over U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan and was also having financial and marital difficulties. Thus, personal and political motivations seemingly converged. He became connected to elements within the Pakistani Taliban who encouraged him to carry out the attack. He was also known to have come from a family with ties to Pakistani militants, pointing to yet another element in a complex story of motivation.²⁷

In another case, an Afghani profiled by a magazine pointed to the strong influence family has on potential recruits. Hanif has an uncle who was a Taliban member named Hanif and as such, from an early age came in contact with Taliban “fighters, officials and supporters.”²⁸ Because of this he was regaled with stories about the prowess of the war against the Soviets and the subsequent battle against the Americans in Afghanistan. Joining jihad was a natural outgrowth of such socialization. He intended to join the Taliban but on his trip to the camp, he stopped at an al-Qaeda base and was impressed with the mujahedeen, viewing them as the elite fighters. He chose to stay with them and join.²⁹

Finally, some are motivated by the sheer adventure of the prospect of participation. In one example, Colleen La Rose, a 46-year-old woman, converted to Islam. Looking seemingly for adventure, she referred to herself as “Jihad Jane” in chat rooms, looking for people to wage jihad with.³⁰

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILING

Is there a demographic profile of a typical recruit? After 9/11 many made sweeping claims that al-Qaeda terrorists were young, uneducated males, from the Middle East, in their twenties to early thirties, and unemployed. However, there has been ample time to examine their backgrounds, and while this may be the case, it was not true of everyone. Other demographic traits emerged that were different. For example, in the aforementioned study by Mastors and Deffenbaugh examined the backgrounds of numerous recruits.³¹ Specifically, the aspects looked at were country of

origin/citizenship/residency, gender, age at recruitment, occupation, and education. The study found that these traits varied, and one central profile did not emerge. The authors explained that the demographic backgrounds of recruits were complex and there was differentiation among them. As such, it is not possible to talk about the profile of the prototypical recruit. To illustrate, take for example a recruit that was born in France and is French, a convert to Islam, 35, male, factory worker, with a secondary education. Another recruit is Moroccan by birth and citizenship, 19, male, fruit stand operator, with an elementary education. There is really no comparison. One exception, however, could be that they are both male. Yet this is not as unusual as once thought.

Women have always played mostly a support role in these terror groups. The network is adaptable, and more women will be considered for operational duties. The Chechens use of women called the “black widows” and the suicide bombers in Iraq are notable examples. For instance, in 2008 al-Qaeda and Iraq used disabled women as bombers. Unbeknownst to the women, bombs were attached to their wheelchairs and remotely detonated.³² Another female suicide bomber detonated a bomb among women and children in a playgroup killing 54 people.³³ Further, in August 2013 a news story broke about the potential for the concealment of explosives in breast implants. This idea was thought to be the brainchild of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) bomb maker Ibrahim al-Asiri.³⁴ He is also credited with the “underwear” bomb and dipping clothes in liquid so that when they dry they would become explosives that would be very difficult to detect. This is al-Qaeda’s adaptive learning at work.

Finally, even though a recruit has a particular demographic characteristic, this does not automatically equate with motivation. In other words, an individual may be unemployed, but this could be unimportant in terms of motivation. Instead, other motivating factors could be at play.

VAST NETWORK OF PROPAGANDA

Thus far the focus was on the individual mind-set. The following section discusses the network’s use of propaganda that shapes or bolsters belief systems. Propaganda serves many purposes. In general, the al-Qaeda network uses propaganda to “educate” individuals about their perception of the proper codes of behavior, political events, social policy, religion, and

training, among other issues and subjects. Propaganda is also used as a recruiting tool. It is all laid out for individuals to internalize. Of note is the wide use of religious texts and historical events to bolster arguments. Those who do not have a firm grip on history and religion would find their arguments difficult to challenge. When these individuals claim they are authorities on those matters, another layer of credibility is added.

Whether the United States agrees with the message put forth by al-Qaeda is not the point. What is important is that on a whole, the message is clear, repetitive, and consistent, and this attracts individuals to the message. In the words of Robert Lindsay, some of it is even “cool.”⁷³ Maintaining support for the network is crucial because without the flow of recruits, members, and passive supporters, the existence of the vast network comes under threat.

USES OF PROPAGANDA

The network uses propaganda to entice potential recruits to join. Therefore, motivated individuals are drawn into groups in the network through this massive propaganda machine.³⁵ This is “the pull” as opposed to “the push” of the network.³⁶ Propaganda is also used in the indoctrination process. The al-Qaeda network uses propaganda not just to target potential recruits but also as an indoctrination tool. Thus, recruits go through a significant indoctrination process, and propaganda is central to this process. Once assessed as possible members, they are further indoctrinated with illustrations of group propaganda. Here, central messages are consistently reinforced. When recruits ask questions about the information presented, they are conveniently explained away. Independent views and critical thinking are quickly suppressed.³⁷

Tawfik Hamid, a former member of the Islamic Group (IG), illustrated this with an example from his own experience in Egypt where he was told to stop thinking for himself. As he explained, “the first tactic *Jamaa Isamiya* employed was to pressure me to suppress critical thought. I have already mentioned how Muchtar [existing member] encouraged me to ‘leave my brain at the door,’ and his use of the phrase, *al fikr kufr* (thinking critically makes one an infidel).”³⁸

In addition to enticing recruits, indoctrinating them, and reinforcing views of members, propaganda serves another purpose—that is, to inform sympathizers and passive supporters.

THE PROPAGANDA MESSAGE

What is the message in the propaganda? Of note, a concerted propaganda effort is influencing potential recruits, members, and other passive supporters. Again, the message is clear, simple, and consistent. They are told that someone else is to blame for their ills. They are fighting, supporting, or promoting jihad for greater Islam, for their Muslim brothers, and to alleviate the suffering of Muslims at the hands of the West and Western-supported regimes. The goal of the network is to overthrow existing regimes and build a world dominated by their version of “true” Muslim governments. In many ways, this feeds into the political motivation of many.

To make its case, the network relies on many “authoritative” sources of information, including those from influential historical thinkers and jihadists. A type of authoritative source is the written works by those considered to be the foundational thinkers of al-Qaeda. In addition, several notable so-called al-Qaeda propagandists emerged over time, including individuals such as the Finsbury Mosque cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri; American-born al-Qaeda spokesman Adam Yahiye Gadahn; Malkia el Around, a Moroccan-born Belgian whose husband was responsible for the killing of Ahmad Shah Massoud; and Said al-Shihir, a Saudi who was instrumental in AQAP. In one example from August 2013, Gadahn released an audio message calling for the assassinations of U.S. diplomats in the Middle East. He also heralded the death of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans in Benghazi.³⁹

Ayman al-Zawahiri used an interesting approach in 2008 to assert his authority on issues. He called what was coined an “open meeting” with him. In this open meeting, individuals were able to submit questions to him, and al-Zawahiri presented in writing the answers to some of them, barring those that were, he claimed, about personal differences and quarrels, and security. In the example provided in the following box, al-Zawahiri justifies the killing of “innocents” by the network. He supported his arguments with authoritative sources such as Usama bin Laden and Abu Yahya al-Libi (both now deceased). Furthermore, when questioned, he even succeeded in putting the questioner in a defensive position.

Some examples of widely used historical figures and jihadists are Ibn Taymiyyah, Sayyid Qutb, and Abdullah Azzam. As illustrated in the previous chapter, Usama bin Laden’s fatwa justifying mobilizing against the United States relied on the arguments of Ibn al-Tamiyyah.

QUESTION AND ANSWER WITH AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI

Ayman al-Zawahiri provided an opportunity for individuals to ask questions about the group and its objectives and tactics. In his responses, al-Zawahiri provided justifications for them, using authoritative sources, including his own and puts it back on the questioner to justify the question asked in the first place. For example, one questioner, geography teacher Mudarris Jughrafiya, asked about the killing of Muslims.

Excuse me, Mr. Zawahiri, but who is it who is killing with Your Excellency's blessing the innocents in Baghdad, Morocco and Algeria? Do you consider the killing of women and children to be Jihad? I challenge you and your organization to do that in Tel Aviv. Why have you—to this day—not carried any strike in Israel? Or is it easier to kill Muslims in the markets? Maybe it is necessary [for you] to take some geography lessons, because your maps only show the Muslims' states.

To this question, al-Zawahiri authoritatively addressed the components breaking apart the argument and replying to the points. From the outset he pointed out that in fact they have not killed innocents in Baghdad, Algeria or in any other place. Any killing that took place was an "unintentional error," or was the result of the enemy using al-Tatarrus (use of human shields). Further, al-Zawahiri noted, this was explained in several authoritative sources including *The Healing of Believers' Chest*, *The Exoneration* and *Al-Tatarrus in Contemporary Jihad*.

Furthermore, al-Zawahiri made clear that the group actually battles those who kill innocents. The perpetrators are the Americans, Jews, Russians and the French and "their agents." As al-Zawahiri put it:

Were we insane killers of innocents as the questioner claims, it would be possible for us to kill thousands of them in the crowded markets, but we are confronting the enemies of the Muslim Ummah and targeting *them*, and it may be the case that during this, an innocent might fall unintentionally or unavoidably, and the Mujahideen have warned repeatedly the Muslims in general that they are in a war with the senior criminals—the Americans and

Jews and their allies and agents—and that they must keep away from the places where these enemies gather. The Crusader-Jewish propaganda claims that the Mujahideen kill the innocent, but the Muslim Ummah knows who its enemy is and who defends it.⁴⁰

Al-Zawahiri also points out that even Usama bin Laden addressed this in a speech where he claimed that the mujahedeen “will only receive every good thing from the mujahedeen” and that the Muslim victims at the hands of the unbelievers and Crusaders are indeed unintentional.⁴¹ As Bin Laden pointed out, they are saddened by these losses and ask for forgiveness from Allah. Al-Zawahiri further maintains that the target is the “puppet rulers.”

He then addressed the question about targeting Israel and asks the questioner if he has heard about events where Israel was targeted. Al-Zawahiri is putting the onus back on the questioner to be more fully aware of al-Qaeda’s activities against the Israelis. Striking Israel includes targeting its allies as well. As he illuminates in detail for the questioner about those activities:

[H]asn’t the questioner heard that Qaida al-Jihad struck the Jews in Jerba, Tunisia, and struck the Israeli tourists in Mombasa, Kenya, in their hotel, then fired two missiles at the El-Al airliner⁴² carrying a number of them? Hasn’t the questioner heard what Shaykh Usama bin Laden ... mentioned in his latest speech, that the battalions of the Mujahideen, after expelling the occupier from Iraq, shall make their way towards Jerusalem? Hasn’t the questioner heard that Allah ... has honored us with the dealing of blows to America—the head of international unbelief—and its allies—like England, Spain, Australia and France—in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen, and Algeria? And those are Israel’s fathers, creators, guardians and protectors.

And then why does the questioner focus on how al-Qaida in particular must strike in Israel, while he didn’t request—for example—the Jihadist organizations in Palestine to come to the aid of their brothers in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq? If this is because of his good opinion of al-Qaida and that it must strike Islam’s enemies everywhere, then we thank him for his good opinion, and we promise our Muslim brothers that we will strive as much as we can to deal blows to the Jews inside Israel and outside it, with Allah’s help and guidance...⁴³

THE THINKERS OF JIHAD

Ibn Taymiyyah (1268–1328) was a Syrian scholar who fought against the Mongols when they invaded the Middle East. Even though the Mongols had converted to Islam, Taymiyyah claimed that they did not follow Sharia, but Yasa, law. Taymiyyah railed against those who did not follow the correct path, arguing they were in a state of *jahiliyyah*, the pre-Islamic pagan era of disbelief and ignorance. Taymiyyah believed that engaging in jihad against such ignorance was permitted.

Sayyid Qutb was an Egyptian scholar who was imprisoned by President Gama al-Nasir for his views and executed in 1966. Qutb wrote many books espousing his views, including *In the Shade of the Quran*, *Milestones*, and *Social Justice in Islam*. In *In the Shade of the Quran*, Qutb outlined his modern view of *jahiliyyah*, and argued that Egypt was not an Islamic country but in a state of *jahiliyyah*. Through his reasoning, he was able to declare the Egyptian regime (although Muslim) apostate (as having abandoned Islam). Qutb advocated jihad to establish an Islamic state.⁴⁴

Also drawing on the work of Ibn Taymiyyah, Azzam argued that jihad was a central duty of Muslims. Azzam draws a distinction between the collective duty, fulfilled by a community, and the individual duty of all Muslims. If Muslims are not able to defend themselves against an invader, others should come to their aid. An example of this is when the mujahedeen helped Afghans expel the Soviets from Afghanistan.⁴⁵

In his autobiographical account of his radicalization, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross provided an enlightening depiction of these types of arguments while employed by a U.S.-based Saudi charity that employed radical members. The author took the reader on his journey of working with them. He described how at first he questioned the explanations provided to him on a variety of issues, but these questions were “answered” with argument or directing him toward “sources” of information.⁴⁶ One such time, he asked his colleague what he thought about the argument that those who leave Islam should be killed.

And, Abdul-Qadir had a ready explanation. “The reason a lot of people are uncomfortable with this is because they don’t understand the notion

of apostasy in Islam. They have these Western ideas about religion as something you try on to see if it feels comfortable, something that you can take off just as easily as you put it on. They hear that you can be killed for leaving Islam, and their reaction is 'Huh?' What they're not considering is that religion and politics aren't *separable* in Islam the way they are in the West. When you take the *shahada*,⁴⁷ you aren't just pleading your allegiance to Allah; you're aligning yourself with the Muslim state. Leaving Islam isn't just converting from one faith to another. It's more properly understood as *treason*.⁴⁸

More inquisitive than most, Gartenstein-Ross also consulted a book on the matter of apostasy. However, this book was already provided to him as an authoritative source.

Still, while Abdul-Qaadir's description of apostasy made sense, I wanted to know for myself: was he right about the evidence? I read up on the matter, turning first to Muhammad bin Jamil Zino's *Islamic Guidelines for Individual and Social Reform ...*

Flipping through Zino's book, I found that it spoke directly to the topic of apostasy. There was a *hadith*, collected by al-Bukhari, in which the Prophet said, "Whoever apostatizes from Islam should be killed." This seemed to leave little room for doubt. At the time, I felt proud that I didn't just react emotionally to Abdul-Qaadir's comment about the killing of apostates, but that I had instead recognized the logic behind the view, did the research and found that his statement was theologically supported.⁴⁹

THE ENEMY DEFINED

The network also defines the enemy for the budding recruits. There are many enemies, but the United States and Israel are portrayed as two of the biggest perpetrators of ills in the Muslim world and are consistently dehumanized. The purpose of dehumanization is to depict the "other" as less than human. Thus, they are able to "suspend the morality that might typically govern reasoned actions toward their fellows," leading to a situation where "it becomes possible for normal, morally upright, and even usually idealistic people to perform acts of destructive cruelty."⁵⁰

Those dehumanized become the scapegoats for the issues and problems encountered or perceived by the members of the network. Eric Staub explained the ramifications of relying on scapegoats. According to him, scapegoating is the process whereby an out-group is blamed for "bad things that happen to the in-group."⁵¹ "Finding a scapegoat makes people believe

their problems can be predicted and controlled; and it eliminates one's own responsibility, thereby diminishing guilt and enhancing self-esteem."⁵²

As already demonstrated so far with examples of the numerous statements by al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden, the United States is accused of occupying and invading Muslim lands and contributing to the decline of Islam. As such, one does not need to look far to find a statement implicating the United States for the problems of the Muslim world.

The Israelis are another vilified enemy. Network members depict them as evildoers who oppress the Palestinians. According to propaganda, they are also bent on the destruction of Hezbollah, a liberation group in Lebanon. Additionally, the Israelis are either in control of the United States or just the opposite. For instance, according to Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Shaykh Saeed), "the U.S. backs and supports Israel in its repression and occupation of the Palestinian lands and its people."⁵³ Either way the relationship is characterized, they all refer to this relationship as the "Zionist-Crusader Alliance" or some variation of this term. American al-Qaeda member Adam Yahiye Gadahn made the following statement about Bush in January 2008:

We raise an urgent appeal to our mujahedin brothers in the Muslim Palestine, the Arabian Peninsula in particular, and the region in general, to be prepared to receive the crusader butcher Bush on his visit to Muslim Palestine and the occupied peninsula at the beginning of January. They should receive him not with roses and applause, but with bombs and booby-traps.⁵⁴

Another example was a statement put out by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula about the collaboration between Jews and Christians and its effect on Gaza. It read in part:

My honourable Islamic nation: your brothers in Gaza are exposed today to the greatest hardships—namely violence, torture, killing, and exile at the hands of the malicious Zionist Jews within eyesight and earshot of the entire world. The Zionist Jews would not have taken the risk of destroying Gaza without support of the Christian battleships that roam about in the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea under the protection of the treacherous leaders of the region.⁵⁵

Recall, the numerous statements made by Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri also exemplified this verbiage.

While the blame is being placed squarely on the United States and Israel, any country that is seen as standing in the path of establishing their

brand of Islamic governments is also an enemy. Even Denmark was not spared al-Qaeda's wrath due to a cartoon controversy that served to place Denmark in the limelight of hatred. As Barry Rubin commented on the situation in Denmark that resulted from the publishing of a Danish cartoon:

Why has this tiny state, with a population smaller than that of little Israel and best known for its quality cheeses and butter, become Public Enemy Number Three in much of the Muslim world?

If America is the Great Satan and Israel is the Little Satan, then Denmark seems to be the Itsy Bitsy Satan. The immediate answer, of course, is the cartoon controversy, which in itself is a pretty bizarre story. Back in September 2005, the magazine *Jyllands-Posten* decided to show support for freedom of speech by running critical cartoons about Islam and its founder, Muhammad. But the resulting explosion of hatred—which included burning Danish embassies and flags—did not just happen spontaneously.

Less well known is the fact that a group of Danish immigrant imams set out to provoke the protests. In doing so, they also added to their publicity package cartoons that had not been published in the newspaper's series, in fact had never been published anywhere. These proved to be the most "provocative" in making Muslims angry. The cartoon controversy affected far more countries than Denmark, but what was most significant was the Danish reaction. Contrary to fellow Scandinavian states Sweden and Norway—where, in one case, the foreign minister pressured an Internet site off the air so as not to "offend" Muslims—the Danes stood firm.⁵⁶

Clearly, existing governments, supported by the Western world, are blamed for the social, economic, and political ills that individuals face. Radical Islam is the solution. The past becomes a place to covet, where Islam was in ascendancy. The writing of network member Abu Dujanah al-Canadi exhibited this line of thinking.

The Muslim ummah is a dead nation. Like the Persians and Romans before us, our ummah has lost supremacy over other nations and now we are ruled by puppets and figureheads of the kufr, [...] Our so-called rulers today are not the Islamic leaders that our beloved Prophet ordered us to obey. Instead, they are tyrannical despots who have put their own laws in place of the Laws of Allah. Essentially, they are pharaohs of the twentieth century.⁵⁷

The argument is that the Muslim world, facing a significant decline, needs to reestablish itself as a predominant force, even at the expense of

innocents. Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Lebanon, Spain, Somalia, and Palestine are just a few examples of where they are calling for jihad. For instance, 26 Saudi scholars issued a letter where they expressed solidarity to the Muslims there and provided the reasoning to participate in jihad in Iraq as a unified front, where they contended, the occupied country may fall into civil war. For these scholars, defensive jihad was the logical roadmap and Muslims were duty bound to fight against the aggressor and not leave an opening for the Jews to gain ground. The scholars stated in part:

The preservation of the unity of Iraq is vital and necessary. There are invisible hands trying to kindle the fire of conflict and to tear down Iraq into different factions. They stimulate internal conflicts between Shi'a and Sunna or between Arabs and Kurds. Such internal war, [which] people from each faction get drawn to, is an evident harm and a free service to the Jews who are sneaking in to Iraq and to the coalition forces that use conflict to strengthen their hold. The aggression of one faction against another, the killing of leaders, the revealing of secrets and at the end each faction would say: "The Americans are better than those."

That is why all Iraqis should agree that it is their right to live in peace under the rule of Islam, one next to the other. This has been true historically for many long centuries. This critical stage of Iraq's history is not a golden opportunity that each group should turn to his advantage. The priority in this stage is to strengthen the unity of the country and the internal agreement and to avoid the causes of conflict and war. Each faction should leave the other alone because [they have] a common interest.⁵⁸

Additionally, the core ingeniously integrates other countries into their propaganda, singling them out as supporters of their two already-defined enemies. For example, in a 2003 audiotape,⁵⁹ Ayman al-Zawahiri spoke about a wide variety of enemies and the need for violent solutions. Al-Zawahiri argued that after Iraq would come Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Pakistan. States surrounding Israel will be dismantled and be submissive to the United States and Israel and thus support the alliance. Al-Zawahiri lays out the areas of the world where attacks are launched; from Qatar, the U.S. Central Command, from Bahrain, the Fifth Fleet, and Egypt, the Suez Canal. He goes on to argue that Yemen allows "crusader vessels" to leave from its ports, and Jordan permits forces to be stationed there and Patriot missile batteries placed to protect Israel. And, he maintains, "after all this, they shout with all hypocrisy and deception that they oppose the

war on Iraq.” Protests and demonstrations will do no good against this Zionist–Crusader alliance and violence is the solution. As al-Zawahiri elaborates:

The crusaders and the Jews do not understand but the language of killing and blood.

They do not become convinced unless they see coffins returning to them, their interests being destroyed, their towers being torched, and their economy collapsing.

O Muslims, take matters firmly against the embassies of America, England, Australia, and Norway and their interests, companies, and employees.

Burn the ground under their feet, as they should not enjoy your protection, safety, or security. Expel those criminals out of your countries.

Do not allow the Americans, the British, the Australians, the Norwegians, and the other crusaders who killed your brothers in Iraq to live in your countries, enjoy their resources, and wreak havoc in them.

Learn from your 19 brothers who attacked America in its planes in New York and Washington and caused it a tribulation that it never witnessed before and is still suffering from its injuries until today.

O Iraqi people, we defeated those crusaders several times before and expelled them out of our countries and holy shrines.

You should know that you are not alone in this battle. Your mujahid brothers are tracking your enemies and lying in wait for them.

The mujahideen in Palestine, Afghanistan, and Chechnya and even in the heart of America and the West are causing death to those crusaders.

The coming days will bring to you the news that will heal your breasts, God willing.⁶⁰

Al-Zawahiri continued to advocate bringing the war to the Zionist–Crusader alliance and support Muslim brothers worldwide in the struggle against them.

TAILORED PROPAGANDA

While members of al-Qaeda buy into the overall thrust of the network’s core argument, network groups also have their own distinct propaganda efforts, and they tailor their messages to their own regional concentrations. For example, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released the “Statement to the Algerian People” in April 2009.⁶¹ In other cases, AQIM also used history and religion to bolster its arguments.

AQIM STATEMENT TO THE ALGERIAN PEOPLE*

Praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds and the consequence for the cautious; Allah bless our master Muhammad the Seal of the Prophets and the Imam of the Messengers; and his family and companions and the peace; After:

Peace be upon you and the mercy of God be upon you.

Compliance with the words of the Prophet peace be upon him with Muslim narrated from Abu Tameem ibn Aws paper Daari may Allah be pleased with him: (debt advice we have: for whom? Said: Allah and His Messenger and the writing and the imams of the Muslims and Aamthm)⁶² and the establishment of the argument and the discharge to the worship of God-believers, advance of the legitimacy of al-Qaeda Islamic Maghreb this author—selected from the words of scholars—of the Muslim nation of Algeria, the coming of a new farce farces policy Altagotip,⁶³ Almnaotp election.

One of the greatest plagues this nation is the complete collapse of the succession, which had been guarding the Muslim religion, and the appropriate decay worldly Sharia glue, ...

Then the control of a handful of customers carrying out schemes rulers the Jews and the Christians in the nation of Islam, from within Evtaatunha, shovels and work procedure of destruction: the destruction of religion, thought, culture, morals, and destroy all the seed of the best that can be instilled in the soil of the nation's arable ..., and the worthy sons fighting who want to be the word of God is supreme and religion is all for God ... The tightened control of the country's Muslims, imposing a secular (Alladenip) of the subjugated peoples themselves, and drove off the debt for each thing as governance, ... Those rulers who are the traitors of us and not them—but the enemy of us—to harm us infidels, and Bmlm robbed and deceived and lost our rights.

The government, or what is known as succession Balimamp⁶⁴ or in books of great importance in the jurisprudence of Islam, as it is the guardian of the religion, and the upper hand for publication

* Reprinted with courtesy of <http://www.worldanalysis.net/> and Casey Britton, caseybritton@gmail.com.

and to defend the father-in-law of the futility of the abusers and the greed of aspirants.

Prudential and to define the view of religion and the provision of care and keeping things on the floor, making a second to the first, and that policy must be the minimum and Hraiah religion and its teachings, and the separation of religion from politics and policy, the minimum legal status or psychological opinions and desires clear violation of the teachings of Islam and the Muslim law of God, there is no may be called to this type of governance that the Islamic rule, or in accordance with Islamic law, but it is a flagrant violation not approved by Islam. Good in Islam and means, not an end, a means to certain purposes, and the combination of these objectives is the establishment of God Almighty in the face of the earth began, and may God the Almighty clarified this goal in the holy book when he said: "The people in the land to enable them establish worship and pay the Zakat and ordered forbidden for the Propagation of Virtue and Vice, and God is the consequence of [Hajj: 41]" Fmqasd governance is the major destinations are

First: the establishment of religion: religion is the establishment of two things:

First: conservation: Abu paramount: "The Imam keeping the debt on the assets that it advances the whole nation, the gas is compromised by the argument between him and explained to him the right thing and take the necessary rights and borders, to be debt Mahrosa of the problem and the nation of illegal fault," [provisions of the Royal Abu Al-27 and the second to none so when Maori p. 11].

II: implementation: the establishment of laws, borders and the implementation of the provisions, and held by the people Baltrgheb and intimidation.

III: the policy of the minimum sentence or life in the affairs of this revelation of God: and to be: the administration and management of all affairs of life, in accordance with the Sharia rules and principles and provisions set forth or derived in accordance with the rules of proper diligence; The rule of the minimum non-debt policy: the rule of the Lord of the Worlds saying: "It is not governed by God's revelation, they are unbelievers (.) is not governed by God's revelation, they are the wrong-doers. It is not governed by God's revelation,

they are the transgressors" [Table 46. 49.47], Sheikh Mohammed Bin Ibrahim Almighty God's mercy: "It is inevitable that is called God, the Almighty sent down the ruling without God is not an infidel an infidel, an unbeliever but is either never work or Kfar believe."

If so, the Muslims must strive for the elimination of such rulers, and do not help in re-election for a complete outline of corruption in the modern worship narrated by Ben silent may Allaah be pleased with him said: "Bayana—the Messenger of Allah and peace be upon him—the obedience in Mnctna and Mlna and Beefna. We are pleased and its impact on us, and the dispute is not only the people can see Kafra outright from God when you have proof" [Agreed].

He said rhetorically: (a outright) wants apparent from saying Padilla was revealed Bouha and reveal something outright if the broadcast and displayed, [Fath al-Baari, 8-13].

Ayaz said the judge: "scholars are unanimously agreed that the ruler does not take place for the unbeliever and that if there is heresy and it started to change or novelty out of the rule of the state and fell to obey him, and then the Muslims to do it and wear it, and installed that they can just Imam, the is not only a must for them to take off their infidel," [Saheeh Muslim explain nuclear 12/229], and Al-Hafiz Ibn Hajar said: "it—the Imam—isolated infidels unanimity, every Muslim must do it in that it has a strong reward, and sweeten it today, it is The deficit must be the migration from the land," [Fath al-Baari, 13/123].

In introducing the event of the rulers and the texts of the Qur'aan and Sunnah have been discharged from the tyranny of Islam from the various sections, and then the Muslims of the revolution were removed and the installation of the disagreement with his religion and his mind, those who reside in the Book of Allah and His Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him salvation, preserving their religion and worldly, but to do with these who demonstrated the fact that they betrayed Allah and His Messenger and the believers, and re-elected, it naivety and treason, and every man Hassib itself.

And the duty of every Muslim religion and zealous for the nation:

- to know with certainty that these rulers apostates disbelievers, to deprive Muslims of their mandate.
- that Ibgdahm and established their own community, and discharged them, and Iedehm, and refrain from helping them in any way, even a moral to participate in the election.
- seek to achieve all its obligation to prepare and struggle to uphold the truth and falsehood.
- to strive in the search for him and the role of gaps in the process of change and the establishment of the State of Islam, the Mujahideen and to assist in every way we can afford, in retaliation for the sanctity of Islam and Muslims.

And people between the paid and Mazur.

On this occasion, we call on our Muslim brothers—the elite and the general—to:

First: a genuine return to Islam and the overall track.

Second: the duty of the scientists said.

Third: the meeting with the understanding and cooperation and integration, to return to the origins of the people of the year to show the way, and determined enemy of the friend, and deserves every one of them.

IV: Preparation and jihad.

We call and we take every opportunity to stop the Juggernaut in a row—the aggressor on the sanctity of Islam and Muslims—to stop his tongue or pen, or gun, and still claims to be a Muslim himself and to review his words and his actions before the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger may Allah bless him and to see in any grade is?, in order to do the same? Term to be the word of God is supreme, or the word infidel rulers of these traitors? Term that governs Islam, or to be governed by infidelity, injustice and immorality? ...

Qurtubi said, may God have mercy on him: (says:) and you Itolhm (ie Ieddhm on Muslims), but it is of them (between the wisdom of the Almighty. Kgmanm—and then said:—

Condition and answer: What has been violated because God and His Messenger, and violated, and Ojpt FN as it should be مهت اداعم

Ojpt him and fire as they collected, including any of the answers of their uh, [Tafseer al-Qurtubi, c 6/217].

About Hudhayfah may Allah be pleased with him: The Prophet, peace be upon him: “what are you a prophet to be God, and if he brought that action, then the succession of the Platform for a prophet, God willing, what would be, then if it is brought, and then be the property Aada, what would be God, and if he brought that action, and then forced the king, what would be God, and if he brought that action, then the succession of the prophet and the Platform for silent,” [Narrated by Ahmad (4/273), and Tyalsi, see: a series of recent conversations the correct number (5)], and would have signed it as the sincere Almsdouk blessings of Allah and peace be upon him.

It does an atom of good will see, and whoever does an atom of evil lira.

May Allah bless Muhammad and his family and companions and the peace.

INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

The al-Qaeda network has a phenomenal propaganda machine that should make Madison Avenue pause. Information is everywhere, including mainstream media throughout the world. Information is used to inform, comment on events and exploits, and ultimately as a recruiting tool. Many groups have even created their own media machines for production and distribution of propaganda. One such effort is the al-Sahab productions and its distribution outlet the Global Islamic Media Front. A variety of groups are affiliated with this outlet. Another is the al-Qaeda distribution network al-Fajr Center, which also distributes media from affiliated groups. Still another example is a robust publishing effort by the Indonesian group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).⁶⁵ Information sharing is a necessity among these groups so that they can learn from one another. Groups examine their environments for information to support or boost their activities.⁶⁶

If individuals need information on bomb making or how to rationalize acts of terrorism, they can find it. For the greater good, the network members are very willing to share.

Groups in the network disseminate their propaganda through a variety of products. There are many different examples including video and

audiotapes, leaflets, pamphlets, books, newsletters, manuals, lectures/sermons, testimonies, letters, poetry, video games, music videos, CDs, and cassettes. A few examples of these types of propaganda are provided next.

SWEAR ALLEGIANCE TO AL-QAEDA

One of the elements that many members talk about is the swearing of allegiance to their leaders. This is called a bayat, and it is an important aspect of demonstrating loyalty. Usually, the oath of bayat is taken and signed. The individual is now committed both verbally and in writing. For example, Bin Laden was known to have his drivers and bodyguards swear bayat to him.⁶⁷ In 2005, al-Qaeda even offered individuals to swear loyalties to its leaders online. The invitation stated in part:

I invite you to the first day of the month of the great swearing of an oath of loyalty to the commander of the Muslim armies, Sheikh Usama bin Laden, and to the commanders of the global jihad: Sheikh Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Emir of the Believers Mullah Muhammad Omar,⁶⁸ and Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi, and to all the jihad fighters.⁶⁹

Zacarias Moussaoui admitted he swore allegiance to Usama bin Laden as did Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

MAGAZINE JIHAD

Many groups distribute their own magazines. Al-Qaeda's magazine *Sawt al-Jihad* (Voice of Jihad) and al-Qaeda in Iraq's magazine *Zurwat al-Sanam* (The Tip of the Camel's Hump) were two examples of magazine efforts. These magazines covered a variety of subjects. For example, the February 8, 2007, issue of *Sawt al-Jihad* featured an interview with Karim al-Tuhami al-Mejjati, who was "martyred" in 2005.⁷⁰ Al-Hitteen, a monthly and delivered magazine in Urdu, is another example.

Another example of propaganda is AQAP's online magazine in English, *Inspire*. *Inspire* was the brainchild of Anwar al-Awlaki (Figure 3.1) and Samir Khan, both killed in a U.S. drone attack. And inspire it does. The magazine offers advice and direction for those who wish to engage in jihad. The article "How to Build a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom" was the inspiration for the bombs built by the Boston Marathon bombers.⁷¹ In



Figure 3.1 Anwar al-Awlaki, killed September 30, 2011 in a U.S. drone attack in Yemen.

an issue published after the bombing, the magazine ran an article titled “Blessed Boston Bombings,” celebrating the attacks and taking credit for its inspiration.⁷² In a 2011 issue, the editors, pleased with themselves, provided reactions from media outlets about the slickness of the magazine. One commentary posted read, “They’re not looking to outdo the readership of the Economist or Time magazine. They only need to inspire one or two people to blow something up in the right place and they’ll make back their start-up costs.”⁷³ Another quoted from Robert Lindsay’s commentary on wordpress.com:

The magazine has a “cool” feel to it. There are nods to the US counterculture and the progressive Left social and environmental movement, pieces that look like Madison Avenue consumer capitalist advertisements for jihad, a Web 2.0 feel, use of hacker leetspeak. All this makes jihad seem cool like the 60’s counterculture, the Social Forum, Greenpeace, the latest cool sneakers or iPod player, wealthy computer nerd-programmer types in Silicon Valley and the hacker underground culture. It’s designed to appeal to hip young English speakers.⁷⁴

As is evident, magazines change over time but as old ones are retired, new ones emerge pointing to the importance of magazines to the dissemination of propaganda.

NETWORK BOOKS

In addition to drawing on historical authoritative books, al-Qaeda members also write their own books. For example, al-Zawahiri wrote several books, some of which are *Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner*, *Bitter Harvest*,

and *Exonerations*. Abu Musab al-Suri,⁷⁵ the al-Qaeda propagandist and strategist, penned *The Global Islamic Resistance Call*. The three men responsible for the 2002 Bali bombing each published a book, which is referred to as the *Martyr's Trilogy*. Already mentioned was that Egyptian scholar Sayyid Qutb wrote several books including *In the Shade of the Quran*, *Milestones*, and *Social Justice in Islam*.

VIDEO PRODUCTIONS

Videos are another popular information source and a recruiting mechanism. Search for jihad videos on the Internet and there are an overwhelming number of returns. Network groups often film and disseminate videos of their training and attacks. Further, groups use videos to disseminate their message, often commenting on events pertinent to their activities and relevant events in faraway places by other network members. They discuss their exploits, bait their enemies, and pay tribute to their fallen comrades. They comment on events, including the policies and actions of the United States, its allies, and partners. Videos are also a telling example of how groups in the network learn from each other. Video methods were adopted and refined, and emerged as much more sophisticated over time.

And the world will not forget the series of gruesome beheading videos released by AQI. The most publicized was the beheading of Daniel Pearl in 2002. Pearl was a *Wall Street Journal* reporter. Those who seethed hatred for the United States and others welcomed such portrayals. Unfortunately, this hatred filters down generation after generation. Thus, a video appeared in which children emulated the beheading videos. Yet, emulation became a reality with another video showing a 12-year-old Taliban boy beheading a hostage.⁷⁶ Another video surfaced in Syria showing a young child participating with Syrian rebels chanting "Allah Akhbar" during the beheading of two Alawite prisoners.⁷⁷ Beheading videos, however, were part and parcel to Chechen groups long before the tactic was being used in other places.

EDICTS AND FATWAS

Another example of propaganda is religious edicts, or fatwas. For example, Shaykh Abdullah bin Muhammad al-Ghunayman issued a fatwa

regarding the Taliban.⁷⁸ In it, he posted a list of several points justifying why Muslims were obligated to aid the Taliban in Afghanistan after U.S. forces arrived. He pointed out that there had been a “gathering” of groups to fight in Afghanistan against the United States and its allies. There have also been times where scholars postured against the Taliban. In his view the Americans have not proven that the attack on 9/11 emanated from Afghanistan, nor defined their objective called “terrorism.” What is being done then is in fact a Crusade. As he rationalizes, “therefore it is obvious that their understanding of ‘terrorism’ is none other than Islam itself, hence making this war a Crusade—a truth that has been clearly stated by a number of their leaders such as the President of the United States.”⁷⁹ None of this is surprising to him given that the Jews and Christians “will never be satisfied with you until you follow their religion.”⁸⁰ He then expounds:

This is why what the Jews do in Palestine—killing babies, women, the young and old, the destruction of their very infrastructure and society—is not regarded as terrorism in the eyes of America. Indeed it happens under their auspices and protection simply because it involves the killing of Muslims. Then when one of them picks up a stone with which to defend himself, he becomes a terrorist!⁸¹

The Shaykh offers several more points including that the goal of the Americans and its allies in this war is to humiliate Muslim countries and “to force them into subservience to America and to protect the Jewish land from any danger that may threaten it.”⁸² The enemy will not stop with the Taliban but venture against other Islamic lands and organizations. Muslim leaders must recognize these plans and unite against the enemies. It is an obligation. The Shaykh explains

It is obligatory upon the Muslim leaders, the kings and presidents, to take heed of what is happening so that it may lead them to take a united stance and work towards defending their lands and peoples. It is obligatory upon them to hold firmly to their religion and to suffice with the natural resources and wealth that Allah has blessed their lands with, to protect them and to prevent their enemy from acquiring them—who use their own natural resources to fight them! It is obligatory upon them to do all that they can to remove their dependency upon their enemy and to use their resources, wealth and men towards attaining strength and nobility, thereby implementing what their Lord, the Exalted, has commanded them...⁸³

Further, Muslims must also unite to stop the enemy and to be aware of the enemy's aims at disunity, resulting in infighting and coming under their control.

Another example is the much-publicized fatwa issued in 2003 by Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. In it, al-Qaradawi argued for boycotting Israeli and American products and promulgated the message that there should be no support for anyone who kills Muslims. For example, in his view of Israelis,

Muslims are not allowed to indulge in any form of dealings with the militant Jews who tend to wage war against Islam and Muslims with every tooth and nail. What do we expect from those who occupied our lands, violated the sanctity of the Sanctuaries, and continue their brutal profaning against all that which is Islamic in broad daylight?⁸⁴

Fatwas are a highly effective propaganda tool. They provide religious explanations and justifications for activities and as such, followers can rationalize their activities.

SINGING THE SONGS OF JIHAD

The network also adapted its propaganda to changing times and recognized, like marketers, the need to focus on target audiences. The use of music videos to appeal to younger Muslims demonstrates the adaptability of the network especially with regard to recruitment. In other words, they realized that they needed to expand propaganda efforts to appeal to younger and more hip individuals.

"Dirty Kuffar" is an example of a hip rap music video performed by Shaykh Terra and the Soul Salah Crew⁸⁵ (Figure 3.2). The target of this particular video was young Pakistani Muslims. Elena Mastors and Alyssa Deffenbaugh explain about the video:

Dirty Kuffar is a music video performed by Shaykh Terra and the Soul Salah Crew. The video opens with the killing of an Iraq civilian and then cuts to a U.S. Marine saying that the experience was awesome, and he wanted to do it again. The rap portion of the video then commences and visually depicts, among other things, jihad flashing across the screen, various world leaders transforming into pigs and devils, al-Zawahiri turning into a lion, and certain leaders and groups being referred to




Figure 3.2 Dirty Kuffar video capture.

as “dirty kuffars.” The video ends with the burning of the World Trade Center towers.⁸⁶

Al-Qaeda’s music video “Allah Akhbar” depicts armed jihadis wearing suicide vests singing and dancing.

Another example of using music to entice individuals is found with the group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), “a political organization with a worldwide presence that seeks to overthrow Western governments through non-violent means in order to install Islamic fundamentalist leadership.” The group uses hip-hop videos to capture the attention of young individuals. The group Arab League, which is affiliated with HT, launched a song that talked about the anger with the United States over operations in Iraq.⁸⁷ HT-America also has conferences that can be attended through webinars, as well as an e-newsletter.⁸⁸

Omar Hammami, the American-born fighter for al-Shabab, became well known for his songs of jihad. He released a series of “gangsta” songs including “Send Me a Cruise,” “Make Jihad With Me,” and “Blow by Blow”⁸⁹ (Figure 3.3).

POINT AND SHOOT: KILLING THE KUFFAR

Video games are another example of the network’s propaganda effort. In one example, the Global Islamic Media Front released a game in September 2006 called *Night of Bush Capturing*. Enemies such as George Bush and Tony Blair are depicted in the game. According to the SITE Institute:



Figure 3.3 Omar Hammami. Screen capture from a video released by his organization prior to his death, reportedly at the hands of rivals in al-Shabab, on September 13, 2012.

The game, which is a modification of an older game, “Quest for Saddam,” features six-levels, culminating in a gun battle with a character representing U.S. President George W. Bush. Each of these stages, given titles such as: “Jihad Beginning,” “American’s Hell,” “Searching for Bush,” and “Bush Hunted Like a Rat,” contain a Mujahid with several weapons traveling around a U.S. forces’ camp, which is covered with pictures of Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,⁹⁰ and the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah. War nasheeds, jihadist songs, play in the background of each level. Upon completion of the game, “Takbir Allahu Akbar” is shouted. The Global Islamic Media Front announced recently the game with a video trailer and images of in-game action. According to the advertisement, the game was distributed for “terrorist children.”⁹¹

Video games are released to vent frustration with the enemy. Al-Qaeda affiliates in Mali created a video game specifically responding to French counterterrorism efforts in the country. Specifically, they created a video game to fight French forces. In the game, users have an al-Qaeda fighter that can shoot down French aircraft. The video appeared on the Ansar al-Mujahideen Arabic Forum (AMAF).⁹² Another game was created by Moazzam Begg, a former detainee at Guantanamo who regularly and critically comments on U.S. detention policies. His game was developed for Xbox and featured himself. “In the game, players control a detainee at the camp, which has been sold by the U.S. Government to a shadowy agency called Freedom Corp. Before he is subjected to torture and scientific experiments, the character must shoot his way out of the detention camp to bring down his captors.”⁹³

PROPAGANDA DISSEMINATION

Making propaganda and putting it in final form are the first steps. However, propaganda also has to be distributed. By taking advantage of the Internet boom, terrorist groups have additional ways to disseminate their messages, collaborate, plan, share information and ideas, train members, raise money, and entice potential recruits. Web sites abound with information, blogs, chat rooms, and forums. Most groups maintain Web sites or associated Web sites, as sometimes these are taken down or moved depending on counterterrorism efforts. As previously mentioned, even Abu Hamza al-Masri has his "Supporters of Shariah" Web site. Sometimes other Web sites demonstrate there is support among individuals and groups that would seem like strange bedfellows. As an example, there were instances on extremist right Web pages where there was seeming support for terror groups whose targets are the same as the terrorists such as Israel. Others express the same need as the terrorists to punish the United States for its decadence and decline.

Social media sites are also popular. Terrorists use Facebook, Twitter, and other social media sites. Terrorists also use YouTube. For example, al-Shabab mastered the Twitter feed. As the Anti-Defamation League put it:

Al Shabaab, a terrorist organization in Somalia that formally merged with Al Qaeda in February 2012, started a Twitter account in December 2011. The account has attracted more than 17,000 followers and is used to disseminate the group's statements, correspond with journalists, release photographs of its supporters, its rallies, and occasionally, its captured enemies. Many of the tweets reflect the group's militant message. A tweet posted on October 22, for example, urged "Muslims in the United States to make their stand." Other tweets have read, "Send them [captive enemy soldiers] to the guillotine." During the September riots at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, Al Shabaab tweeted: "Obama, Obama, we are all Usama."⁹⁴

The Taliban tweets too and its tweets reflect, fabricated or otherwise, battlefield gains against coalition forces.⁹⁵ Either way, it is a propaganda coup for the Taliban. Al-Qaeda has its own Twitter account (Figure 3.4). On Twitter, the question was asked about improving its media effort. Unfortunately for al-Qaeda, concerned tweeters seized the opportunity and bombarded the address with satirical suggestions for the network.⁹⁶



Figure 3.4 Al-Qaeda on Twitter.

Al-Shabab was also busy using Facebook for recruitment. In 2008, it focused on young men in the United States, particularly Somalis. The first casualty was Shirwa Ahmed, who carried out a suicide bombing. As the investigation commenced, it was found that there were 19 others who were recruited.⁹⁷

YouTube videos abound with examples, including many previously mentioned. Videos of speeches, statements, songs, and instructions appear regularly on the video venue. Through stenography, terrorists can also share information. Seemingly benign pictures can be used to transmit nefarious messages.⁹⁸

Second Life emerged as another terrorist venue and evidence indicates this can be used for recruitment and other activities. Author Jennifer Hesterman explained this complex environment of avatars:

The first step is to anonymously create an avatar and select what locations to “fly” to, typically an island, city or buildings, many crafted after actual locations. Once there, you can visit nightclubs, concert venues, restaurants, shops, hotels, museums, universities, movie theaters, and bookstores. Some islands are protected by a fence prohibiting the avatars from flying in if they are not “recognized” or do not use the correct password. The user may also enter a building or an island and password protect it, allowing select avatars to access the area. Inside the building, it is possible to post videos, pictures, or billboards. Users can start their own church and hold open or closed services. Communicating with other avatars is accomplished by typing in text, voice, blinking or hand signals. If clandestine communication is desired, it could be done by arranging books on a shelf in a certain way where the letters spell words, communicating completely off the radar.⁹⁹

As the former illustrates, there are a myriad of options for terrorists to connect, share ideas, and recruit. The only limitation is the creativity of the user.

Groups in the network may have different short-term goals, enemies, and *modus operandi*, but all are united in the goal of using violence to achieve their ends. "The Internet's world-wide reach has enabled them to establish their ultimate objective of a pan-Islamic 'Caliphate' in cyberspace."¹⁰⁰ However, the full extent of the number of Internet sites is not quantifiable due to sites being added or shut down, or emerging elsewhere. The number is likely in the thousands.¹⁰¹ According to Gabriel Weimann, the Internet is an ideal place for terrorists in that it offers

- Easy access
- Little or no regulation, censorship, or other forms of government control
- Potentially huge audiences spread throughout the world
- Anonymity of communication
- Fast flow of information
- Inexpensive development and maintenance of a Web presence
- A multimedia environment (the ability to combine text, graphics, audio, and video and to allow users to download films, songs, books, posters, and so forth)
- The ability to shape coverage in the traditional mass media, which increasingly use the Internet as a source for stories¹⁰²

Furthermore, decentralization of the network means that more individuals are posting information on the Internet. Jarett Brachman described the breadth of the information on the Internet:

One of the primary strategies for jihadi ideologues has been to continuously decentralize the expertise and authority to produce propaganda and disseminate it online. Any number of detailed training manuals can be found accompanying graphics and moviemaking software that encourages young men to learn these software packages and use them for advancing jihad. Main propaganda images and organizational logos are often placed on central repository Web sites that allow interested jihadi propagandists, anytime, anywhere, to log in and employ them for their own material. The use of a single logo provides the perception of a broad, unified front, when in reality it is disparate groups of individuals motivated by the same ideological agenda who are producing these products.¹⁰³

The Internet also provides a way to disseminate these products, but as these groups became more sophisticated they desired to reach beyond Arabic-speaking audiences. Thus, there has been a proliferation of Web sites, forums, and materials offered in multiple languages to include English, Spanish, French, Dutch, Swedish, and Urdu.¹⁰⁴

The network employs savvy computer-literate people just like any organization. Thus, cyber attacks are part and parcel to the network groups, or those sympathetic to their cause. With this realization national security verbiage now includes the term “cyberterrorism” to denote attacks by our many detractors and as is customary, the terrorist also evolved, calling for “electronic jihad.”¹⁰⁵

In addition to any government-sponsored programs aimed at debilitating Web sites, there are those private citizens who have taken on hacking al-Qaeda-related Web sites as their own personal jihads. Some of them have been highly effective in the short term, although in the long run, taking down one site or flooding a Twitter account leads to another being opened up and could potentially disrupt monitoring and operational efforts of the U.S. government, its allies, and partners.¹⁰⁶

A further concern is counterintelligence. Terrorists can use the Internet against us, just as we troll the Internet for information and potential avenues of disruption. Terrorists can collect data on targets, particularly individuals working for governments or are in government-related jobs who post on social media. Too often, individuals are not careful about sharing their details about jobs, including security clearances, where they live, and their current locations.¹⁰⁷

Although the Internet certainly allowed groups to evolve their propaganda efforts, reach a wider audience, and share information, it is not the only way the message gets out. For one, Internet messages target those who are Internet savvy and, most important, have access to computers. Not everyone is in this position. Furthermore, network groups operate locally and have established networks. Thus, the distribution of materials also happens locally, whether it is a sermon given or fatwa posted in the mosque, a magazine, a book or cassette in a bookstore, a meeting group in prison, or a statement on television. As already expounded upon, terrorists use local networks to transfer money and have sophisticated courier networks. The power of local networks should never be overlooked just because the Internet is a popular subject.

CONCLUSION

This chapter focused on an overview of the psychology of individuals and the network's propaganda. Clearly, it is, for the most part, a widespread and sophisticated propaganda machine. The subject of the next chapter is psychological and operational tools of influence. Also included is a discussion of the various types of intelligence collection and the implementers of the campaign.

NOTES

1. Stephen Morgan, "New Psychological Concepts to Combat New Terrorism," 2001, <http://www.selfgrowth.com/articles/Morgan1.html> (accessed May 5, 2009).
2. Doug Mataconis, "Ron Paul: American Foreign Policy Is the Primary Motivation for Terrorism," *Outside the Beltway*, August 28, 2011, <http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/ron-paul-american-foreign-policy-is-the-primary-motivation-for-terrorism/> (accessed August 27, 2013).
3. Discussed in Chapter 3 is that to be valid, writings of individuals needed to match their behavior.
4. Strobe Talbott, "The Other Evil: The War on Terrorism Won't Succeed without a War on Poverty," *Foreign Policy*, 127, 2001, 75–76.
5. Martha Cottam, Elena Mastors, Beth Dietz-Uhler, and Tom Preston, *Introduction to Political Psychology* (New York: Psychology Press, 2010), 15.
6. H. H. A. Cooper, "What Is a Terrorist: A Psychological Perspective," *Legal Medical Quarterly*, 2, 1978, 16–32.
7. K. Pearce, "Police Negotiations: A New Role for the Community Psychiatrist," *Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal*, 22, 1977, 171–174.
8. J. W. Crayton, "Terrorism and the Psychology of the Self," in *Perspectives on Terrorism*, eds. L. Z. Freedman and Yohan Alexander (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resource, 1983), 33–41.
9. Michael Taylor, *The Terrorist* (London: Brassey, 2008), 74.
10. Andrew Silke, "Courage in Dark Places: Reflections on Terrorist Psychology," *Social Research*, 177, 2004, 1.
11. Ibid.
12. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
13. Ken Heskin, "The Psychology of Terrorism in Northern Ireland," in *Terrorism in Ireland*, eds. Yohan Alexander and A. O'Day (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 88–105.
14. Raymond R. Corrado, "A Critique of the Mental Disorder Perspective of Political Terrorism," *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, 4, 1981, 293–310.

15. Clark McCauley, "The Psychology of Terrorism," Social Science Research Council, 2002.
16. Albert Bandura, "The Role of Selective Moral Disengagement in Terrorism and Counterterrorism," in *Understanding Terrorism*, eds. Fathali Moghaddam and Anthony Marsella (Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 2004), 121–50.
17. Fathali Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism," in *Psychology of Terrorism*, eds. Bruce Bongor, Lisa Brown, Larry Beutler, James Breckenridge, and Philip Zimbardo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 69–80.
18. Randy Borum, "Understanding the Terrorist Mindset," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, 2003, 7–10.
19. Simon Cottee and Keith Hayward, "Terrorist (E)motives: The Existential Attractions of Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34, 2012, 963–968.
20. Part of personal motivation is psychological problems. Because it is not the norm does not mean that it does not cease to exist in the network.
21. Elena Mastors and Alyssa Deffenbaugh, *The Lesser Jihad: Recruits and the Al-Qaida Network* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 67–88.
22. *Ibid.*, 89–119.
23. Again, this does not suggest that the network is completely devoid of those with psychological problems.
24. Abd Samad Moussaoui, *Zacarias, My Brother* (New York: Seven Stories, 2003), 65–66.
25. *Ibid.*, 47.
26. Jerome P. Bjelopera, "American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat," CRS, November 15, 2011.
27. Richard A. Serrano and David S. Cloud, "Bomb Suspect Had Pakistani Family Ties to Future Militants," *The Seattle Times*, May 8, 2010.
28. Sami Yousef and Ron Moreau, "Inside al-Qaeda," *Newsweek*, September 13, 2010, 31.
29. *Ibid.*
30. Dina Temple-Raston, "Jihadi Cool: Terrorist Recruiters' Latest Weapon," *NPR*, March 26, 2010, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=125186382> (accessed August 26, 2013).
31. Mastors and Deffenbaugh, *The Lesser Jihad*.
32. Jennifer L. Hesterman, *The Terrorist–Criminal Nexus* (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2013).
33. *Ibid.*
34. Olivia Goldhill, "Breast Implant Explosives Could Be Used in Terrorist Attack," *The Telegraph*, August 16, 2013 (accessed August 22, 2013).
35. Mastors and Deffenbaugh, *The Lesser Jihad*, 89–119.
36. *Ibid.*
37. Tawfik Hamid, *Inside Jihad* (self-published, 2008).
38. *Ibid.*, 33.

39. Sean Waterman, "American al Qaeda Propagandist Calls for Killings of U.S. Diplomats," *Washington Times*, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/19/american-al-qaeda-calls-murder-us-diplomats/> (accessed August 22, 2013).
40. "The Open Meeting with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri," 2008, *Washington Post*, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/OpenMeetingZawahiri_Part1.pdf (September 23, 2013), 2–4.
41. Ibid.
42. Israeli airline.
43. "The Open Meeting with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri," *Washington Post*, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/OpenMeetingZawahiri_Part1.pdf (September 23, 2013), 2–4.
44. Mastors and Deffenbaugh, *The Lesser Jihad*, 34.
45. Ibid.
46. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, *My Year Inside Radical Islam* (New York: Penguin, 2007).
47. Declaration of belief in the oneness of Allah.
48. Gartenstein-Ross, *My Year Inside Radical Islam*, 153–64.
49. Ibid., 152–153.
50. Phil Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect* (New York: Random House, 2007), 307.
51. Martha Cottam, Elena Mastors, Beth Dietz-Uhler, and Tom Preston, *Introduction to Political Psychology* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 158.
52. Ervin Staub, *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 48.
53. "Interview of Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (a.k.a. 'Shaykh Saeed')," *NEFA Foundation*, June 21, 2008, <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefaabualyazidinvu0808.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2009).
54. "Tape: American al-Qaeda Member Renounces Citizenship," *CNN*, January 6, 2008, <http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/01/06/gadah.n.tape/index.html> (accessed April 28, 2009).
55. "Al Qaeda in Yemen: From Here We Will Begin and in Al-Aqsa We Shall Meet," *NEFA Foundation*, January 20, 2009, <http://www1.nefafoundation.org/documents.html> (accessed May 6, 2009).
56. Barry Rubin, "Denmark: Al-Qaeda's New 'Itsy Bitsy Satan,'" *Pajama's Media*, June 5, 2008, <http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/denmark-al-qaedas-new-itsy-bitsy-satan/> (accessed May 19, 2009).
57. Abu Dujanah al-Canadi, "Khilafa: The Dire Need," in *The Jihad Fixation: Agenda, Strategy, Portents*, ed. Arthur Monteiro (New Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2001), 157.
58. "Open Sermon to the Militant Iraqi People," *PBS*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saud/etc/fatwa.html> (accessed May 19, 2009).

59. Ayman al-Zawahiri, "Al Qaeda Statement," *BBC*, May 21, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3047903.stm (accessed July 31, 2007).
60. Ibid.
61. "Statement to the Algerian People," *World Analysis.net*, April 6, 2009, <http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/print.php?storyid=465> (accessed April 13, 2009).
62. Narrated by Muslim.
63. Islamic nation.
64. Religious figure.
65. "Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiya's Publishing Industry," *International Crisis Group*, February 8, 2008.
66. James J. F. Forest, "Knowledge Transfer and Shared Learning among Armed Groups," in *Armed Groups*, ed. Jeffrey H. Norwitz (Newport: Naval War College, 2008), 269.
67. Thomas Joscelyn, "The Hamdan Verdict," *The Long War Journal*, August 6, 2008, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/the_hamdan_verdict.php (accessed May 19, 2009).
68. Reclusive leader of the Taliban.
69. "Now Online: Swear to Al-Qaeda Leaders," *MEMRI*, Special Dispatch Series No. 1027, November 18, 2005, <http://memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page+archives&ID=SP102705> (accessed November 30, 2005).
70. "Sawt al-Jihad #30: Interview with the Martyr Karim al-Mejjati," *NEFA Foundation*, <http://www1.nefafoundation.org/documents.html> (accessed April 15, 2009).
71. Elena Mastors, "Case Study 2013 Boston Bombings," *The Counter Terrorist*, August/September 2013, 16–27.
72. Alexandra Schuster, "Al Qaeda's Inspire Magazine Praises Boston Bombings, Takes Credit for Inspiring Suspects," *Huffington Post*, May 31, 2013, http://huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/31/al-qaeda-inspire-magazine-boston-bombings_n_3367314.html (accessed August 16, 2013).
73. Robert Lindsay, "Inspire Reactions," *Inspire*, 5, 2011.
74. Ibid.
75. Captured and in captivity.
76. "Most Shocking Video Ever: 12 Year Old Taliban Boy Beheads Man," December 10, 2012, <http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/191270.php2> (accessed August 17, 2013).
77. "Syrian Rebels Use a Child to Behead a Prisoner," December 10, 2012, <http://humanrightsinvestigations.org/2012/12/10/syrian-rebels-use-a-child-to-behead-a-prisoner/> (accessed August 17, 2013).
78. Abdullah bin Muhammad al-Ghunayman, "Taliban Fatwa," 2001, <http://www.islamicawakening.com/viewarticle.php?articleID=975&pageID=62> (accessed September 23, 2013).
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, "Ulama's Fatwa on Boycotting Israeli and American Products," *Islam On-Line*, June 30, 2003, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?cid=1119503545220&pagename=IslamOnline-English-Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaEAskTheScholar (accessed May 20, 2009).
85. This 2004 jihadist rap video, produced in London, can be viewed at <http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=9083681522527526242> (accessed January 15, 2007).
86. Mastors and Deffenbaugh, *The Lesser Jihad*, 107.
87. Madeleine Gruer, "Innovative Recruitment and Indoctrination Tactics by Extremists: Video Games, Hip-Hop, and the World Wide Web," in *The Making of a Terrorist*, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 12.
88. Jennifer L. Hesterman, *The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus* (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013).
89. Jason Ryan and Mark Schone, "Alabama-Born Al Qaeda Spokesman, Reported Dead, Releases More Hip Hop Tracks," *CBS News*, <http://abc-news.go.com/Blotter/omar-hammami-releases-al-qaeda-rap-songs/story?id=13358038> (accessed August 17, 2013).
90. Highest ranking Shia scholar in Iraq.
91. "Way Radical, Dude," SITE Institute, October 6, 2006, <http://www.siteintel-group.org/bin/search/search.cgi> (accessed October 15, 2006).
92. Michael Peck, "Al Qaeda's Goofy Video Game Provokes Laughter, Not Terror," *Forbes*, March 13, 2013, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2013/03/13/al-qaedas-goofy-new-video-game-provokes-laughter-instead-of-terror/> (accessed August 17, 2013).
93. Thomas Joscelyn, "Al Qaeda's Xbox Fantasy Game," *The Weekly Standard*, June 1, 2009, http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2009/06/al_qaedas_xbox_fantasy_game_1.asp (accessed August 17, 2013).
94. "Tweeting for Terror," ADL, December 14, 2012, <http://www.adl.org/com-bating-hate/international-extremism-terrorism/c/tweeting-for-terror.html> (last accessed August 19, 2013).
95. Hesterman, *The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus*.
96. "Twitter Trolls Al-Qaeda: Extremist Hashtag Flooded Jihad with PR Advice," *RT News*, rt.com/news/al_qaeda-twitter-pr-advice-622/, August 19, 2013 (accessed August 22, 2013).
97. Hesterman, *The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus*.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid., 255.
100. Joshua Sinai, "Terrorism on the Internet and Effective Countermeasures," *The Intelligencer*, 18, 2011, 21.
101. Ibid.

102. Gabriel Weimann, "How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet," *United States Institute of Peace*, March 2004, 3.
103. Jarret Brackman, "Internet as Emirate: Al-Qaeda's Pragmatic Use of the Virtual Jihad," *The Officer*, 81, no. 10, December 2005.
104. Brynjar Lia, "Al-Qaeda Online: Understanding Jihadist Internet Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, January 2006, 14.
105. Jack Cloherty, "Virtual Terrorism: Al Qaeda Calls for 'Electronic Jihad,'" May 22, 2012, <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/cyber-terrorism-al-qaeda-video-calls-electronic-jihad/story?id=16407875> (accessed August 17, 2013).
106. Hesterman, *The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus*.
107. Ibid.

4

The Business of Influence

I can admit it freely now. All my life I've been a patsy. For as long as I can recall, I've been an easy mark for the pitches of peddlers, fund-raisers, and operators of some sort or another.

—Robert Cialdini¹

From a very young age I was always interested in manipulating people. Not in a bad way, but I found it interesting how many times I was able to obtain things or be in situations that would be unreal.

—Christopher Handagy²

Not a day goes by where individuals are not influenced by someone or something. Influence techniques are used on people all the time. Think about the last time you bought a car. Odds are that the salesperson had you first fill out paperwork to determine your interest. This is a deliberate commitment strategy, because once people commit to something in writing, it is difficult for them to change their minds. The car dealers are certainly on to this fact. Those in the advertising field also try their hand at influence in their marketing campaigns to get individuals to buy perfume, sneakers, coffee, and other products. People are constantly and intentionally being influenced by others.

In our own lives, we also use subtle techniques of influence whether or not we recognize them as such. In other words, we can do these things instinctively without ever having been taught the rules of the game. Think about it. We tell our children, “There will be no dessert until you eat your vegetables” or “there are starving children who don’t even have food to

eat so eat your dinner.” We are trying to influence their behavior every step of the way.

This chapter is principally about influence and how to use it to form the basis for disrupting the network. Before tackling influence, however, the chapter begins with an overview of intelligence collection methods because without an understanding of information and its sources, influence operations cannot be effectively planned. The psychological techniques of influence are then explained. Many government agencies are in the business of influence. As illustrated in Chapter 1, there is an overt “white world” of informational influence called public diplomacy. This side deals with disseminating truth for the purpose of influence and is not relevant here. What is relevant is the covert (operational) side—the “black world” of informational influence. Combining psychological techniques with covert action, in particular black propaganda, can aid the United States in causing the demise of al-Qaeda without firing a shot.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

The collection of intelligence is essential in order to plan any type of operation, not just influence operations. There are many ways to collect intelligence. These range from the highly technical to the reliance on skilled individuals. Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt define collection as “the gathering of raw data, through espionage; technical means (photography, interception of electronic communications, and other methods involving technology); exploitation of open sources (for instance, publications, and radio and television broadcasts); or in any other manner.”³ But what is intelligence? According to the same authors, “Intelligence refers to *information* relevant to a government’s formulation and implementation of policy to further national security interests and to deal with threats from actual territories.”⁴

As noted, intelligence is derived from different types of sources called the INTs. These general areas are (1) human intelligence, (2) imagery intelligence, with the addition of geospatial intelligence, (3) signals intelligence, (4) measurement and signature intelligence, and (5) open source intelligence. Each of these is summarized next. An influence campaign may use information from some if not all of these sources.

The first source of intelligence is human intelligence (HUMINT) collection. As the name suggests, HUMINT is derived from human sources. As Mark Lowenthal elaborates:

HUMINT largely involves sending agents to foreign countries, where they attempt to recruit foreign nationals to spy. Agents must identify individuals who have access to the information that we may desire; gain their confidence and assess their weaknesses and susceptibility to being recruited; and make a “pitch” to them, suggesting a relationship.⁵

There is also imagery intelligence (IMINT). The role of IMINT is to collect imagery through a variety of ways including satellites and unmanned vehicles. Another term that emerged in the intelligence repertoire is geospatial intelligence, or GEOINT, which is a combination of imagery with geospatial data.

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) “is the generic term given to the process of deriving intelligence from intercepted electromagnetic ways, generally referred to as signals.”⁶ Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) involves “gaining information from predictable measurements of materiel, such as shipping containers, trace elements from smoke stacks, or the chemical composition of an object from afar. MASINT also uses the analysis of unique signatures, such as the wakes left by warships, to derive useful intelligence.”⁷

Finally, open source intelligence (OSINT) focuses on collecting information such as newspapers, books, radio, television, and the Internet in the public domain.⁸ The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence houses the Open Source Center, formally the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which is dedicated to collecting and analyzing open source information.

Aiding in these collection efforts are agencies that father this crucial information, which in turn can be used in planning and executing operations. To name a few, these include the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), military branches, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of State (DOS), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). There are also sources of valuable information from other agencies, to include state and local law enforcement and other local bodies, depending on the type of information needed. As the next three chapters on individual, group, and intergroup fissures reveal, collection requirements need to focus on specific types of information necessary for an influence campaign.

Gathering information is the first step in the process. This information must then be analyzed. Analysis puts together disparate pieces of the puzzle. Depending on the situation, analysis can be done by analysts who provide a finished product or expertise, by the operators themselves, or

both working in conjunction with each other. However, as this takes place, it is important that these individuals know what type of information to look for. Examples in the individual, group, and intergroup chapters suggest possible areas of focus.

PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE TECHNIQUES

Psychologists and others in the influence world write rather extensively on the principles of influence. In his work, Cialdini discussed in great detail what he called “the weapons of influence.” According to him, these weapons of influence are (1) reciprocity, (2) commitment and consistency, (3) social proof, (4) liking, (5) authority, and (6) scarcity. In his view, all of these principles must be understood before trying to use influence effectively. Furthermore, he argued that these weapons of influence have cross-cultural applicability.⁹

The first rule, reciprocity, essentially involves having to return a favor when one is done for us. In other words, “we should try to repay, in kind, what another person has provided us.”¹⁰ According to Cialdini:

One of the reasons reciprocation can be used so effectively as a device for gaining another’s compliance is its power. The rule possesses awesome strength, often producing a “yes” response to a request that, except for an existing feeling of indebtedness, would have surely been refused.¹¹

Those who do not follow this rule often become outcasts of a social group. Thus, the internal discomfort felt by not reciprocating and the potential to become ostracized from a group are powerful incentives for reciprocity. There are variations of the reciprocity rule. Of note is the contrast principle, which when used in conjunction with the principle of reciprocation, can create a “fearsomely powerful force.”¹² The contrast principle is about perception. It “affects the way we see the difference between two things that are presented one after the other.”¹³ This duo, Cialdini maintained, was an explanation for the Watergate scandal.

The Watergate operation was the brainchild of G. Gordon Liddy, the intelligence head for the Republican Committee to Reelect the President (CRP). Although he orchestrated the Watergate break-in, frankly he was not viewed as the most stable individual. Nevertheless, Liddy proposed an operation that would use 10 men and had a budget of \$250,000 in untraceable cash. However, at this time, Nixon did not face an imminent threat

of defeat because candidate Edmund Muskie did poorly in the primaries and George McGovern was perceived as defeatable.¹⁴ Finally, the office of Lawrence O'Brien, the Democratic National Committee's chairman (the target of the break-in), didn't have information that could defeat Nixon.¹⁵ Nevertheless, CRP director John Mitchell approved the plan in a meeting with his assistants. As Cialdini further elaborated:

Despite the obvious counsel of the above reasons, the expensive, chancy, pointless, and potentially calamitous proposal of a man whose judgment was known to be questionable was approved. How could it be that intelligence men of the attainment of Mitchell and Magruder would do something so *very, very* foolish? Perhaps the answer lies in a little-discussed fact: The \$250,000 plan they approved was not Liddy's first proposal. In fact, it represented a significant concession on his part from two earlier proposals, of immense proportions. The first of these plans, made two months earlier in a meeting with Mitchell, Magruder, and John Dean, described a \$1 million program that included (in addition to the bugging of the Watergate) a specially equipped communications "chase plan," kidnapping and mugging squads, and a yacht featuring "high class call girls" to blackmail Democratic politicians. A second Liddy plan, presented a week later to the same group of Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean, eliminated some of the program and reduced the cost to \$500,000. It was only after these initial proposals had been rejected by Mitchell that Liddy submitted his "bare bones" \$250,000 plan, in this instance to Mitchell, Magruder, and Frederick LaRue. This time the plan, still stupid but less so than previous ones, was approved.¹⁶

Cialdini's second principle is about commitment and consistency. As he explained, "once we have made a choice or taken a stand, we will encounter personal and interpersonal pressures to behave consistently with that commitment. Those pressures will cause us to respond in ways that justify our earlier decision."¹⁷ These comments were derived from the psychological literature on balance and consistency advanced by Leon Festinger, Fritz Heider, and others. Dissonance is considered an aversive state that results when individuals' behaviors are inconsistent with their attitudes. Individuals are motivated to reduce the dissonant state once it occurs.¹⁸ Commitment is also integral to consistency. Cialdini notes that "once a stand is taken, there is a natural tendency to behave in ways that are stubbornly consistent with the stand."¹⁹

This technique was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter with the example of the car dealer who asks an individual to fill out paperwork

before settling on a car. If signed, the paperwork was a written commitment that is often psychologically difficult to get out of. But perhaps the most famous example is Chinese techniques used against American prisoners of war during the Korean War. Often the Chinese first asked for simple things from the prisoners, such as anti-American statements “so mildly anti-American or pro-Communist as to seem inconsequential.”²⁰ Soon however, the prisoners were asked to list the ways in which the United States was not perfect, and so on, until the prisoners agreed to broadcast anti-American statements to the camp, to other POW camps in North Korea, and to American forces in South Korea. No coercion was used. Rather, the Chinese mastered this influence technique of building on previous statements and commitments.

The next principle of influence is social proof. Social proof is essentially when individuals look to others to find out what is correct behavior. In other words, social proof is following the crowd. The fifth influence principle is authority. Suffice to say that individuals have a “deep-seated sense of duty to authority.”²¹ This can be a powerful tool at the hands of influencers. Titles, type of clothing, and the ownership of jewelry and cars are all symbols of authority. For example, if an individual is approached by a man wearing a suit, who provides a card with a title “Director of Marketing,” and then produces a new glossy and detailed marketing plan for the individual’s store, he will be seen in a position of authority on marketing matters. It is more likely that individuals will accept marketing advice from him as opposed to a young, casually dressed guy with no card and a clipboard in his hand. Research demonstrates that individuals obey authority and will do things for an authority figure that they even find unconscionable. In fact, torturers often claim they were just obeying the authority of their superiors.²²

Stanley Milgram is the most cited scholar on obedience. His findings come from a series of experiments in the early 1960s. Milgram was interested in why individuals in Nazi Germany engaged in such horrific behavior. In a landmark study, subjects were told that they were going to test other people’s abilities to learn—“the learners.” The subjects were then seated at a shock generator that had 30 switches, marked from 15 volts (slight shock) to 450 volts (severe shock). When a learner made a mistake memorizing words, a “teacher” told the subjects to administer a shock, increasing the intensity of the shock each time. But even as the shocks grew in intensity, two-thirds of the subjects continued to administer the shocks. Interestingly, the subjects showed severe signs of stress

in doing so, but continued anyway. As Cialdini maintained, "According to Milgram, the real culprit in the experiments was his subject's inability to defy the wishes of the boss of the study—a lab coated researcher who urged and, if need be, directed the subjects to perform their duties, despite the emotional and physical mayhem they were causing."²³ The key takeaway from this experiment was that when individuals are told to do something by someone they view as in a position of authority, most will obey even if it violates their values.

Cialdini's last principle is scarcity. This is when "opportunities seem more valuable to us when their availability is limited."²⁴ Simply put, when something is scarce, it is wanted even more, and if something is rare or is becoming rare, it is perceived to be more valuable.²⁵ Cialdini discussed this aspect of influence with the example of his visit to the Mormon temple in Mesa, Arizona. He admitted that he never was very interested in going to the temple but that he read in the paper that there was a special inner sector of temples that only church members were allowed entry. However, the one exception to this was that nonmembers were allowed to tour a newly constructed temple a few days immediately following its construction, which also included the restricted section. Since the Mesa temple underwent such extensive renovations as to be considered new, non-Mormon visitors were able to see the banned areas of the temple. As he recalled, "I remember quite well the effect of the article on me: I immediately resolved to take a tour. But when I phoned a friend to ask if he wanted to come along, I came to understand something that changed my decision just as quickly."²⁶ He went on to explain that he had no desire to go to the temple, observe the architecture, take a tour, nor had the need to have questions answered about the Mormon religion. But now the restricted ability to see the temple was going to become unavailable and this made it more appealing.

In the world of influence, Hadnagy preferred to use another term called *social engineering*, which he defines as "the act of manipulating a person to take action that *may or may not* be in the 'target's' best interest. This may include obtaining information, gaining access, or getting the target to take certain action."²⁷ He argued that to be successful in influence and persuasion, there are five fundamentals: (1) setting clear goals, (2) building rapport, (3) being observant of your surroundings, (4) being flexible, and (5) getting in touch with yourself.²⁸ The key is to make sure to have covered all the bases and have a well-thought-out plan before trying to influence any target. He also covered the aforementioned influence

tactics outlined by Cialdini. Adding, but relating it to the notion of reciprocity, he argues that creating a sense of obligation, where “one feels the need to take due to some sort of social, legal or moral requirement, duty, contract or promise,” is a powerful tool.²⁹ Another supplement is the notion of concessions or yielding—the “I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine principle.”³⁰ Finally, in addition to social proof there is what he termed “organizational proof.” In this regard, the organization has its own authority, in particular stemming from those in charge and who have more power and access.

Adding to the influence discussion is the use of rumor as a necessary tactic in an influence campaign. Intuitively, the far-reaching impact that rumors can have on the beliefs and actions of others is widely understood. Rumors are all around and a huge part of individuals’ information environment. They are transmitted by word of mouth, print, electronic media, and the Internet.³¹

Understanding the key to unlocking the success of rumors is the focus of numerous psychological studies. Rumors are “unverified and instrumentally relevant information statements in circulation that arise in contexts of ambiguity, danger, or potential threat and that function to help people make sense and manage risk.”³² According to psychologists Nicholas DiRonzo and Prashant Bordia, rumors have several attributes.³³

- Rumors are information statements.
- Rumors are threads in a complex fabric of social exchange, information commodities exchanged between traders.
- Rumor is information that is circulated because it is instrumentally relevant to rumor participants; the information relates to, affects, interests, or threatens them in some way.
- Rumor is important communicated information that is unverified.

For an influence operator, these are important to understand before planning any informational influence campaign.

Even in the face of rumors that alert individuals to a necessary activity that later shows to be erroneous, individuals still tend to follow the instructions for that original activity. Rumors affect both behavior and attitudes.³⁴ For instance, those playing the stock market often succumb to rumor, which in turn influences whether they buy or dump a stock. Further, negative rumors often cause stress and anxiety. Rumors spread in the face of uncertainty, and some studies indicate that anxiety may hinder fact-finding accuracy, and as already understood from the point of this

chapter, they are spread for propaganda purposes. Groups that spread propaganda often do so for self-enhancement and for solidarity and cohesion (in the face of an out-group). For any rumor, credibility of the source (discussed in more detail later) is important as is hearing it repeatedly.³⁵

Having outlined the different psychological influence techniques and the importance of rumor, the discussion now turns to operational influence.

OPERATIONAL INFLUENCE TECHNIQUES

The primary operational techniques used in the informational influence campaign falls under the rubric of covert action. Covert action is conducted under the auspices of the intelligence community and is defined in the National Security Act, Sec. 503(e), as “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”³⁶ It involves persuasion, propaganda, and paramilitary action.³⁷ Thus, there are several aspects of covert action. These elements are characterized as (1) propaganda (perception management), (2) political/economic action, (3) coups, and (4) support to insurgents. These elements of covert action are by no means mutually exclusive and can be used in conjunction with each other.³⁸

Propaganda or, as it frequently is referred to, black propaganda (or perception management) is the tool most necessary for the informational influence campaign. Lowenthal describes propaganda in the following way:

Propaganda is the very old political technique of disseminating information that has been created with a specific political outcome in mind. Propaganda can be used to support individuals or groups friendly to you or to undermine your opponents. It can also be used to create false rumors of political unrest, economic shortages, or direct attacks on individuals to name a few techniques.³⁹

Political action “enables an intelligence operation to intervene more directly in the political process of a targeted nation,”⁴⁰ whereas another technique, economic activity, focuses on economic unrest. Another component of covert action is to assist others in orchestrating a coup.⁴¹ Finally, paramilitary operations involve support to insurgents. A few historical examples are provided next to help put these into context.

Writing about the Cold War, now-deceased CIA Director Allen W. Dulles⁴² commented on the extent of Soviet propaganda. In doing so, he illustrated the central importance of the tradecraft of propaganda and also how the Soviets disseminated such propaganda.

As a part of the *apparat*, Moscow also vigorously uses all the instrumentalities of its propaganda machine. In one year, according to the Soviet Ministry of Culture's report, the Soviets published and circulated approximately thirty million copies of books in various foreign languages. This literature is widely and cheaply distributed through local bookstores, made available in reading rooms and in their information and so-called cultural centers. In many countries throughout the world, they control newspapers and have penetrated and subsidized a large number of press outlets of various kinds which do not present themselves openly as Communist.

With some of the most powerful transmitting stations in the world, they beam their messages to practically every major area of the world. They step up their propaganda to the particular target areas which they consider to be most vulnerable, and adjust it as their policy dictates. An organization known as the All Union Society for Cultural Relations Abroad, which poses as an independent organization but is strictly controlled by the Communist party of the Soviet Union, endeavors to establish cultural ties with foreign countries, supply Soviet films and arrange programs to be given by Soviet Artists.

Then the foreign news agency of the Soviet Union, well known as Tass, a state-controlled enterprise, has offices in more than thirty major cities of the Free World. It adjusts the "news" to meet Soviet objectives in the recipient countries. All these instruments of propaganda are part and parcel of what is called the *agitprop*.⁴³

Certainly, the Soviet Union's propaganda machine garnered respect from a tradecraft perspective. An example of a specific operation conducted in India against pro-Chinese Communists was provided by former CIA operative Duane Clarridge. As he explained in more detail:

In south India, I became aware of a minor weekly newspaper that, if not an official organ of the pro-Chinese faction [of Indian Communists], supported it completely. I devised a plan to push this newspaper further and further to the left—so far in Bolshevik extremism that two things would happen. One, the Indian government would be forced to come down on the newspaper and hopefully take the leadership of the pro-Chinese Communists with it; and two, its vitriol would add to the already serious tensions between the pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet Communists.

The publisher was a Tamil, and to get in touch with him I borrowed a support agent named Petros [F] from outside India. Petros didn't look Chinese, but on the other hand, he didn't look Indian either. "Eurasian: might fit. I brought him to Madras, and gave him specific instructions: "Go see the pro-Chinese publisher. Tell him you have come from Beijing, or 'the Center,' as they call it. Offer him this stipend that he can't refuse, and recruit him on behalf of Beijing."

This would be a "false flag" recruitment—when an intelligence service recruits a target while pretending to represent another nation—a common piece of tradecraft...

Petros brought off the charade brilliantly. The pro-Chinese publisher eagerly took the bait and was proud that his work had come to Beijing's attention. Petros told him he would soon be receiving instructions on what party line the Center wanted him to take in his newspaper. The plan was for me to write up the bogus instructions, orders from 'the Center,' which would form the basis for the newspaper's editorial policy.⁴⁴

The United States was also involved in the overthrow of Iran's Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh in 1953. He was replaced by Shah Reza Pahlav, a dictator, who ironically was also overthrown in the Iranian revolution of 1979. According to CIA declassified documents, the United States was fearful because Mossadegh was not playing ball with the West. In particular, his intransigent relationship with the British-run Anglo-Iranian Oil Company sparked concerns that a British invasion over a threatened oil supply would ensue, followed by a Soviet backlash.⁴⁵

Covert action was obviously not confined just to India and Iran. Rather, it was conducted all over the world. These next cases are examples from Latin America. They also stand out due to the publicity they received. These cases are also from the Cold War, so it is important to remember that the Soviet Union was seen as a formidable enemy, and both countries were engaged in a struggle for control in regions throughout the world. The United States considered Latin America its "backyard." Thus, encroachment by the Soviets and through their proxy Cuba was seen as a significant threat to the United States.

The overthrow of Guatemala's government in 1954 and the Chilean government in 1973 are heavily cited as having CIA involvement.⁴⁶ As such, in these countries, both presidents were for land redistribution, and to the United States this meant that a communist was in power.

For example, in 1944, Guatemala experienced the October Revolution. The supporters of the revolution who espoused freedom and democracy were mostly urban, middle-class professionals and academics.⁴⁷ The next

year, Juan Jose Arevalo was elected president, and he was reform minded. Morris Blackman and coauthors explained that,

Arevalo's government eliminated the semifeudal systems of peonage and forced labor, established judicial procedures to ensure the protection of workers' rights, and tamed the violent misuse of power that had marked the Jorge Ubico regime that preceded the 1944 rebellion ... Most important, however, was the government's assistance in creating structures and institutions that encouraged the mobilization and participation of what are known in Latin America as "popular groups."⁴⁸

In 1959, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was elected and he built on earlier reforms and also expanded reform efforts, including focusing on land distribution. Seeking land redistribution meant that Arbenz would come up against corporations. One in particular was the United Fruit Company who held the most unused land. For the United States, all of these activities were worrisome. These were code names for communist, and in 1954 there was a coup. Reform policies such as these would become a thing of the past.

Another high-profile case was Nicaragua. In 1979, a revolution in Nicaragua overthrew the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle and brought to power the left-leaning Sandinista National Liberation Front, often referred to as the Sandinistas. The CIA devised a plan to destabilize the government. Part of this plan was to train and equip ex-Somoza paramilitary forces that were already operating in Nicaragua from their base Honduras. They joined forces with exiles living in Miami because their common goal was to rid the Sandinistas from power. They became known as the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN). Eventually, these forces were being commonly referred to as the Contras.

SOURCE CREDIBILITY AND DELIVERY

The credibility of the source of any influence message, including rumor—whether it comes from a person, an article on the Internet, a posting on a blog, or a book—is the single most important part of any successful influence campaign. As noted in Chapter 1, there is no point to a well-crafted message if the source is not credible. For example, if the United States and Israel are seen as the root of all evil in the world, messages traced back to either one will be fruitless. This is precisely because the source of the message is not seen as credible. After 9/11 there was and still is a widely

circulating conspiracy theory that Israel perpetrated the attacks, and furthermore, the Israelis warned all Jews in New York to leave. Even though an estimated 500 Jews died in the World Trade Center collapse, the rumor continues to persist.⁴⁹ And while the United States provided significant evidence that this was an act perpetrated by al-Qaeda, the conspiracy is alive and well. It was not until Usama bin Laden actually came out and took responsibility that this conspiracy could be questioned. And even then, plenty of conspiracy theorists suggested that the United States doctored his speech, and remained wedded to their views.

Influence expert Henry Mills provided additional insight on this subject. He argued that first the messenger must be trusted. To illustrate his argument, Mills used an instructive example of the interaction between British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler in September 1938.

Hitler wanted to take over Czechoslovakia. He had already secretly mobilized the German army to attack Czechoslovakia, but his army needed until the end of September to prepare. If he could hoodwink the Czechs into delaying their mobilization, the German army could take the country by surprise.

Hitler persuaded Chamberlain that if the Czechs gave up the Sudetenland (a German-speaking region of Czechoslovakia), he would live in peace and never make another territorial demand.

Chamberlain, desperate to avoid war, foolishly believed him. He wrote to his sister "[Hitler] was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word."

The Munich Agreement that followed allowed Germany to occupy the Sudetenland. A few months later, Hitler broke his word and invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia. When Hitler attacked Poland in September 1939, there were no talks. What little trust there had been evaporated. Britain and France declared war on Germany and World War II began.⁵⁰

Mills and other influence experts indicate that influencers must appear free from bias. In other words, the speaker's integrity will invariably be tested. "If we think the message is biased, we can carefully analyze the message or dismiss it, depending on the circumstances. Professional persuaders, therefore, work hard to appear unbiased and trustworthy."⁵¹ In fact, some of the most successful persuaders often appear as though they are acting against their own interests. Mills demonstrates this with the example of Patrick Reynolds and his advocating against smoking. As Mills notes,

One of the most persuasive people for the antismoking lobby in the United States is Patrick Reynolds. Patrick Reynolds, who inherited \$2.5 million from the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company founded by his grandfather, has urged victims of smoking-related illnesses to sue the tobacco companies for damage.⁵²

At times, influencers with credibility issues may use other messengers. For example, one of the ways in which corporations get their message out is through front organizations. This can obviously be applied to entities other than corporations.⁵³

How messages are framed is also an important consideration. For example, negative and positive framing can affect the target in different ways. Further, if a message is delivered in person, "preloading," that is, "being able to plant ideas or thoughts in a way that is not obvious or overbearing" is an essential skill. Developing rapport and having a clear goal is part of this skill.⁵⁴ In the black world, personas that will be messengers and key influencers will need to be created and oftentimes this takes years of preplanning. But successful campaigns to undermine targets require that these individuals are strategically placed, something that will be returned to in later chapters.

The other influence challenge is to put together a campaign that does not rely on one source of influence. If, for example, an influence message appears from one source, even with unquestioned credibility, it is highly unlikely to be believed if it is not found in other channels too. Thus, any effort at influencing must be well thought out and appear in more than one influence channel. Finally, targets also process information in a variety of ways, including visual, auditory, and kinesthetic (feelings).⁵⁵ It is a good practice to understand the target if the message is being singularly directed or in person. If the message appears in nondirected or multidirected ways, then it should be in multiple places, with a good idea to mix visual and auditory modes of delivery.

Influencers must also be flexible. Sometimes they will not be successful and it is important to stop, think, and adjust if necessary. Not getting stuck on a seemingly good idea is central to successful planning and implementation.

Breaking al-Qaeda by using informational influence techniques is going to take putting together talented and creative thinkers. Those who are exceptional at it are so because this type of thinking comes naturally. Others have the proclivity and can be taught the ropes by more seasoned experts. However, the simple fact is that not everyone is suited to do this

type of work. And like any organization, individuals are assigned or end up working in areas that they are not well suited for. This is not for everyone and will be apparent very quickly. These individuals, as well as the naysayers who say it cannot be done, need to be moved out because they will drain the efforts of others. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the CIA is best poised to lead such an effort. At the same time, the agency needs to be able to draw on others in the community to aid in its efforts.

CONCLUSION

Having introduced collection and the psychological and operational influence techniques, the next three chapters focus on how they can be specifically applied at the individual, group, and intergroup level. The examples provided in the next three chapters are just that—examples. These examples demonstrate what could be done—the concept. They in no way should be taken as specific recommendations. Furthermore, because of changing events, examples used may already be out of date. But again, it is the concept, not the specific example, that matters. The next chapter addresses the individual level illustrated with a case study of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda.

NOTES

1. Robert Cialdini, *The Psychology of Influence* (New York: Collins, 2007), x1.
2. Christopher Hadnagy, *Social Engineering: The Art of Human Hacking*, (Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, 2011), xvii.
3. Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence* (Washington DC: Brassey's, 2002), 8.
4. Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, 1.
5. Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003), 74–77.
6. Michael A. Turner, *Why Secret Intelligence Fails* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), 89.
7. Ibid.
8. Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, 37. In the world of open source information, sometimes ordinary people achieve extraordinary things. Shannon Rossmiller successfully infiltrated chat rooms, notably leading to the arrest of an American, Ryan Anderson, bent on helping al-Qaeda destroy his own people. Anderson, a member of the U.S. military, decided that he did not

agree with the Iraq War. However, he went one step further. He sought out contacts with al-Qaeda so he could help them against us. A reporter chronicled Rossmiller's activities in October 2007. More specifically, "Rossmiller developed her remarkable talent for chatting up terrorists after September 11, when she started going into online forums and cajoling valuable information from other visitors. She also passed along numerous files to federal authorities. Her information has led US forces abroad to locate Taliban cells in Afghanistan, discover a renegade stinger-missile merchant in Pakistan, and help another foreign government identify a ring of potential suicide bombers. She has also assisted in nabbing two domestic would-be terrorists and seen them both convicted of felonies. National guardsman Ryan Anderson received five concurrent life sentences, and Michael Reynolds, convicted in July and awaiting sentencing, faces a similar fate." Rossmiller succeeded in doing what the intelligence community spends billions on each year. Added issues in the community are that these efforts are hardly coordinated, with each agency pursuing its own activities because of different mandates and goals. However, armed with only her computer, Rossmiller managed to bring to justice individuals who would like nothing more than to see Americans and our allies die and collected information that led to the thwarting of terrorist attacks against us. And she is one woman. The article goes on to report, "Rossmiller succeeds by exploiting a fundamental flaw in al Qaeda's famously decentralized organization. An absence of strict hierarchy makes it pretty easy for a cunning person to mix among the terrorists. So she poses as a potential al Qaeda soldier looking for like-minded comers. She creates multiple characters and uses her older and more respected personae to invite the new ones into private forums. There are other self-taught counterterrorists like her, but they tend to translate and discuss, lurk and report. Rossmiller works the terrorist boards as if she were playing a complex videogame. Her characters come complete with distinct personalities and detailed biographies that are as richly conceived as any protagonist on an HBO series." For the full story see, Jack Hitt, "Behind Enemy Lines With a Suburban Counterterrorist," *Wired Magazine*, October 23, 2007, http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-11/ff_rossmiller.

9. Robert Cialdini, "The Science of Persuasion," *Scientific American Mind*, February 2001, 284, 76.
10. Cialdini, *The Psychology of Influence*, 17.
11. *Ibid.*, 21.
12. *Ibid.*, 42.
13. *Ibid.*, 11.
14. *Ibid.*, 43.
15. *Ibid.*, 43.
16. *Ibid.*, 44.
17. *Ibid.*, 57.

18. Martha Cottam, Elena Mastors, Beth Dietz-Uhler, and Tom Preston, *Introduction to Political Psychology* (New York: Psychology Press, 2010).
19. Cialdini, *The Psychology of Influence*, 67.
20. Ibid., 70.
21. Ibid., 213.
22. Cottam et al., *Introduction to Political Psychology*.
23. Cialdini, *The Psychology of Influence*, 213.
24. Ibid., 238.
25. Ibid., 239.
26. Ibid., 238.
27. Christopher Hadnagy, *Social Engineering: The Art of Human Hacking* (Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, 2011), 10.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 191.
30. Ibid., 194.
31. Nicholas DiRonzo and Prashant Bordia, *Rumor Psychology: Social and Organizational Practices* (Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 2007).
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 16–17.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, 124.
37. Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, 8.
38. Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, 129.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, 75.
42. Allen Dulles was director of the CIA from 1953 to 1961.
43. Allen W. Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (Guilford: Lyons Press, 2006), 228–229.
44. Duane R. Clarridge, *A Spy for All Seasons* (New York: Scribner, 1997), 93.
45. “Documents Reveal New Details about CIA’s Role in 1953 Coup in Iran,” *Fox News*, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/08/20/documents-reveal-new-details-about-cia-role-in-153-coup-in-iran/#ixzz2dGwKo2E4> (accessed August 28, 2013).
46. There are numerous books written by Latin American experts about U.S. policy in Latin America. For example, see Morris Blackman, William M. Leogrande, and Kenneth Sharpe, *Confronting Revolution* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986); and Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984).
47. Blackman et al., *Confronting Revolution*.
48. Ibid., 25.
49. Bryan Curtis, “4000 Jews, 1 Lie Tracking an Internet Hoax,” *Slate*, October 5, 2001, <http://slate.msn.com/id/116813> (accessed September 28, 2008).

- 50. Henry Mills, *Artful Persuasion* (New York: AMACON, 2000), 15.
- 51. Ibid., 16.
- 52. Ibid., 17.
- 53. Ibid., 18.
- 54. Hadnagy, *Social Engineering*, 63.
- 55. Ibid., 63.

5

Breaking Individuals

And as the best form of gratitude for the righteous martyr and for the life of the mujahid Sheikh Usama bin Laden is to continue on the path of jihad in the Cause of Allah, and to help the Muslims and the weak, the General Command of Qaedat al Jihad—and after the completion of consultation—announces that Sheikh Dr. Abu Muhammad Ayman al-Zawahiri, may Allah grant him success, has assumed the responsibility of the leadership of the group.

—Al-Qaeda¹

People don't know that this man [Bin Laden] was tender, gentle, kind, with refined feelings, even when life was hard.

—Ayman al-Zawahiri²

This chapter is about the first breaking point—that is, at the individual level. Depending on circumstances the leaders of groups may have to be influenced. If they are to be effectively influenced, then they must first be identified. In other words, just because a person is called the leader does not make it necessarily so.³ This person may not even be able to affect change. The next step is to understand what leaders believe and how they operate. Attempting to influence their activities to support U.S. interests cannot be achieved without understanding what makes them tick. In other words, the hard questions about them need to be mastered.

Certainly, there is a lot of academic work being done on individuals, in particular leaders, and there is a plethora of literature on personal style, personalities, dysfunction, and the like.⁴ Although this literature certainly contributes to understanding of individuals, practically speaking, in any

informational influence campaign, an approach focused on particular aspects of leaders for the purpose of influence is necessary. Having an in-depth understanding of leaders leads to planning effective influence campaigns against them. Thus, in this chapter, a tailored framework is introduced that provides the basis for understanding and analyzing leaders. This framework draws heavily on psychological approaches to studying leaders in a political context.

Once introduced, the framework is illustrated with the case study of Ayman al-Zawahiri. In doing so, several of al-Zawahiri's fissures were noted. Key fissures were identified only after the establishment of *behavioral patterns*—thus, the fissures held constant throughout his life. Public statements and writings were used only if they were consistent with al-Zawahiri's behavior. Otherwise, they were considered rhetoric and unverifiable with regard to understanding him. Also demonstrated were examples of psychological and operational techniques used to construct an influence campaign against al-Zawahiri.

THE LEADERSHIP FRAMEWORK

There are four aspects of the leadership framework: (1) personal characteristics, (2) operating environment, (3) advisory process, and (4) information environment.⁵ Each is discussed in more detail next.⁶

Personal Characteristics

The first part of the framework, personal characteristics, focuses on the leaders' views of themselves, to include degree of self-confidence and locus of control,⁷ personal perception of the role they play and how they became a leader, ideology and philosophy, motivation (task, affiliation, or power),⁸ beliefs,⁹ values,¹⁰ proclivities, and likes and dislikes. Another important aspect identified is background and skills. Among them are their age, birthplace, where they were raised, and other relevant socialization factors. Also included are marital status, the nature of the marital relationship, and relationships with immediate and extended family, and the nature of those relationships. Other aspects include interests, schooling, including the type of student they were, and focus of study, former positions held, and key personal associates. Understanding the norms of leaders is also important. Norms include views of how individuals could

behave, impertinent behaviors, words or phrases that are insulting, and views of the role of minority or majority groups.

Operating Environment

The second part of the framework is the leaders' operating environment. This includes how they came to power. Also identified are groups or individuals that constrain these leaders, whether or not they challenge constraints¹¹ and the images they hold of other groups.¹² Incorporated are also perceptions about others, their degree of ethnocentrism, and distrust for others.¹³ However, of interest is not only how they view others, but also how others view them.¹⁴ Thus, the focus is on existing perceptions about leaders on a variety of perceptual issues, and at a more basic level, whether they are liked, disliked, and by whom. Also relevant is their view of a defined constituency or followers and sources of finance and areas of corruption.

Advisory System

The third part of the framework deals with their advisory system. Some of the most significant people in their world are their advisors. It is important not to become caught up in the formality of line and block charts because they may not identify key influencers. Therefore, both formal and informal networks of advisors are important. Advisors may also change over time. For a variety of reasons, advisors can also fall out of favor, or new ones may emerge. When the most influential advisors are identified, the potential spin, personal agenda, or filtering of information by them could also be discerned. Finally, some leaders may not even care about advice from others. As a result, they may pay lip service to their advisors but consider themselves the ultimate authority on all issues. Last is the degree of control leaders need over the policy process, and their interest and level of policy expertise.

Information Environment

The framework's fourth and final part is the information environment. This includes the degree of complexity exhibited. For example, some leaders are open to information, deal in shades of gray, and tend to see differentiation in their environments.¹⁵ As such, they are likely to search for ways to help them understand their states of affairs. These types of

leaders usually want a lot of information at their disposal. Those who lack in cognitive complexity are “black and white thinkers.”¹⁶ They are essentially closed to conflicting information, do not seek out alternative views, and do not care about supplementary information. Once certain traits are established, notably regarding the degree of cognitive complexity and motivation, and responsiveness to constraints, it is possible to draw additional conclusions about the nature of the leader’s style.¹⁷ Whether complex or not, the type of information they pay attention to, the sources of this information, and how they prefer information presented facilitates the designing of an influence campaign.

THE CASE OF AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI

The analysis of Ayman al-Zawahiri begins with a summary of some key findings related to several of the personal characteristics in the framework, namely biographical information, background and skills, and some other traits that developed at an early age.

Some Background and Early Traits

Ayman al-Zawahiri was born in Maadi, Egypt, a suburb of Cairo, in 1951. He was from a wealthy and educated family. In fact, his family seemed “never to have faced social or economic hardships; many of its members would be considered part of the elite in any society.”¹⁸ For example, al-Zawahiri’s grandfather was the imam at the al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo, his father was a professor of pharmacology; and his maternal grandfather was a professor of oriental literature, president of Cairo University, and also served as ambassador to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.¹⁹

Al-Zawahiri was interested in education and was considered a loner and introvert. According to an account by Montasser al-Zayyat, a Cairo lawyer who was imprisoned with him in 1981:

His family noticed his interest in reading, academic excellence and studiousness from a young age. Whenever he got tired of studying, he would not spend time with children his age to play or watch television, but rather read books on religion and Islamic jurisprudence as a pastime.”²⁰

Al-Zawahiri read and was influenced by the Islamist literature of Sayyid Qutb, Abu al-Mawdudi, and Hassan al-Nadwya.²¹ Abdullah

Azzam, frequently referred to as the spiritual father of Usama bin Laden and revered leader of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, also had a significant influence on al-Zawahiri's thinking.²² After al-Zawahiri graduated from school in 1968, he enrolled in the medical college at Cairo University. He finished his medical training in 1974, and then completed a master's degree in surgery in 1978.²³ He married Azza Ahmed Numar in 1979 and had at least four children by her. Azza graduated from Cairo University with a degree in philosophy but met the criteria of being a pious wife.²⁴ His wife and two of his children were killed during a U.S. airstrike in Afghanistan in December 2001.²⁵ In fact, in a letter written to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the now-deceased leader of what was then called al-Qaeda in Iraq, Zawahiri explained that he was a victim of the great Satan United States when they killed his family during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

That the author of these lines has tasted the bitterness of American brutality, and that my favorite wife's chest was crushed by a concrete ceiling and she went on calling for aid to lift the stone block off her chest until she breathed her last, may God have mercy on her and accept her among the martyrs. As for my young daughter, she was afflicted by a cerebral hemorrhage, and she continued for a whole day suffering in pain until she expired. And to this day I do not know the location of the graves of my wife, my son, my daughter, and the rest of the three other families who were martyred in the incident and who were pulverized by the concrete ceiling, may God have mercy on them and the Muslim martyrs. Were they brought out of the rubble, or are they still buried beneath it to this day?²⁶

Al-Zawahiri later married two other widows of a colleague who died in the bombing.²⁷ He also had children by them, and it is assumed his family still resides with him.

Despite the opportunity granted by his elite status in society and access to education, al-Zawahiri was more interested, it seems, in clandestine activities aimed at overthrowing the Egyptian regime. According to author Nimrod Raphaëli:

At the age of 15, al-Zawahiri joined Jam'iyat Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyah, a "Salafi" (Islamic fundamentalist) movement lead by Sheikh Mustafa al-Fiqqi, but soon left to join the Jihad movement. By the age of 16, he was an active member of a Jihad cell headed by Sa'id Tantawi. Tantawi trained al-Zawahiri to assemble explosives and to use guns. In 1974, the group split because the group declared Tantawi's brother as *kaf-iir* (infidel) because he fought under the banner of *kuffar* or infidels which

characterized the Egyptian army. In 1975 Tantawi went to Germany (and is said to have disappeared) and Ayman took over the leadership of the cell. He immediately organized a military wing under Issam al-Qamari, an active officer in the Egyptian army at the time.²⁸

Tawfik Hamid, a medical student at that time and member of the Islamic Group, discussed his impression of al-Zawahiri, who had come to the medical school to give a sermon. Hamid noted the passion that al-Zawahiri exhibited during his speech and described him as “fiery” and “charismatic.”²⁹ After finishing his studies, al-Zawahiri took a position in a Cairo clinic operated by the Muslim Brotherhood. He then traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan, and stayed for four months. “For him, this experience was providential because it opened his eyes to the wealth of opportunities for jihad action in Afghanistan.”³⁰

The Egyptians imprisoned al-Zawahiri in 1981 as a suspect in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat. Here more personal characteristics were evident including additional information on his formative years, traits, and motivation. Some elements of his early operating environment, specifically how he dealt with rivals and the perceptions of him by others, also emerged. For example, while in prison, al-Zawahiri was branded a man who created discord among the other prisoners. Specifically, in prison with him was Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman. Rahman, who was blind, was appointed emir of the group. Debate in prison focused on whether Rahman could lead a newly formed coalition of the Islamic Group (IG), led by Refai Taha, and other jihadist factions.³¹ Montasser al-Zayyat, who witnessed the altercation in the prison, explained that many of the jihadists felt a sense of failure because of “several rushed and ill-conceived” operations, which exacerbated tensions further. In fact, “many heated discussions raged in prison over the causes of these failures. Some members were accused of negligence and of not having completed the tasks with which they had been entrusted.”³²

Al-Zawahiri, among others such as Esam al-Qamari, did not think that Rahman was fit to lead the new group because he was blind. According to them, a leader could not have impaired senses.³³ Taha believed that “Zawahiri was fanning the fire of dissension by encouraging al-Qamari to argue against Rahman’s leadership.”³⁴

Al-Zawahiri confessed in prison (he claims under torture) and revealed the details of his associations, and he also told them the hiding place of al-Qamari. Subsequently, al-Qamari was arrested and executed.³⁵ Interestingly, the Egyptian authorities did not realize the extent of

al-Zawahiri's involvement in the jihad movement, although he did not have direct involvement in the assassination. Al-Zawahiri was always extremely secretive and cautious with regard to his clandestine activities and remains so today.³⁶ Because he was relatively unknown, he was only convicted of a firearms charge and received three years in prison.

Al-Zawahiri was released from prison in 1984 and went to work in Saudi Arabia at the Ibn al-Nafis Hospital, and then went to Pakistan to work as a surgeon in the Kuwaiti Red Crescent Hospital. At this time, the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan was in full swing. Nimrod Raphaeli described that al-Zawahiri would apply his medical skills to support the fight against the Soviets.

[He] would go to the war zone for three months at a time to perform surgery on wounded fighters, often with primitive tools and rudimentary medicines. At the same time, he opened the "Islamic Jihad" bureau in Peshawar to serve both as a liaison point for new Mujahedeen and a recruitment agency.³⁷

According to some sources in Pakistan, the IJ reorganized under the leadership of Sayyed Imam al-Sherif (Dr. Fadl). However, while he was considered the ideological "leader," al-Zawahiri "was more active in the group's daily activities to the point where members of the group thought he was the actual leader and pledged allegiance to him."³⁸ It seems that al-Zawahiri was not only in charge of the group but sought to establish its clear presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

In 1988, three leaders of the Islamic Group (IG) settled in Peshawar. One of them was Khaled al-Islambuli, the brother of the man who assassinated Anwar al-Sadat. The point of their trip was to challenge.³⁹ Their fight was revealed in publications by the Islamic Group (*al-Fath*) and by al-Zawahiri (*al-Murabitoon*). For example, the IG accused al-Zawahiri of selling arms and using the money to buy golden nuggets. He was also accused of depositing money in a Swiss bank account. According to Raphaeli, "in the face of these accusations, some relief agencies decided to cut off their aid to Zawahiri, and the need for funds forced him to seek assistance from Iran."⁴⁰ Al-Zawahiri was also accused by Azzam of causing problems. Azzam complained to his son-in-law that al-Zawahiri was a troublemaker and that he, along with others, only intended to create discord among the mujahedeen.⁴¹ Azzam's son-in-law recounted what was said about al-Zawahiri and others like him. As Fawaz Gerges expounded on the fundamentals of the conflict:

Abdullah Anas, Azzam's son-in-law and a senior jihadist who fought in Afghanistan along his side, recalled that Azzam had complained bitterly to him about backbiting troublemakers, Zawahiri in particular, who spoke against the mujahedeen. In his memoirs, Anas reported that Azzam would say, "They have only one point, to create *fitna* [sedition] between me and these volunteers."⁴²

Gerges also illuminated that problems were brewing early on between Azzam and al-Zawahiri. For example, Azzam and al-Zawahiri differed on their conception of jihad.

Azzam's conception of jihad was more limited and defensive than Zawahiri's ... In his sermons and writings, Azzam stressed that jihad was a personal duty (*fard'ayn*). "When the enemy enters the land of Muslims, jihad becomes individually obligatory." Unlike Sayyid Qutb, Zawahiri, and other revolutionaries, Azzam emphasized resistance, not aggression. For example, in Afghanistan he had focused almost exclusively on expelling the Soviet occupiers and had opposed meddling in the country's internal affairs. He eschewed terrorism and the targeting of civilians. Taking jihad global, he warned, "could turn [jihadists] into bandits that could threaten people's security and would not let them live in peace."⁴³

Azzam and his two eldest sons were killed by a car bomb in 1989, and some rumors suggested that al-Zawahiri played a role to move Azzam out of the way so that he could be the key influencer of Usama bin Laden. Azzam's followers, in particular Usama Rushdi, believed al-Zawahiri spread rumors that Azzam was an American spy and brought on the final split between Bin Laden and Azzam.⁴⁴

When all was said and done, al-Zawahiri "emerged the winner from this conflict [with the Islamic Group], largely because of bin Laden's support and because of the murder of Abdallah Azzam, the spiritual leader of bin Laden."⁴⁵

Al-Zawahiri followed Bin Laden to Sudan. However, negative views of him as a coward, traitor, and liar emerged there too. According to Dr. Fadl⁴⁶:

After Al-Zawahiri informed me that he was acting as an agent for the Sudanese, the brother Rifat, whose [real] name is Zaki 'Izzat Zaki, invited me to the celebration of the birth of his daughter. A number of the brothers were there—Abu Talha, Hisham Abaza, and others. I said to them more than what I said in the *Document [of Right Guidance for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World]*. I told them that jihad was not an obligation for them

in Egypt, that there was no parity [between them and the Egyptian security forces], and [thus] they incurred no sin [by not waging jihad].

I told them that they had learned the principles of guerilla warfare and conventional warfare, and that the confrontation they were carrying out in Egypt could not be classified as either—that it was a kind of futility that brought no benefit.

I spoke to them about the error in what they were doing, using proofs from the *shari'a* and from reality ... The brothers said they had been convinced by what I said. This was in late 1993 or early 1994.

Dr. Fadl further explained al-Zawahiri's reaction.

Al-Zawahiri was alarmed when he learned of this, and he gathered them together and said to them: "Dr. Fadl [i.e. Sayyed Imam] wants to make us a salafi group, but we are a jihad [group], and we may continue fighting in Egypt down to our last dollar and our last man."

But this was a lie, as he was the first to leave Sudan when the Sudanese expelled them in 1995, when they discovered that Al-Zawahiri had been lying to them and didn't fight down to the last man, as he claimed. He was the first to flee, as usual. When the Sudanese expelled him, he announced that he was stopping operations in Egypt, in 1995—after he had hanged his brothers on the gallows and crammed them into the jails in Egypt.⁴⁷

There are several things to keep in mind when considering al-Zawahiri's personal characteristics and operating environment during the time period of his life as a child to his work in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Sudan. Al-Zawahiri was not an extrovert, and leadership qualities were not self-evident. He educated himself in jurisprudence, thus concentrating on the art of argument. And there was evidence that he used the art of argument to speak out against his and others' detention while in prison. He instructed and gave advice surreptitiously if it was in his interests. He also challenged those who he believed did not serve the purposes of the movement, as depicted by him, and he found others expendable if it served his own purposes. By pursuing his own agenda, he also conflicted with many individuals and groups. The role he carved for himself even behind the scenes gave him power, and when the time was right, he took control over the Islamic Jihad (IJ). In other words, he successfully maneuvered his way out of conflicts and emerged as the winner.

Thus, it was indeed a calculated move when he merged his own group, the IJ, with al-Qaeda in 1998 by joining "The Global Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders." This official partnership resulted in a

reorganization of al-Qaeda into four committees: military, religion, finance, and the media.⁴⁸ The United States was the centerpiece of The Global Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders. Usama bin Laden was al-Zawahiri's ticket for a greater role in the transnational movement against the crusaders and Jews. He pragmatically shifted his focus.⁴⁹ However, there was fallout over al-Zawahiri's decision, and he had to be aware of the repercussions of abandoning his group's goals in order to serve his own interests. According to one account,

Fundamentalist sources maintain that Zawahiri's signing of the statement of "Global Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders" in February 1998 was an ill-omened act for al-Jihad Organization because it caused the rapid downfall of the most prominent leaders of the group who were residing abroad, and members of the group who were living in other Arab countries were extradited to Egypt."⁵⁰

Obviously, the fate of the group was not his concern.

Al-Zawahiri served Bin Laden well and is often heralded as the man behind Bin Laden who crafted the arguments and gave him direction—he is the power behind the throne, a notable personal characteristic that came up time and again. Bin Laden had the charisma to be in the forefront, and al-Zawahiri wanted his own power to grow and to get his message out through whatever means necessary.

Despite the protestations of other members of his group, al-Zawahiri knew what he wanted. But during the summer of 1999, members of the IJ were becoming uncomfortable with al-Zawahiri's growing ties to Bin Laden. As a result, al-Zawahiri was ousted as their leader. Thartwat Shehada took control of the group and wanted to get back the original work of the group, the focus on Egypt. Shehada did not have the financial backing to achieve this goal, and by spring of 2001, al-Zawahiri was able to reassert control over the group.⁵¹ Al-Zawahiri made another calculated move and packed the leadership of al-Qaeda with his trusted Egyptian allies. The Egyptians were clearly in control of al-Qaeda.

More elements of the framework, mainly in the areas of personal characteristics, operating environment, his way of finding advisors that agreed with him, and elements of his information environment were evident. For one, al-Zawahiri exhibited characteristics of a "director." His preference was for direct control, and he preferred his own advice to others and advocated his own views.⁵² For example, when members of his group disagreed with him, he went ahead with his own agenda and made

decisions to their detriment. He also found trusted individuals to run the organization who would not disagree with him. Additionally, his drive for power manifested itself in the type of maneuvering that would put him back on top. Al-Zawahiri was not a man to be challenged or crossed. He was a man seeking power and control.

Quest for Relevance and Power

After the September 11 attacks on the United States perpetrated by al-Qaeda, the United States struck back with the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in December 2001. After the United States successfully disrupted al-Qaeda's operating base in Afghanistan, it seems al-Zawahiri became geographically separated from Bin Laden. Bin Laden was remarkably silent since his statement in 2004 until September 2007 when a tape was released where he made a general statement to the American public that did not talk about operational matters, but rather appeared as a lecture to the American public on U.S. culture, politics, history, and the merits of Islam. The statement read like a lecture on what Americans have done and seems as though he was painting a picture of blame squarely on Americans and their support for their leaders. He also made a great appeal for Americans to embrace Islam.

In the meantime, al-Zawahiri pressed on in his quest for relevance and power. The network became more diffuse, and al-Zawahiri was becoming less important as a hands-on director. He began making more statements that attempted to demonstrate his operational and leadership relevancy. He maintained a self-image as a powerful and important leader. As such, he commented on operational matters and offered direction to those he perceived to be among his followers: the members of the global jihad. In fact, already noted was that in January 2008, al-Zawahiri offered an advice page carried on four jihadist Web sites. Individuals submitted questions to him by mid-January 2008.⁵³ His replies were published in early April 2008.⁵⁴

From the examination of collected information, it appeared that al-Zawahiri viewed the United States as a power that could be challenged.⁵⁵ In 2002, al-Zawahiri was interviewed, and he clearly articulated his belief that al-Qaeda had the power to strike the United States.

In regard to our evaluation of that which has occurred so far; before all else, it is imperative that we acknowledge the victory achieved by the

Muslims against the Crusader forces, in New York and Washington. It was a clear success, which was more damaging to the Empire of Evil, than the heaviest blow ever sustained by the enemies of Islam. The bleeding continues even today and only Allah knows how long it may continue for.

If the only fruit of these attacks were to demonstrate to the Mujahid Muslim youth the importance of the few, it would be enough. This small group, in numbers and equipment, were able to inflict immense slaughter on the greatest idol worshipped today, despite its power and arrogance.⁵⁶

In September 2004, al-Zawahiri released yet another statement where he provided comments on Afghanistan, Iraq, and other issues. According to him:

The defeat of America in Iraq and Afghanistan has become just a matter of time, with God's help ... Americans in both countries are between two fires. If they carry on, they may bleed to death—and if they pull out, they lose everything.⁵⁷

In an interview conducted with Montasser al-Zayyat on al-Jazeera, an anchorwoman asked al-Zayyat what he thought about the al-Zawahiri statement. He replied:

The main thing I read in this statement is the smartness and shrewdness of this man, who has come up with the statement at the time where there is uproar over his disappearance and reports speaking about his death and that of his colleague and brother Shaykh Usama Bin Laden. He has made it a point to choose the proper timing, while the whole world is getting ready to speak about the third anniversary of the 9/11 incidents. He preceded all the heresies and tales that would be told and came out to us confident, clear, composed, and determined in his mobilization discourse. He challenges the United States and the coalition armies and says the question of evicting the invasion forces from Afghanistan is just a matter of time. He also defies Pervez Musharraf. I say that Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri is managing an open match with modest resources despite the world security alert against him. He is managing an open match with the United States with all its huge resources and intelligence services.⁵⁸

In another statement released in July 2007, al-Zawahiri berated the United States, blaming the country for the loss of Muslim security in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq, the Philippines, Chechnya, Kashmir, "and other places where America strikes us directly or support [s] our enemies by all possible means so they can replace America in striking us." Al-Zawahiri called on others to "surround America with horror." As he put it:

Why not chase them like they chase us? Why not terrorize them like they terrorize us? And we possess the means to do that. It is our right to make bombs out of our bodies when we lack the weapons of mass destruction that they have used to kill our children with? If these murderers cannot feel that their security cannot be achieved at the expense of our security, we may never taste security.⁵⁹

Obviously, al-Zawahiri made his move to be in the forefront of power. What this may point to is that he was preparing everyone to consider him the next leader of al-Qaeda. According to some, al-Zawahiri was pushing for more operational control.⁶⁰ As such he saw fit to comment on and assert his influence over everything from the war in Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Egyptian elections, oil production in Saudi Arabia, and Muslim theology.⁶¹

Al-Zawahiri was also focused on the then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, the leader of the U.S. satellite. According to a *Newsweek* article from July 2007:

Pakistani intelligence officials believe Zawahiri was behind two attempts to kill Musharraf that failed in December 2003. Since then, Zawahiri has been on an almost personal crusade to assassinate or overthrow the Pakistani leader. In one video, which was among at least 10 audio and video spots he released this year [2007], and which was produced and put on a jihadist Web site in record time, Zawahiri condemned the Red Mosque raid and urged Pakistani Muslims to “revolt” or else “Musharraf may annihilate you” (the Mosque apparently served as a safe house for foreign and jihadist militants moving between urban areas and the tribal agencies until Pakistani security forces stormed it on July 10, killing about 70 militants and students holed up inside).⁶²

However, many in the jihad movement did not welcome al-Zawahiri’s agenda and multitude of comments. Usama Rushdi, who was imprisoned with al-Zawahiri, argued:

He is rising his credibility among Islamic radicals by speaking out on so many subjects ... He’s trying to stay in control and give the impression that he’s behind everything in the Middle East and everywhere else, fighting against the Americans in Iraq. But he knows, and everyone knows, that that is not true, that he has nothing to do with anything in Iraq.⁶³

Al-Zawahiri’s focus on Pakistan created further rifts among the network members. In fact, many in al-Qaeda believed that he became too powerful and was literally obsessed with Musharraf. The 2007 *Newsweek* article also elaborated.

In [pushing his own agenda], al-Zawahiri has provoked a potentially serious ideological split within Al Qaeda over whether he is growing too powerful, and has become obsessed with toppling Musharraf. ... The anti-Zawahiri faction in Al Qaeda fears his actions may be jeopardizing that safe haven [in Pakistan], according to two jihadists ... they are Omar Farooqi, the nom de guerre for a veteran Taliban fighter and chief liaison officer between insurgent forces in Afghanistan's Ghazni province, and Hemat Khan, a Taliban operative with links to Al Qaida. They say Zawahiri's personal jihad has angered Al Qaeda's so-called Libyan faction, which intel officials believe may be led the charismatic Abu Yahya al-Libi, who made a daring escape from an American high-security lockup at Baghram air base in 2005. The Libyan Islamists, along with bin Laden and other senior Qaeda leaders, would love to see Musharraf gone, too. But they fear that Zawahiri is inviting the Pakistani leader's wrath, prematurely opening up another battlefield before the jihadists have properly consolidated their position.⁶⁴

Interestingly, Bin Laden later made a statement that in fact bolstered al-Zawahiri's views on Pakistan. He seemed to be following the dictates of al-Zawahiri and not the other way around.

In the fall of 2012, al-Zawahiri weighed in on Egyptian affairs, not surprising as this is a case near and dear to him. He criticized then President Muhammad Morsi for his lack of support in Palestine and called for the kidnapping of Americans.

The aforementioned letter al-Zawahiri wrote to al-Zarqawi was an example of him trying to assert his authority in Iraq. In it, al-Zawahiri lectured al-Zarqawi on his leadership and operating style and that he needed to take direction from those who know better, namely, al-Zawahiri. For example, he wanted al-Zarqawi to stop the sectarian violence against the Shias because it reflected badly on the network. However, it should be noted that al-Zawahiri vehemently disliked Shia. The letter read in part:

The gracious brother Abu Musab, God protect him and watch over him, may His religion, and His Book and the Sunna of His Prophet aid him, I ask the Almighty that he bless him, us, and all Muslims, with His divine aid, His clear victory, and His release from suffering be close at hand. Likewise, I ask the Almighty to gather us as He sees fit from the glory of this world and the prize of the hereafter.

1- Dear brother, God Almighty knows how much I miss meeting with you, how much I long to join you in your historic battle against the greatest of criminals and apostates in the heart of the Islamic world, the field

where epic and major battles in the history of Islam were fought. I think that if I could find a way to you, I would not delay a day, God willing.

2-My dear brother, we are following your news, despite the difficulty and hardship. We received your last published message sent to Sheikh Usama Bin Ladin, God save him.

Likewise, I made sure in my last speech—that Aljazeera broadcast Saturday, 11 Jumadi I, 1426h, 18 June 2005—to mention you, send you greetings, and show support and thanks for the heroic acts you are performing in defense of Islam and the Muslims, but I do not know what Aljazeera broadcast. Did this part appear or not? I will try to attach the full speech with this message, conditions permitting.

Likewise, I showed my support for your noble initiative to join with your brothers, during a prior speech I sent to the brothers a number of months ago, but the brothers' circumstances prevented its publication.

I want to reassure you about our situation. The summer started hot with operations escalating in Afghanistan. The enemy struck a blow against us with the arrest of Abu al-Faraj, may God break his bonds. However, no Arab brother was arrested because of him. The brothers tried—and were successful to a great degree—to contain the fall of Abu al-Faraj as much as they could. However, the real danger comes from the agent Pakistani Army that is carrying out operations in the tribal areas looking for mujahedeen.

I want to keep corresponding with you about the details of what is going on in dear Iraq, especially since we do not know the full truth as you know it. Therefore, I want you to explain to me your situation in a little detail, especially in regards to the political angle. I want you to express to me what is on your mind in regards to what is on my mind in the way of questions and inquiries.

I want to be the first to congratulate you for what God has blessed you with in terms of fighting battle in the heart of the Islamic world, which was formerly the field for major battles in Islam's history, and what is now the place for the greatest battle of Islam in this era and what will happen, according to what appeared in the Hadiths of the Messenger of God about the epic battles between Islam and atheism. It has always been my belief that the victory of Islam will never take place until a Muslim state is established in the manner of the Prophet in the heart of the Islamic world, specifically in the Levant, Egypt, and the neighboring states of the Peninsula and Iraq; however, the center would be in the Levant and Egypt. This is my opinion, which I do not preach as infallible, but I have reviewed historical events and the behavior of the enemies of Islam themselves, and they did not establish Israel in this triangle surrounded by Egypt and Syria and overlooking the Hijaz except for their own interests.

As for the battles that are going on in the far-flung regions of the Islamic world, such as Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Bosnia, they are just the groundwork and the vanguard for the major battles which have begun in the heart of the Islamic world. We ask God that He send down his victory upon us that he promised to his faithful worshipers.

It is strange that the Arab nationalists also have, despite their avoidance of Islamic practice, come to comprehend the great importance of this province. It is like a bird whose wings are Egypt and Syria, and whose heart is Palestine. They have come to comprehend the goal of planting Israel in this region, and they are not misled in this, rather they have admitted their ignorance of the religious nature of this conflict.

What I mean is that God has blessed you and your brothers while many of the Muslim mujahedeen have longed for that blessing, and that is Jihad in the heart of the Islamic world. He has, in addition to that, granted you superiority over the idolatrous infidels, traitorous apostates, and those turncoat deviants.

This is what God Almighty has distinguished you and your brothers with over the mujahedeen before you who fought in the heart of the Islamic world, and in Egypt and Syria to be precise, but this splendor and superiority against the enemies of Islam was not ordained for them.

God also blessed you not only with the splendor of the spearhead of Jihad, but with the splendor as well of the doctrines of monotheism, the rejection of polytheism, and avoidance of the tenets of the secularists and detractors and inferiors, the call to the pure way of the Prophet, and the sublime goal that the Prophet left to his companions. This is a blessing on top of blessing on top of blessing which obliges you and your noble brothers to be constantly thankful and full of praise. The Almighty said: (If ye are grateful, He is pleased with you) and the Almighty says: (If ye are grateful, I will add more unto you).

Because of this, we are extremely concerned, as are the mujahedeen and all sincere Muslims, about your Jihad and your heroic acts until you reach its intended goal.

You know well that purity of faith and the correct way of living are not connected necessarily to success in the field unless you take into consideration the reasons and practices which events are guided by. For the grandson of the Prophet Imam al Hussein Bin Ali, {the Leader of the Faithful Abdallah Bin al-Zubair}, Abdul Rahman Bin al-Ashath, and other great people, did not achieve their sought-after goal.

If our intended goal in this age is the establishment of a caliphate in the manner of the Prophet and if we expect to establish its state predominantly—according to how it appears to us—in the heart of the Islamic world, then your efforts and sacrifices—God permitting—are a large step directly towards that goal.

So we must think for a long time about our next steps and how we want to attain it, and it is my humble opinion that the Jihad in Iraq requires several incremental goals:

The first stage: Expel the Americans from Iraq.

The second stage: Establish an Islamic authority or amirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate—over as much territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq, i.e., in Sunni areas, is in order to fill the void stemming from the departure of the Americans, immediately upon their exit and before unIslamic forces attempt to fill this void, whether those whom the Americans will leave behind them, or those among the un-Islamic forces who will try to jump at taking power.

There is no doubt that this amirate will enter into a fierce struggle with the foreign infidel forces, and those supporting them among the local forces, to put it in a state of constant preoccupation with defending itself, to make it impossible for it to establish a stable state which could proclaim a caliphate, and to keep the Jihadist groups in a constant state of war, until these forces find a chance to annihilate them.

The third stage: Extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq.

The fourth stage: It may coincide with what came before: the clash with Israel, because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity.

My raising this idea—I don't claim that it's infallible—is only to stress something extremely important. And it is that the mujahedeen must not have their mission end with the expulsion of the Americans from Iraq, and then lay down their weapons, and silence the fighting zeal. We will return to having the secularists and traitors holding sway over us. Instead, their ongoing mission is to establish an Islamic state, and defend it, and for every generation to hand over the banner to the one after it until the Hour of Resurrection.

The Muslim masses—for many reasons, and this is not the place to discuss it—do not rally except against an outside occupying enemy, especially if the enemy is firstly Jewish, and secondly American.

If the matter is thus, we must contemplate our affairs carefully, so that we are not robbed of the spoils, and our brothers did not die, so that others can reap the fruits of their labor.

If we look at the two short-term goals, which are removing the Americans and establishing an Islamic amirate in Iraq, or a caliphate if possible, then, we will see that the strongest weapon which the mujahedeen enjoy—after the help and granting of success by God—is popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries.

So, we must maintain this support as best we can, and we should strive to increase it, on the condition that striving for that support does not lead to any concession in the laws of the Sharia. And it's very important that you allow me to elaborate a little here on this issue of popular support. Let's say:

If we are in agreement that the victory of Islam and the establishment of a caliphate in the manner of the Prophet will not be achieved except through jihad against the apostate rulers and their removal, then this goal will not be accomplished by the mujahed movement while it is cut off from public support, even if the Jihadist movement pursues the method of sudden overthrow. This is because such an overthrow would not take place without some minimum of popular support and some condition of public discontent which offers the mujahed movement what it needs in terms of capabilities in the quickest fashion. Additionally, if the Jihadist movement were obliged to pursue other methods, such as a popular war of jihad or a popular intifadah, then popular support would be a decisive factor between victory and defeat.

In the absence of this popular support, the Islamic mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows, far from the masses who are distracted or fearful, and the struggle between the Jihadist elite and the arrogant authorities would be confined to prison dungeons far from the public and the light of day. This is precisely what the secular, apostate forces that are controlling our countries are striving for. These forces don't desire to wipe out the mujahed Islamic movement, rather they are stealthily striving to separate it from the misguided or frightened Muslim masses. Therefore, our planning must strive to involve the Muslim masses in the battle, and to bring the mujahed movement to the masses and not conduct the struggle far from them.

This, in my limited opinion, is the reason for the popular support that the mujahedeen enjoy in Iraq, by the grace of God.⁶⁵

In the letter, al-Zawahiri also addressed the issue of the "slaughtering" of hostages as evidenced on the beheading videos discussed in Chapter 3. Again, it is not that al-Zawahiri thinks this should not be done, but he was concerned about the support for the actions of the mujahedeen because of that type of violence. In his view, other methods such as bullets work just as well.

Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable—also—are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages. You shouldn't be deceived by the praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of you as the shaykh of the slaughterers, etc. They do not express the general view

of the admirer and the supporter of the resistance in Iraq, and of you in particular by the favor and blessing of God.

And your response, while true, might be: Why shouldn't we sow terror in the hearts of the Crusaders and their helpers? And isn't the destruction of the villages and the cities on the heads of their inhabitants more cruel than slaughtering? And aren't the cluster bombs and the seven ton bombs and the depleted uranium bombs crueler than slaughtering? And isn't killing by torture crueler than slaughtering? And isn't violating the honor of men and women more painful and more destructive than slaughtering?

All of these questions and more might be asked, and you are justified. However this does not change the reality at all, which is that the general opinion of our supporter does not comprehend that, and that this general opinion falls under a campaign by the malicious, perfidious, and fallacious campaign by the deceptive and fabricated media. And we would spare the people from the effect of questions about the usefulness of our actions in the hearts and minds of the general opinion that is essentially sympathetic to us.⁶⁶

As of a self-fulfilling prophecy, al-Zawahiri became the leader of al-Qaeda after Bin Laden was killed in 2011. Curiously, it took six weeks of consultation before it was announced that he was the new leader. This delay probably points to the fact that al-Zawahiri continues to be a polarizing figure in the jihadi movement. Immediately jumping into his new role, he vowed to continue the global jihad and as mentioned in Chapter 1, news surfaced that al-Zawahiri named Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, as his deputy. No doubt this was an effort to consolidate his power over one of the most important al-Qaeda satellites and demonstrate his relevance to the network.

In his numerous statements and prose, there was a clear description of his enemies,⁶⁷ and the degree of distrust and ethnocentrism he had with regard to them. He gave black-and-white depictions of the in-groups and out-groups in his operating environment. Al-Zawahiri portrayed his thinking as there are those who were with him, and those who were against him. In other words, there were those who agreed with him and those who did not. One either supported him, his views, and his tactics, or was considered an enemy. In an e-mail exchange that took place in 2006 between al-Zawahiri and two Egyptians, who were publicly critical of al-Zawahiri, there is information that bolsters the fact that al-Zawahiri does not like to be questioned about his methods, nor does he welcome criticism, especially by other Muslims. In fact, he wrote two e-mails to

his detractors despite the security risk in doing so.⁶⁸ For example, in one of the e-mails, al-Zawahiri wrote to al-Zayyat, "I beg you, don't stop the Muslim souls who trust your opinions from joining the jihad against the Americans." As al-Zayyat later explained about the e-mail, "Let's put it this way: Tensions had been building between us for a long time. ... He always thinks he is right, even if he is alone."⁶⁹

All of this harkens to al-Zawahiri's motivation for power, a key personal characteristic that seemed to develop more strongly over time. The information reviewed revealed that he views himself as important, wants things done his way, and does not take threats to his power kindly. He does not respect constraints. When he is threatened he tends to lash out, becoming more abrasive and contentious. Therefore, the focus on Musharraf was not that surprising. Al-Zawahiri was obviously threatened by the proactive stance that Musharraf took in the tribal areas in which al-Zawahiri purportedly resides, and of course Musharraf was perceived to be supporting the quest to find al-Zawahiri himself. Musharraf was a pawn of the United States. Al-Zawahiri likely viewed these actions against him as a personal affront, and in return, he tried to get even. In fact, he wrote in the al-Zarqawi letter that "the real danger comes from the agent Pakistani army that is carrying out operations in the tribal areas looking for mujahedeen."⁷⁰

Of further note, much was learned about al-Zawahiri's information environment. Al-Zawahiri did not demonstrate any degree of cognitive complexity. He was very rigid and dogmatic and was not likely affected by information that does not fit into his worldview. He had access to information and followed current events, and because of his perception of self-importance, he very likely paid attention to information written about him specifically. In each of his proclamations, he mentioned current events, analyzed them through his worldview, and gave his advice. He was also concerned with whether his statements were publicly released, a further indication of his need to be seen as important. However, while he was able to release statements quickly as evidenced by his commentary on the Red Mosque raid, there is also some evidence that his access to information may, at times, be delayed. This could be a function of where he was hiding, and it is likely that he was periodically moving based on his own security concerns. For instance, in his letter to al-Zarqawi, al-Zawahiri wrote about his own lack of knowledge about his released statement on al-Jazeera, mentioned that he was aware of the arrest of a network member Abu Faraj al-Libi, as well as Pakistani operations in the

tribal areas. Yet, maintaining relevance will require him to communicate more often, opening the door for mistakes. In fact, an intercepted conference call between al-Zawahiri and other key network leaders alerted the United States and resulted in the closures of diplomatic offices.⁷¹

Influencing Al-Zawahiri

Having learned about al-Zawahiri by focusing on his personal characteristics, operating environment, advisory system, and information environment, the next step was to construct an influence campaign. This entails exploiting al-Zawahiri's depiction of himself as a jihadist leader, noting the hypocrisy this unveils, and using his own words against him.

In al-Zawahiri's letter to al-Zarqawi, he wrote that he wished he too could join the fight if only there was a secure way to do so. Al-Zawahiri made numerous other statements urging people to fight. But there is also a perception that he is a coward and hypocrite. Another perception is that he is a traitor to the cause. This type of information provides glaring opportunities to discredit him. The key is to use his words and behavior against him.

By putting together this evidence from al-Zawahiri's past, his cowardly, traitorous behavior can be demonstrated. So can his hypocrisy. For example, the views that he fled both Sudan and Afghanistan, while other operational leaders were risking their safety and their lives can be exploited. Furthermore, he was accused of working with Sudanese intelligence for his own gain, ratting on his Egyptian brother, and causing problems in jail and in his dealings with Azzam. What could also be focused on is that al-Zawahiri did not ever want to fight and put his protection and interests over the fight for global jihad. Clearly, he was not joining the fight due to his own view that he was a great and important leader, not a fighter. Although everyone who participates in jihad was at risk, he ran away or satisfied his own selfish interests. As such, al-Zawahiri believes he is better than everyone else and should not be sacrificed for the cause. Therefore, the key is to use the idea of his own behavior to discredit him.

To exploit this fissure, a compilation of thoughts on whether al-Zawahiri did anything to help the network that was not in his self-interest and challenging his leadership could be created. Because he says one thing and does another—that is, he is not consistent—he could be further branded as an untrustworthy hypocrite and a traitor. As the psychological tool of

consistency demonstrates, those who are inconsistent are viewed as having personality flaws. As a result, they will not be liked or trusted.

The compilation could be an essay or book, written under a pseudonym in multiple languages, but with additional information close enough to resemble several existing members that are not fond of him in the first place (some may actually be able to be enticed to participate), which can be distributed in both local and Internet channels. Rumors can be circulated about its impending release. Once this content is shared, it will likely spark debate. In turn, relying on the scarcity and social proof weapons of influence, individuals who do not have it will want it. Well-placed Internet jihadis, cultivated by the United States, will be able to share and initiate debate. Remember too that there are already other essays circulating from, for example, Abu Faraj al-Libi, that can also be put into the essay or book.

The next step is to create a fictitious letter written as part of a wider influence strategy. The intended recipient of the letter can be a well-placed Egyptian al-Qaeda member such as Saif al-Adl. This fictitious letter could say something to the effect that al-Zawahiri is lamenting the type of individuals now in charge of the global struggle. They are ignorant and clearly do not meet the standards he and Bin Laden set for the network. This would play upon information that he is a self-proclaimed leader, is always right, and that he believes that everyone should conform and follow his dictates. The letter could also say that al-Zawahiri would never fight for groups in the present network, but would keep supporting them with rhetoric.

Also suggested in the letter could be that other avenues of support need to be cut off, particularly in the areas of funding. All efforts could then be put toward Pakistan, the most important target and, of course, the place where al-Zawahiri is likely hiding. Another key country is Yemen where his second-in-command resides. The letter could also mention the grumbling by others about his focus on Pakistan but in the letter, they could be dismissed as heretics, because al-Zawahiri knows what is best. Furthermore, the fictitious letter could state that he thinks that the only way to rescue al-Qaeda from its present malaise is to follow his dictates laid out in many of his statements over the last few years.

Another key point in the letter could be derogatory comments about the ethnic composition of the core group. It is not a secret that al-Zawahiri packed the original group with Egyptians, all in leadership positions, his trusted "advisors." Furthermore, the camps in Afghanistan were segregated. Clearly, al-Zawahiri was not evenhanded when dealing with

groups outside the Egyptian ethnicity.⁷² The real letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian, about his unpopular methods in Iraq, and his instructions for change, is also a thematic precedent that was already set. Another was the friction between al-Zawahiri and a Libyan faction led by Abu Yahya al-Libi, who is now deceased. For an influence campaign, al-Zawahiri's view that if the job is left to those other than his trusted people with a proven track record—the Egyptians—then the network goes haywire, must be exploited. Thus, al-Zawahiri, in the fictitious letter, or in a follow-on letter, could tell al-Adl that the entry of these barbarians such as Zarqawi, members of al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Maghreb, and other factions into the network such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula brought shame upon it. Examples can be used to illustrate these beliefs. Another example could be that an Egyptian had to be put into the al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) media position under the false pretense of being an Iraqi. This was because the Egyptians needed to run operational matters because Iraqis were not competent to run their own affairs.⁷³ Nonetheless, because they were serving the wider interests of the core, they would continue to be supported in his future proclamations. Additionally, he was considering sending more Egyptians or trusted Arabs to take charge in Iraq. Other leaders who do not follow the rule of law laid out by him could also be replaced or banished from the network. He wants obedience to his authority.

The letter would need to be actually be “intercepted” or “found” and released in various venues. Local distribution of copies and newspaper articles in numerous locations and in multiples is important. Those who have the letter may further distribute it, and those who do not may demand it. Thus, the scarcity rule of influence would be at play. Once demand is created, the letter would likely end up in Internet channels, posted by Internet-savvy individuals. Here, further debates may start. Due to social proof, others will keep distribution alive. Eventually, the letter would likely be in the hands of a widely distributed population or would be heard about by others. Spreading simple rumors about the content of the letter on Twitter can be a useful addition to this process.

Other confirming bits of information may also increase the credibility of the invented scenario. Here again, scarcity is a powerful influence tool. Once these confirmatory bits of information get into the hands of some, everyone will want it. And because of social proof, when one source disseminates it, everyone else may follow suit.

To support this scenario, once released, policy makers and analysts alike should appear as if in a frenzy and ask for intelligence analysis of

the letter. However, popular clerical leaders or other noted experts on al-Qaeda must independently authenticate the letter. Relying on experts rests on the psychological tool of authority. Remember, it is essential to source credibility that there absolutely is not a U.S. footprint. Thus, experts should not be American or viewed as pro-American.⁷⁴

If these aforementioned scenarios are successful, it may be a turning point for al-Zawahiri. He may be challenged and discredited. He will not be liked or trusted. A bonus of course is that al-Zawahiri may likely emerge. Knowing that he sees himself as a powerful and exalted leader, he will likely respond to the challenges against him. This was already demonstrated with his numerous defensive speeches and the question-and-answer sessions he held. Furthermore, the e-mail he wrote to Zayyat suggested that al-Zawahiri may take risks when his credibility is on the line. It also seems he was willing to take a risk with a conference call in 2013 with other network leaders to discuss operational matters, likely to assert his authority. Soon after the fictitious letter is made public, the areas along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border where he is believed to be hiding could be monitored. In other words, time to watch for commotion. Already known from his speeches is that there may be a delay in his response. But when all is said and done, he may demand a way to get his own message out.

Knowing about al-Zawahiri's personal characteristics, advisory system, operating, and information environment, is there a way to influence him? In other words, can the way he thinks be changed? Currently, it is almost impossible to influence al-Zawahiri because he is constantly reinforcing and confirming his belief system. He is, by now, entirely entrenched in his rigid convictions. But there are always incentives, and here al-Zawahiri's characteristics prove instructive. His views cannot be changed, but if he were backed into a corner, he may do what is in his own best interest. This is where there may be leverage. The incentives for his giving up and quietly disappearing could work when he is near capture or when his power has dissipated and his influence became nominal.

The fact that he has an entrenched worldview, however, should not stop the creation of a perception that foreign governments are influencing him. First, evidence suggests that al-Zawahiri is self-interested, self-absorbed, seeks power, and has his own agenda.

Numerous examples illustrated that al-Zawahiri is not a man of his word and cannot be trusted. Thus, a rumor could be started that al-Zawahiri is in negotiations with certain intelligence services for his surrender.

Such a depiction can play off rumors that are already in place that he was an agent of the Sudanese and a duplicitous one at that. This fictitious story about another intelligence agency may be that he was provided enticements such as cash and a guarantee of his safe passage and protection in a new country. Different types of evidence of this need to be crafted and released in several local networks. The scarcity and social proof tools of influence would then take care of the rest, eventually finding its way to more venues. A reminder of this could reappear in several channels in different venues both locally, such as a newspaper article that may need to be picked up by other papers, and on the Internet, being spread and discussed by U.S. Internet plants. What also could be released is the “discovery,” preferably by those who already dislike him, of a fake bank account with a significant amount of money in it that can be credibly tied to al-Zawahiri. The precedent was set by the IG that accused him of hoarding funds for his own personal gain.

While the rumor mill is being churned, another tactic could be to play off the problems that al-Zawahiri has with other individuals and groups in the network. The rumor already exists that al-Zawahiri got rid of Azzam and sold out Qamari. He is known to discredit his critics. As highlighted earlier, the conflict with Abu Yahya al-Libi is an illustration of that contention. There could be another rumor that those he disagrees with are going to be eliminated. This may send some at first and then others running to protect them because of the tool of social proof. If all goes well, they may turn on al-Zawahiri in the process. A network focused on perceptions of internal enemies is better than a network focused on external enemies. This could lead to his capture or to his elimination by members of his own network.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provided a framework for analysis of individuals. Understanding individuals is central to identifying fissures and also to success in influencing their activities. Psychological approaches to influence and operational methods are the key methods to create a viable influence campaign. Leaders of terrorist groups do have vulnerabilities. Focusing a campaign on these vulnerabilities and exploiting them is one way to begin to break the network, individual by individual. The next step is to focus on group fissures.

NOTES

1. Bill Roggio, "Al Qaeda Appoints Ayman al Zawahiri Successor to Bin Laden," June 16, 2011, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/06/al_qaeda_names_ayman.php#ixzz2cGzUNhcM (accessed August 17, 2013).
2. "Osama Bin Laden Was Tender and Kind, Zawahiri Says," *BBC News*, November 15, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-15750813> (accessed August 27, 2013).
3. For example, some leaders are merely figureheads.
4. For a review of this literature see Martha Cottam, Elena Mastors, Beth Dietz-Uhler, and Tom Preston, *Introduction to Political Psychology* (New York: Psychology Press, 2010). Much of this literature can be applied beyond leaders. However, in certain cases, there may not be enough information on individual vice leaders to conduct a thorough analysis.
5. This framework and some data on al-Zawahiri first appeared in Elena Mastors and Jeff Norwitz, "Disrupting and Influencing Leaders of Armed Groups," in *Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism, and Counterinsurgency*, ed. Jeffrey H. Norwitz (Newport: Naval War College, 2008), 323–342.
6. This framework introduces many pertinent aspects of leaders that need to be well understood before proceeding with any influence campaign against them. However, those examining leaders are at the behest of the information that can be accessed or found. There may be times where certain parts of the framework cannot be filled in. In this regard, the framework is ideal, and at times the ideal cannot be fully satisfied.
7. Psychologists define locus of control as the view of the world in which individuals do or do not perceive some degree of control over situations in which they are involved. Self-confidence is an individual's sense of self-importance or image of ability to cope with the environment. For further discussion, see Cottam et al., *Introduction to Political Psychology*.
8. Psychologists define need for power as the concern with establishing, maintaining, or restoring one's power, for example, one's impact, control, or influence over others. The need for affiliation is concerned with establishing, maintaining, or restoring warm and friendly relationships with other persons or groups. Task-interpersonal emphasis is the relative emphasis on getting the task done versus focusing on the feelings and needs of others. For further discussion, see Cottam et al., *Introduction to Political Psychology*.
9. Beliefs are defined as "associations people create between an object and its attributes." For further discussion, see Cottam et al., *Introduction to Political Psychology*.
10. Values are types of beliefs; they are "deeply held beliefs about what is right and wrong." For further discussion, see Cottam et al., *Introduction to Political Psychology*.

11. Whether a leader challenges constraints is especially relevant to the discussion of a leader's cognitive complexity. Determining both of these may allow further discussion of a leader's style. This is more fully addressed in the information environment section of the framework.
12. Image theory provides a framework for this analysis of perceptions of other groups. The theory encompasses perceptions about capabilities, culture, and the role of perception of threat and opportunities. It then explains strategic choices made by decision makers based on these perceptions of other groups. For further discussion, see Martha Cottam, *Images and Intervention* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1994); and Cottam et al., *Introduction to Political Psychology*.
13. Psychologists define distrust of others as a general feeling of doubt, uneasiness, and misgiving about others; inclination to suspect and doubt others' motives and actions. Ethnocentrism is defined as a view of the world in which one's own nation holds center stage; strong emotional ties to one's nation or group and emphasis on national or group honor and identity. For further discussion, see Cottam et al., *Introduction to Political Psychology*. Content analysis commonly determines these traits. However, we chose to identify the trait as described by political psychologists and then look for behavioral patterns of that trait. We then note if these are fissure points that can be influenced.
14. Here the image model is also relevant.
15. Psychologists define cognitive complexity as the ability to differentiate the environment; that is, the degree of differentiation a person shows in discussing other people, places, policies, ideas, or things. For further discussion, see Cottam et al., *Introduction to Political Psychology*. This trait is commonly determined by content analysis. However, we chose to identify the trait as described by political psychologists and then look for behavioral patterns of that trait. We then note if these are fissure points that can be influenced.
16. Cottam et al., *Introduction to Political Psychology*.
17. For further discussion, see "Who Leads Can Matter in Foreign Policymaking: A Framework for Leadership Analysis," 1996, a paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California.
18. Nimrod Raphaeli, "Ayman Muhammad Rabi' Al-Zawahiri: The Making of an Arch-Terrorist," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 14, Winter 2002, 1–22.
19. *Ibid.*, 1–22.
20. Montasser al-Zayyat, *The Road to Al-Qaeda* (London: Pluto, 2004), 16.
21. Raphaeli, "Ayman Muhammad Rabi' Al-Zawahiri," 3–5.
22. *Ibid.*, 3–5.
23. *Ibid.*, 10.
24. *Ibid.*, 12.
25. *BBC News*, "Profile Ayman al-Zawahiri," September 27, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1560834.stm (accessed September 11, 2007).

26. ODNI, "English Translation of Ayman al-Zawahiri's Letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," October 11, 2005, <https://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/dni101105.html> (accessed September 23, 2013).
27. "Who Is Ayman al-Zawahiri?" *MSNBC*, March 25, 2004, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4555901/> (accessed September 11, 2007).
28. Raphaeli, "Ayman Muhammad Rabi' Al-Zawahiri," 4.
29. Tawfiq Hamid, interview with author, February 25, 2008.
30. Raphaeli, "Ayman Muhammad Rabi' Al-Zawahiri," 7.
31. Al-Zayyat, *The Road to Al-Qaeda*, 30.
32. *Ibid.*, 29.
33. Y. Carmon, Y. Feldner, and D. Lav, "The Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya Cessation of Violence: An Ideological Reversal," *MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis*, No. 309, December 22, 2006, <http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA30906> (accessed September 21, 2007).
34. Al-Zayyat, *The Road to Al-Qaeda*, 30. Rahman was later convicted for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center attack and is currently in prison in the United States.
35. Al-Zayyat, *The Road to Al-Qaeda*, 30.
36. Raphaeli, "Ayman Muhammad Rabi' Al-Zawahiri," 6.
37. *Ibid.*, 7.
38. Abdul Hameed Bakier, "Imprisoned Leader of Egypt's Islamic Jihad Challenges al-Qaeda," *Terrorism Monitor*, December 10, 2007, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373842&printthis=1> (accessed March 13, 2008).
39. Raphaeli, "Ayman Muhammad Rabi' Al-Zawahiri," 8.
40. *Ibid.*, 1–22.
41. Lawrence Wright, "The Man Behind Bin Ladin," *The New Yorker*, September 16, 2002, <http://www.lawrencewright.com/art-zawahiri.html> (accessed September 11, 2007).
42. Fawaz Gerges, *Journey of the Jihadist* (Orlando, FL, Harcourt, 2007), 123.
43. *Ibid.*, 122–123.
44. *Ibid.*, 123.
45. Raphaeli, "Ayman Muhammad Rabi' Al-Zawahiri," 9.
46. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif is currently in prison in Egypt where he wrote this book.
47. Daniel Lav, "An In-Depth Summary of Sayyid Imam's New Polemic against al-Qaeda, 'Exposing the Exoneration,'" *MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis*, February 23, 2009, 1–15.
48. Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda* (New York: Columbia, 2002).
49. Al-Zayyat, *The Road to Al-Qaeda*.
50. "Ayman al-Zawahiri's Book Knights Under the Prophet's Banner," *Al-Sharq al-Wasat*, December 12, 2001.
51. Alan Cullison, "Inside Al-Qaeda's Hard Drive," *Atlantic Monthly*, 2004.
52. Cottam et al., *Introduction to Political Psychology*, 105.

53. Yassin Mashurbash, "Questions for al-Qaida," *Der Spiegel*, January 15, 2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,druck-528680,00.html>.
54. Randall Mikkelsen, "Ask Zawahiri Web Forum Draws Qaeda Curious," *Yahoo News*, January 25, 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080125/wr_nm/security_qaeda_zawahiri_dc (accessed January 28, 2008).
55. Specifically, al-Zawahiri views the United States through an imperial image. The classic imperial image occurs when there is a perceived threat from another group that is perceived as superior in both capability and culture. Usually, imperials are not challenged as they are far superior. However, in some cases, the imperial power is seen as a declining one. Therefore, it can be challenged. For further discussion, see Cottam et al., *Introduction to Political Psychology*.
56. "Interview with Ayman al-Zawahiri," *Azzam Publications*, October 11, 2002, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Fear_Allaah/message/289?source=1 (accessed January 28, 2008).
57. "Al Zawahiri: U.S. Faltering in Afghanistan," *CNN*, September 9, 2004, <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/09/09/zawahiri.tape/index.html> (accessed December 6, 2007).
58. "Al Jazeera TV Airs Comments on Al-Zawahiri's 9 Sep Statement," *Al Jazeera*, September 10, 2004, <http://cryptome.org/al-four.htm#Al-Jazirah%20Carries%20Al-Zawahiri's%20Recorded%20Videotape> (accessed September 11, 2007).
59. Ayman al-Zawahiri, "Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri: The Hateful British and Their Indian Slaves," July 17, 2007, <http://theunjustmedia.com/Islamic%20Perspectives/Sheikh%20Ayman%20al-Zawahiri> (accessed September 1, 2007).
60. Bruce Hoffman, "Outlook: Worse Than Bin Laden," *Washington Post*, September 11, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2007/09/07/DI20070907209> (accessed September 12, 2007).
61. Craig Whitlock, "Al-Zawahiri Presses Ideology, Deepens Rifts Among Islamic Radicals," *Washington Post Foreign Service*, http://www.shockandawe.us/cms/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=32&Itemid=2 (accessed September 11, 2007).
62. Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, "Al Qaeda Family Feud," *Newsweek*, July 30, 2007.
63. Craig Whitlock, "Al-Zawahiri Presses Ideology, Deepens Rifts among Islamic Radicals," http://www.shockandawe.us/cms/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=32&Itemid=2 (accessed September 11, 2007).
64. Yousafzai and Moreau, "Al Qaeda Family Feud."
65. ODNI, "English Translation of Ayman al-Zawahiri's Letter."
66. Ibid.
67. The image model is used for determining the image that al-Zawahiri holds of others. Throughout the book, the term *enemy* is used to describe those that al-Zawahiri does not like. This is because that is how he refers to them.

However, as already noted, technically speaking, the model would describe his image of the United States as an imperialist, not an enemy. An imperialist is a country superior in capability and culture than al-Qaeda. For further information, see Cottam et al., *Introduction to Political Psychology*.

68. Whitlock, "Al-Zawahiri Presses Ideology."
69. Ibid.
70. ODNI, "English Translation of Ayman al-Zawahiri's Letter."
71. Eli Wake, "Exclusive: Al Qaeda Conference Call Intercepted by U.S. Officials Sparked Alerts," August 7, 2013, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/07/al-qaeda-conference-call-intercepted-by-u-s-officials-sparked-alerts.html> (accessed August 17, 2013).
72. "How Did Al Qaeda Emerge in North Africa?" *Christian Science Monitor*, May 1, 2007, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0501/p12s01-wome.htm> (accessed May 7, 2007).
73. Fred Baker, "Al Qaeda in Iraq Duped into Following Foreigners, Captured Operative Says," *American Forces Press Service*, July 18, 2007.
74. For a discussion about the importance of credibility of sources, see Gerry Spence, *How to Argue and Win Every Time* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995).

6

Breaking Groups

After collectively wringing our hands for years over how many hearts, minds and billions of dollars it will take to win the global war on terror, the secret weapon needed to fight the terrorists might just turn out to be the terrorists themselves.

—Sarah Barmak¹

Here we ask our good brother, why would the break in contact with the Emirate only be with you? Why do you only turn on your phone with the Emirate when you need it, while your communication with some media is almost never ending.

—AQAP Shura Council²

At some point in an individual's life, he or she joins a group. This can be the boy scouts, a sailing club, a political party, or the military. Groups bring people together for a common purpose. Individuals do seek interaction with others and want a shared identity. One way to achieve this is to join a group. Once a person is part of a group, however, he or she now has the benefit of a group identity. Although of course personal identity is still important to an individual, the member also adopts a group identity. Therefore, even though groups are made up of individuals, certain group processes are important in that they can and do affect the behavior of individuals. The group is a powerful entity.

As noted in Chapter 3, individuals in the al-Qaeda network are not "crazy" and are motivated because of different reasons. This chapter focuses on the functioning of network groups. Groups are not perfect, and there are always fissures within them, even in the most cohesive ones.

This is so because groups are made up of individuals, and individuals often differ in their conception about group norms. The discussion then turns to the type of fissures that can be leveraged at the intragroup level. Finally, fissures within the al-Qaeda network and how to exploit them through informational influence are illustrated. Ironically, advice about the focusing on fissures within the group and using information influence as a type of tactic came from the “advice” of now-deceased al-Qaeda member Abu Yahya al-Libi. As Jarret Brackman noted:

Abu Yahya advises the United States to spin the minor disagreements among leaders or Jihadist organizations as being major doctrinal and methodological disputes. He suggests that any disagreement, be it over personal, strategic or theological reasons, can be exacerbated by using them as the basis for designating new subsets, or schools-of-thought. These fractures can also serve as useful inroads on which targeted information operations can be focused: such an environment becomes a “safe-haven for rumormongers, deserters, and demoralizers, and the door is left wide open for defamation, casting doubts, and making accusations and slanders,” he explains.

This “war of defamation” as he terms it, leaves the jihadist propagandists almost impotent in that no matter how they try to defend themselves, dispel misconceptions, and reply to accusations, their voice will be as “hoarse as someone shouting in the middle of thousands of people.”³

Groups are made of individuals, and groups can and do suffer from conflict.

THE NATURE OF GROUPS

Individuals join al-Qaeda for a variety of reasons. Certain connections have to be severed or remain uninformed, especially those deemed threatening to the survival of the group. This could be friends, family members, spouses, outside groups, and the like. The group wants the individual to focus on the work of the group and not let the secrets of the group out. This secretive new group, with its like-minded members, becomes central to the individual, and the group is now, in essence, a new family. This process is referred to as depluralization;⁴ that is, when an individual's previous identities are stripped away.

Groups have norms, which are “a scale of values which defines a range of acceptable (and unacceptable) attitudes and behaviors for members.”⁵ Norms are constantly being defined and reinforced by the group. Once

in the group, members are pressured to conform to the norms set by the group. One important group norm in the network is the requirement that individuals participate in violence. By joining a group, personal accountability and responsibility is shifted away from the individual to the group. Therefore, heinous acts can be committed on behalf of a group, which individuals would not ordinarily perpetrate on their own. This process is called “deindividuation.”⁶ According to Albert Bandura, individuals who participate in harmful activities toward others actually go through a process of moral disengagement.⁷

Research indicates that individuals do conform in groups. They tend to change their beliefs or behaviors so that they are consistent with the standards set by the group. Mazur Sherif demonstrated this. In an interesting experiment, Sherif created a perceptual illusion of a perceived motion of a stationary light in a darkened room. He then had participants judge how far the light had moved. Sherif found a great deal of convergence when it came to the judgments of the group of participants; in fact, the light never moved. Group members actually used the judgment of others to modify their own judgments about the movement of light.⁸

However, as in the case with some groups, some individuals do not fully conform. Thus, even though groups strive for conformity among their members, there may still be “deviant” members within them. Despite everything, they do not follow the rules, and they threaten the cohesiveness of the group. These members can be punished so that they comply, or they can be expelled from the group. However, some of these individuals can also be considered “positive deviants,”⁹ that is, overachievers or highfliers.

There can also be those deviant members who seek to leave the group on their own. Individuals leave groups for a variety of reasons, which can include conflict with other group members, bad experiences, disagreement with norms, the attractiveness of another group, and self-esteem/self-confidence issues. Ultimately, no matter what the reason, they are no longer committed to the group. Leaving a group, especially one that is secretive, is oftentimes very difficult. Punishments for attempting to leave or leaving can be as severe as death.

Group indoctrination is important, and group propaganda is central to this indoctrination. The group’s central messages are constantly reinforced. When individuals in the group are faced with conflicting information or question the group’s stance, alternative views are conveniently explained away. If individuals question the messages and explanations, they are offered rationalizations that explain away doubt. Indoctrination

is an ongoing process, and individuals are asked to put the group above everything else.

GROUP FISSURES

Terrorist groups are not perfect entities, and they oftentimes suffer from fissures. In his review of the literature, Randy Borum contended that these fissures are group vulnerabilities. He characterized these fissures as internal mistrust, boredom/inactivity, internal power competition, and major disagreements.¹⁰ Certainly, these are important fissure points that can be leveraged when it specifically comes to the al-Qaeda network. In this chapter, Borum's characterizations of vulnerabilities are used, but in some cases, they were expanded on. For the purpose of this chapter, it is argued that the most significant aspect that can potentially derail the functioning of groups is conflicts between members. For organizational purposes, these are characterized as (1) personal conflict and mistrust, (2) deviant group members, and (3) disagreement over policy and procedure. While these are separated for discussion purposes, it does not mean the fissures are mutually exclusive and not interrelated.

FISSURE: PERSONAL CONFLICT AND MISTRUST

Borum maintained that dissent in groups can lead to power struggles between members and that differences of opinion can result in factional disputes. Who should make decisions and who is going to lead or dominate the group are important questions. Power struggles can also result in splits so severe that individuals leave a group and form another. Furthermore, power struggles can potentially destroy a group causing members to turn on each other and even eliminate rivals. While power is undoubtedly important, this needed to be expanded because conflict between individuals is not necessarily always because of power. For example, individuals in groups have basic personality conflicts too. Oftentimes, group members just do not like one another, and this can be personality based. One individual may dislike another because the way that a person speaks, tends to dominate discussions, believes he is always right, and so forth. As explained in Chapter 4 about the likability principle, it is central to individual interaction, and if individuals do not like each other, they

will not support, respect, or work with each other. Also, groups that are in periods of inactivity and under low threat may find that members become bored. In turn, this can lead to internal tension and quarrels. This is a good point, but inactive individuals who are not proactive may find themselves being perceived as not being productive and contributing members of the group. Furthermore, individual tension also occurs when members suffer from self-esteem issues, bad experiences, or find other groups more attractive. Thus, any type of conflict between members of a group is an exploitation opportunity in an informational influence campaign because when tension occurs, the level of commitment of certain members may in turn drop.¹¹

Terrorist groups must maintain a high security posture. That being said, a situation of internal distrust may result if a climate of suspicion is created. Building on the point made by Borum, groups that must maintain a high security posture go to great lengths to ensure internal security. Groups will often announce to their members that security forces always target them, and individuals must be vigilant to protect against such penetration. Once a group trusts a member, some suspicion is alleviated, but groups tend to continually watch their members for potential betrayers. Thus, terrorist groups create their own counterintelligence wings to not only stop penetration from the outside but also to find betrayers within. This creates the potential for serious mistrust between individuals. When something happens to the group, its members will naturally look to see what caused it. Looking at the individuals within the group is a likely outcome. Suspicion can fall on members of the group. The point here is that mistrust that already exists can be exploited, and when it does not, it can be created.

Just how debilitating personal conflict can be was interestingly brought up by Ayman al-Zawahiri himself. Recall that in Chapter 5 that al-Zawahiri decided that he would entertain a series of questions from those interested in the work of al-Qaeda. Yet when he finally did release his answers, he noted that he did not address those who dealt with “personal differences and quarrels” and “security.” As he stated, “it had been my intention prior to the arrival of the questions to respond to every question that reaches me, with the exception of types of questions: those dealing with personal differences and quarrels, and those dealing with matters of security.”¹² And conflict there is.

Consider an example from Yemen where there was a rift between older members and younger more radicalized members. This can be

characterized as a power struggle. Younger members, who have served on the battlefield in Iraq, were pushing to do operations inside Yemen. However, there was also push back from the older members. According to one account from the *Jamestown Foundation*:

Throughout the spring and early summer, a schism has emerged within the ranks of Al-Qaeda in Yemen, pitting younger, more radicalized members against the moderate old guard. These strategic differences materialized on July 2, when a suicide bomber attacked a convoy of Spanish tourists in the governorate of Marib, killing nine people. The new generation of militants, many of whom were radicalized in Iraq, is determined to carry out attacks in Yemen. This represents a sharp break from the old guard, who have advised their younger members to have patience and allow for negotiations with the Yemeni government to continue. The old guard is also concerned that any attacks within Yemen will lead to a government crackdown on its leadership, much like what happened in the aftermath of the *USS Cole* attack in 2000 and the September 11 attacks in 2001.¹³

If this is the case, then the best strategy would be to exploit these differences. A way to achieve this is to create the perception of a coup by the younger members and also the environment where the old guard members are feeling personally threatened by the younger members. This is an ultimate defiance of authority. It will be to the benefit of the old guard to move against these members. Here the task is to find ways in which to transmit messages and evidence of the betrayal by the young guard, while playing on their disrespect to figures of authority. Twitter feeds and the use of social media sites will be useful and believable given they are the young guard. Rumors work here too, but statements attributed to the younger members can also be disseminated. These statements would discuss the need to get rid of the old way of thinking. The scarcity influence principle can be useful here because individuals would want this coveted information, and it will in turn spread because of social proof. Well-placed sources working for the United States can also disseminate and discuss.

Another example of internal conflict was found with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a Southeast Asian group in the al-Qaeda network. This group also had its share of internal problems. There were two views on what was taking place. The first is that members were factionalized due to the issue of sectarianism. Zachary Abuza articulated:

Several commentators now speak of irrevocable factional rifts in JI between the pro-al-Qaeda camp that favors collapsing the state by

damaging the economy, and the proponents of the neo-Darul Islam schools that argue that JI should focus on sectarian conflict and aim to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. Evidence of this has been documented on web forums and in chat rooms.¹⁴

Conversely, the arrest of much of the group's command and control caused organizational disunity, where the cell structure became much more diffuse. As Abuza further explained, there was a challenge to this perspective.

This rift, however, is overstated for three reasons. First, Hambali, and others equated as being the leaders of the pro-al-Qaeda line, threw themselves into fomenting sectarian conflict in 1998–2001 and saw such conflicts as essential to their goal. Second, they are not mutually exclusive strategies. Indeed, many of the operatives tied to the JW Marriott and Australian Embassy bombings were arrested as a result of investigations into the ongoing sectarian violence in the Maluku and in Central Sulawesi. Sectarian violence is an important recruiting and indoctrinating tool for JI. Third, too much attention is given to recent statements by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (also known as Abu Bakar Bashir), who is now publicly denouncing jihad. ...

What is occurring now is less zero-sum factional rifts than breakdowns in the organization's command and control. JI always encouraged members to establish their own cells as well as organizations with varying degrees of overtones. With the arrest of much of the Mantiqi structure, JI has become a far more horizontal organization with much less command and control. Individual *wakalahs* and cells are more autonomous than they have ever been. Therefore, what may appear as irrevocable factional rifts could simply be organizational disunity because of counter-terrorist operations.¹⁵

Here is an opportunity to capitalize on both perspectives. First, the issue is not about whether the sectarian differences exist but the extent to which it is important. It can be made important by pitting these factions against each other. At the same time, organizational disunity can be capitalized on. Certain individuals have to be convinced to make a power play, and studying their profiles through the method learned in the previous chapter can determine this. Those individuals who believe they should have the authority to be in charge need to be identified and manipulated. One way to promote fractionalization is to create a debate through rumors and public forums that the old guard is seen as selling out the new guard. In fact, when individual cells are arrested, they can be told by authorities

it was because of others who disagreed with their role in the organization. When some are released it can also be rumored that they sold out the others to the authorities to win the battle. Meetings, orchestrated by authorities on the streets, can feed into this perception. The key is to create dissension and pit individuals against each other. When conflict becomes personalized, individuals find it difficult to trust each other. The influence campaign is the key to making this happen, and the scarcity and social proof weapons ensure rumors will spread like wildfire.

Another fissure that could have been exploited before the death of Bin Laden is the leadership succession issue in the core group. Who was going to take charge? Al-Zawahiri? An Egyptian? As was discussed, the dominance of Egyptians was already a sticking point for many other ethnicities. Former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Michael Hayden commented on the rift between Saudis and Egyptians.

Bin Laden is now an “iconic” figure hiding in the remote border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan ... And frankly, then, we think there has been an awful lot of jockeying among possible successors ... Keep in mind, he’s a Saudi. An awful lot of that leadership is Egyptian ... If the Saudi dies, who becomes the next guy may be quite a contentious matter ... And there are fissures in al Qaeda because of this dominance of Egyptians inside the senior leadership, where you have a Saudi at the top ... You can only imagine what then happens if he goes and then who comes in.¹⁶

As was illustrated in the previous chapter, al-Zawahiri is not an iconic figure like Usama bin Laden. Many dislike him and see him as furthering his own goals. Previous chapters focused on these perceptions. With this in place, the leadership succession issue could have been seized upon. Factions emerged over this issue. Egyptians were clearly the in-group, and this fissure can be exploited by a publicized on-the-ground campaign and on the Internet suggesting what leadership under al-Zawahiri would look like in the long run. Here again, relying on scarcity and social proof, a series of fictitious policy papers on behalf of al-Zawahiri, who continually asserts himself as an authority on all matters, could have been released.

The first fictitious paper could have addressed the leadership structure. The paper could suggest that the leadership of al-Qaeda was to be Egyptian. An accompanying explanation of Egyptian competence to lead over other ethnicities could have been suggested. Then a series of think pieces about the nature of the network could have been released. These can

be compiled by cultivated sources. To fuel the fire, a derogatory assessment of the AQAP's leader being used for their power in the region was a necessary evil al-Zawahiri was willing to sacrifice for his consolidation of power.

Al-Qaeda already did the work. This situation was ripe for a competition among authority members who view themselves in leadership positions and believe they should promulgate their views. With nudging, real debates can spread through local and Internet networks and be cultivated by jihadi personas created by the United States.

FISSURE: SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DISAGREEMENT

Borum suggested that substantive and procedural fractures occur in groups. Unless the group is highly cohesive, there are often disagreements about the way things are done and the methods and goals of groups. These disagreements can and do create rifts between members of groups. From there, cliques may form, and members will compete with each other. However, more dominant cliques or individuals may also have the power to expel the others. On the other hand, individuals may leave the group to carry out their version of their group. At this point, individuals from groups form others and rename themselves (usually a variant name of the first group) and press forward with their agenda. The intention here is to focus on how intragroup fissures can create dissension and fracture a group. Identifying those fractures, even ever so slight, can be leveraged in an influence campaign. Thus, helping along the fracture, exploiting it, and destabilizing the group may ultimately cause them to turn on one another.

There are two excellent examples of what happens when groups suffer from fissures that stem from substantive disagreements. The Islamic Group in Egypt (IG) and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) both fractured because of these types of disagreements.

More specifically, in 1998, the IG renounced violence and maintained a ceasefire with the Egyptian government. However, in August 2006, al-Zawahiri announced that the IG had merged with al-Qaeda. Thus, the IG was extending its campaign to include al-Qaeda's more global focus. According to al-Zawahiri, the groups would form "one line, facing its enemies."¹⁷ Speaking to an unidentified interviewer on the same video, Muhammad al-Hukaymah, an IG member, addressed the rift within the IG

regarding the use of violence. Obviously, those who aligned with al-Qaeda supported the use of violence. But not all was well with other members of the IG. It seemed that while this decision was supported by some members of the group, others outright rejected al-Zawahiri's claim. As a result, a debate was sparked between al-Zawahiri and some members of the IG that rejected al-Zawahiri's contention. In fact, Karam Zuhdi, the president of the IG's consultative council, rejected the claims of the video and accused al-Zawahiri of lying. He further argued this was not a group merger, but a merger of certain individuals with al-Qaeda.¹⁸ The IG indeed fractured.

The second example is the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC). The GSPC, a long-standing terrorist group in Algeria, was born out of an internal struggle within the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The GSPC, which broke away from the GIA, represented the more radical group. But the GSPC decided to merge with the al-Qaeda network in 2006, thus taking on a broader mandate than just overthrowing the Algerian regime. The GSPC subsequently changed its name to al-Qaeda Organization in the Lands of the Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM did a significant amount of advertising to let the world know of its newly minted alliance with al-Qaeda and its wider struggle against the crusaders. In particular they used videos to highlight footage of their activities, which also included a guest appearance by al-Zawahiri praising their actions.¹⁹

However, much earlier, in February 2005, dissension within the GSPC was evident. The GSPC was going through a radicalization process with some members moving closer toward al-Qaeda's camp. Daniel Lav expounded on the basis of the rift.

The ideological radicalization led by 'Abd Al-Wadoud [the Emir] is evident in a virulent February 2005 communique he authored, in which he attacked Hassan Hattab [founder of the group] when the latter came out in favor of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's National Reconciliation Plan, under which former terrorists who laid down their arms could receive amnesty. In the communique, 'Abd Al-Wadoud compared Hattab to the early Islamic apostate 'Abdallah Bin Sa'd Abi Sarh and to the Afghan commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, who had fought against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

'Abd Al-Wadoud's holy wrath was not sparked solely by conviction; if he wanted to keep face with the global jihad movement he had to distance himself as much as possible from the disgrace of the group's founder and first commander being willing to strike a deal with the "apostate" regime. In fact, this statement was only one part of an all-out campaign

against the National Reconciliation Initiative and the moderate tendency within the GSPC. Abu Omar 'Abd Al-Barr, who, before he left the group, had served as its media director and one of its top leaders, related that shortly after Bouteflika announced the National Reconciliation Initiative, it was brought for discussion to the GSPC's 10-member leadership council ... of which he was a member. The council decided not just to reject the reconciliation initiative, but also to eliminate any elements within the GSPC that supported it.²⁰

Thus, for both the IG and the GSPC, the grumblings among the members were already noticeable.

Additionally, as discussed already, Omar Hammami fancied himself a prolific tweeter. However, he brought his disagreements with al-Shabab public. Al-Shabab was quick to respond, tracked him down and killed him. Oftentimes, these debates were brought out in public forums. It is at this point where it is best to start sowing the seeds of dissension or exacerbating tensions to make sure that the group will indeed fracture beyond repair. In other words, it is important to seize on these types of opportunities early on and implement a campaign that invites more distrust than already exists. Thus, it is a good idea to monitor groups for fissure points and move forward with creating opportunities to use informational influence to further disrupt the group. But if this is not possible, then seizing on an already existing divide can also be effective. In these cases, factions did arise. This situation can be effectively exploited too.

An approach could be taken to heighten the tension among the members who were for the merger and those who were opposed to it. Evidence could be manufactured and promulgated through both local and Internet channels such as social media, chat rooms, and forums that the rivalry would result in "cleaning house" by one faction, notably those who support al-Qaeda and believe that the other factions are not being true to the struggle. Members who are now distrustful of others due to disagreements over the direction that the group should take should be made to feel uncomfortable with their own safety. These members need to be looking over their own shoulders for fear of what is going to happen to them. The threat needs to be personalized through targeted messages and rumors that state a threat exists because of contact with the group. Whispers by authorities warning them of their demise will exacerbate these tensions. At this point personal safety will likely take precedence over the direction of the group and members will walk away from the group to ensure their own safety, or they will look to challenge the authority of the other

faction. Those being challenged should respond with their tactics. If individuals do not leave, other group-level incentives may apply. Members under threat would be in such disarray that it would be extremely difficult for them to join forces with others as effective.

FISSURE: DEVIANTS

Identifying deviants (even positive ones) is important. They are the weak links that can be effectively tapped in any influence campaign. Focusing on deviant members can be a highly effective strategy in an influence campaign. As noted earlier, groups have norms, and members are expected to follow them. When they follow the rules, they are liked. Individuals are expected to respect authority.²¹ Deviant group members are problematic because they are not perceived to conform and therefore threaten the cohesiveness of the group. They also threaten the conformity of other members in that they may hold sway over others and promulgate deviant behavior. Additionally, deviants often bring negative attention to the group. The group deals with deviants who cannot be rehabilitated through conformity measures or they are expelled or killed. If there are not obvious deviants, then they should be created.

Deviants are the dream of an influence operator. For one, deviants are always on the fence. Although they may be tolerable to a point, there is always a breaking point that comes when they have pushed the limits. The first task is to identify those weak links in the group. As discussed earlier, the reasons for this vary, but the bottom line is that they do not like to follow the rules. It is important to find out why and then use these deviants. A good idea then is to examine the individuals in the group who do not like to follow the rules and then exploit them or their circumstances. They are already on the cusp of likeability. There are numerous targets in this regard. The same applies to positive deviants or high fliers. These individuals are the overachievers, and it is likely that their behavior can be affected. High fliers do not like to conform and are often left alone because of their significant contribution to the group. They are the outliers, and often because their behavior is only tolerated, they can also be targeted to create further dissension within a group.

These individuals can be exploited in various ways. First, already deviant behavior can be seized upon and then circumstances can be twisted to our advantage. Second, encouraging such behavior can result in significant

internal group dissension and individual defection from the group. Third, another tactic is to create the appearance of deviance even when none exists. This can result in individuals in the group turning on each other.

For example, an excellent example of deviance was demonstrated when a split occurred between Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the one-eyed key operational commander, and the ruling Shura Council of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. In a 10-page letter to Belmokhtar, the Shura outlined a series of issues it had with him. Among his transgressions were failing to submit his expense report, answer his phone, and carry out a “spectacular” attack against the “crusader alliance.” He was called a “bleeding wound” amongst jihadis.²² The letter was written to him in response to Belmokhtar’s letter addressing the Shura Council that assessed the organization’s activities as well as its leadership.

Stephanie Medina illustrated that the relationship between Belmokhtar and the group, especially the Abdelmalek Droukdel, was complex and ran aground after years of contention.

The central cast in this tragic comedy boils down to Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a taciturn, one-eyed brigade commander who has been with the “company” since the tender age of 19, and his arch-rival, AQIM commander Abdelmalek Droukdel, who upper management have been promoting over Mokhtar for decades. Their mutual animosity dates back to the early days of AQIM, before the brand merger with Al-Qaeda, when it was still going by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). As part of the internal restructuring that followed 2003’s management exodus (to Paradise, as many of them were killed), Droukdel, Belmokhtar’s contemporary, was promoted to lead GSPC. To say that Belmokhtar felt slighted is putting it lightly. After all, though Droukdel has a Bachelor’s degree in mathematics over him, Belmokhtar had risked life and limb in jihad, losing his eye either to the infidel’s shrapnel or to his own mishandling of explosives during training, depending upon whom you ask.

In 2006, GSPC underwent a corporate takeover as Al-Qaeda, the unparalleled brand leader in global jihad, offered operational support and brand recognition in return for overall control. During the process, at the end of which GSPC was redubbed “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Belmokhtar struck at the chance for a promotion. Both Belmokhtar and Droukdel wrote candidacy letters directly to Osama bin Laden, asking to be the new “emir” of the organization. Bin Laden, like any good executive, decided not to involve himself in the drama, and Belmokhtar was passed over again. In a fit of pride, Belmokhtar moved his operations further south and away from direct AQIM oversight, into the Mali region where he has wreaked havoc ever since.²³

In response to being called out, Belmokhtar not only implemented a bloody attack in January 2013 on the Amenas gas facility in Algeria and another attack on a French uranium mine in Niger, he also went on to form his own group to rival AQIM. Since this split already occurred, how to exploit these types of contentious relationships that occur between groups is examined in the next chapter.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was another example of a deviant. In his leadership of al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Zarqawi was advancing the greater goals of engaging the United States worldwide. However, he was also a problem child. As talked about in Chapter 5, there was a tipping point for al-Zarqawi, and that was that his tactics, particularly the beheadings and violence against Shia and Sunni civilians, were causing more harm than good. Many other groups with the common goal of ousting the United States and gaining control over Iraq turned on AQI. Some even began working with U.S. forces to expel AQI from Iraq. Al-Qaeda was getting bad press because of al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi did not respond well to authority of the wider al-Qaeda movement, in particular those who believed they were in charge and could redirect his behavior to suit the wider network. Al-Zarqawi was killed. However, while his leadership came and went, the circumstances of his death can be seized upon as an opportunity.

How in fact was he found and killed? What were the circumstances that led to his eventual death? It is time to craft a story. The best way to approach this is an on-the-ground rumor campaign, but media and Internet forums and chat rooms, buttressed by Twitter feeds, can be leveraged to pose these questions to a wider audience. Once questions are asked about the circumstances of al-Zarqawi's (or anyone else in the group) untimely demise, many will then look for answers, and social proof will kick in. At this point, it is necessary to provide a series of possible answers that reflect very poorly on those within AQI and the wider network. Who would gain from their capture or death? For example, did those who rose to leadership positions in AQI after al-Zarqawi's death have an incentive? Similarly, just why are certain individuals being captured and not others? What about those in the network with an axe to grind, particularly al-Zawahiri? For example, Zarqawi angered many people, including prominent Salafi theoreticians such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.²⁴ Once questions are raised, suspicion may be cast on members of the group. And when suspicion is raised, the sense of threat becomes heightened, and members tend to turn on each other. Turncoats are not taken lightly in terrorist groups. They violate group norms and challenge the cohesion of the group. They are the

betrayers. Of course, this is just one example, and it obviously relates to the other fissure points already outlined in previous sections.

A second tactic involves identifying members who can be offered various incentives for walking away from the group, or who can be leveraged to foster dissension. Again, the key is to hone in on those who are disaffected by their circumstances or role in the group. Incentives often need to be personalized. In other words, look for the complainers. They are group members, but believe they are entitled to something more. Thus, they will not abandon the group until they tried to achieve what they believe they are entitled to, whether it is position, status, adequate monetary compensation, and so forth. An influence campaign can provide incentives to either aid in fostering dissension or that may get members to abandon the group. These can even be threatening in nature, depending on the individual and circumstance. Obviously, orchestrated defection would be preferential, but insinuating that members are abandoning the group and exposing the reason can be just as debilitating to group cohesion. The reasons need to be promulgated locally through rumors by well-placed sources. Once one person comes under scrutiny, members will likely look inward to find other possible turncoats. Investigations will take place, and when threat is heightened, they may find evidence about individuals that they did not consider threatening in the first place.

Here it is useful to provide an example. Wadih El Hage was a member of al-Qaeda. In 1999, he testified in a United States court about the 1998 Embassy bombings in Africa and his dealings with al-Qaeda while in Africa. After years of supporting the cause, El Hage moved to Sudan in 1992 and became Usama bin Laden's secretary. He later moved to Kenya and supported al-Qaeda's efforts there.²⁵ But El Hage was indeed a deviant member. For one, his wife became miffed when Bin Laden pushed El Hage to take a second wife.²⁶ Additionally, he was frustrated with Bin Laden. El Hage wanted money to get an operation for his wife, but the request was not granted. To solve his problem, El Hage stole money from Bin Laden.²⁷ El Hage and individuals like him can be easy prey in an influence campaign. They can be enticed to defect and can even provide negative testimonials and interviews to the media about the network. However, the first public interview should be an exclusive. That way, everyone will want to read it because it is scarce. Social proof dictates that others can take it from there and disseminate this coveted interview in Internet and media channels. Individuals like El Hage can also be used to work against the organization to destroy it from within. After all, they have issues with

group norms (multiple marriage pressure) and secrets. Stealing money is a secret that can have severe repercussions for group members.

Another example is seen in the story of Uzbek network member Azizbek Karimov. Karimov's story differs from El Hage in that he owed money to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and in fact, the IMU blackmailed him to act on their behalf.²⁸ As he elucidated:

Here are a few words on how I was detained. I came to Kyrgyzstan in 2002, the USA started attacking Afghanistan in autumn 2001. We took advantage of this. Before we could not leave Afghanistan because our passports and other things were taken away. We were under strict control. But there was one reason, which is when the US attacks started in Afghanistan, everyone was scattered all over the place. Some left for Iran, some for Pakistan, and some were held captive in war zones. I am one of those who went to Pakistan. From Pakistan I went to Iran, from there to Turkey and from Turkey to Kyrgyzstan. I meet some Uighurs in Kyrgyzstan, they provided me with a home and other things and I got married there. The IMU members then got hold of me through them. They contacted me after finding out that I had established myself in Kyrgyzstan. The contact was through the Internet. They started ordering us to stay there, and that they would send some people. They also sent some money for us to get married and live. I was bound by the organization with that money. I could not leave or do anything. Then they started demanding terrorist acts from us.²⁹

Again, the work has already been done in that he is a marginal deviant with tenuous commitment. Individuals such as him can be enticed to work against the group with the promise that they will eventually be freed from the chains of the group.

Another tactic is to create the perception that certain individuals are only involved in the group for their own personal gain; that is, wealth and power are the drivers, as opposed to security and commitment to the cause. As with other vulnerable individuals, the appearance that they cannot be trusted, are sacrificing the security of other members in pursuit of their own goals, and are indeed benefiting (and not sharing) with other group members can be created. Here the story of Mokhtar Belmokhtar is an example of someone who does not play the game and who has been accused of serious transgressions against the organization. A way to accomplish this is to create the perception that the target member is living beyond his means. Money in concocted bank accounts or the creation of concocted bank receipts can achieve this. In the day and age of Swiss

bank accounts and offshore accounts, these are not hard to manufacture. Bank account numbers or records could be strategically placed locally. Additionally, receipts for luxury items left for others to find as well as the purchasing of goods in the individual's name can also help create this perception. If a luxury vehicle arrives in front of the house one day, so be it. At this point, a rumor campaign is an effective tool, and the scarcity and social proof principles can be capitalized on.

CONCLUSION

This chapter identified several interrelated fissure points at the intragroup level. Many examples were used to highlight how these types of fissures could be exploited. Although they were discussed separately, they are, in fact, all interrelated. The discussion now turns to the third and last part of the campaign: fissures at the intergroup level.

NOTES

1. Sarah Barmak, "Defusing Jihad from Within: Could It Be That the End of Islamist Violence Will Be Brought about by Jihadists Themselves?" *The Star*, July 21, 2007, <http://www.thestar.com/Unassigned/article/238314> (accessed April 20, 2008).
2. Stephani Medina, "Al-Qaeda Employee Is Chewed-Out by His Boss for Not Filing Expense Reports, Poor Job Performance," *Policymic*, <http://www.policymic.com/articles/45177/al-qaeda-employee-is-chewed-out-by-his-boss-for-not-filing-expense-reports-poor-job-performance> (accessed August 27, 2013).
3. Jarret Brackman, "Abu Yahya's Six Easy Steps for Defeating Al Qaeda," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 1, no. 5, September 2008, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=18&Itemid=54 (accessed April 28, 2009).
4. Phil Zimbardo, "The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason and Order versus Deindividuation, Impulse and Chaos," *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*, 17 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969); Phil Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect* (New York: Random House, 2007).
5. Rupert Brown, *Group Processes Dynamics Within and Between Groups* (UK: Blackwell, 2000), 56.
6. Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect*, 307.

7. Albert Bandura, "The Role of Selective Moral Disengagement in Terrorism and Counterterrorism," in *Understanding Terrorism: Psychological Roots, Consequences and Intervention*, eds. F. M. Moghaddam and A. J. Marsella (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press, 2004), 121–150.
8. Mazur Sherif, *The Psychology of Social Norms* (New York: Harper & Row, 1936).
9. Michael Hogg and Deborah Terry, "Social Identity and Self-Categorization Processes," in *Organizational Contexts*, *Academy of Management Review*, 25, no. 1, 2000, 127.
10. Randy Borum, *Psychology of Terrorism* (Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, 2004), 52–54.
11. Richard Moreland and John Levine, "Socialization in Small Groups: Temporal Changes in Individual-Group Relations," in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1982), 137–192.
12. "Translation of al-Zawahiri Speech," *CTD Weblog*, April 3, 2008, <http://pogger.wordpress.com/2008/04/03/translation-al-zawahiri-speech/> (accessed April 15, 2008).
13. Gregory D. Johnson and Brian O' Neill, "Yemen Attack Reveals Struggle Among Al-Qaida's Ranks," *Jamestown Foundation*, July 10, 2007, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373533> (accessed April 19, 2008).
14. Zachary Abuza, "Jemaah Islamiya Enters Regrouping Phase," *Jamestown Foundation*, November 21, 2006, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370215> (last accessed April 20, 2008).
15. Ibid.
16. Bill Gertz, "Al Qaeda's Egyptian-Saudi Divide," *Washington Times*, March 12, 2008, <http://prairiepundit.blogspot.com/2008/03/al-qaedas-egyptian-saudi-divide.html> (accessed April 20, 2008).
17. "Al Zawahiri: Egyptian Militant Group Joins Al Qaeda," *CNN*, August 5, 2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/08/05/zawahiri.tape/index.html> (accessed September 21, 2007).
18. Karam Zuhdi, "Interview," *Al-Jazeera*, August 6, 2006.
19. Daniel Lav, "The Al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb: The Evolving Terrorist Presence in North Africa," *MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis Series*, 332, March 7, 2007, <http://memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archives&ID=IA33207> (accessed April 19, 2008); Nazim Fethi, "Al-Qaeda Video Masks Deep Fissures within Group," *Magharebia*, May 10, 2007, http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2007/05/10/feature-01 (accessed April 19, 2008).
20. Lav, "The Al Qaeda Organization."
21. Stanley Milgram, "Behavioral Study of Obedience," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 67 (1963): 371–378; Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); Robert Cialdini, *The Psychology of*

- Influence* (New York: Collins, 2007); Phil Zimbardo, "The Stanford Prison Experiment," 1971, <http://www.prisonexp.org/> (accessed August 4, 2007).
22. Damien McElroy, "Al-Qaeda's Scathing Letter to Troublesome Employee Mokhtar Belmokhtar Reveals Inner Workings of Terrorist Group," *The Telegraph*, May 29, 2013, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/10085716/Al-Qaedas-scathing-letter-to-troublesome-employee-Mokhtar-Belmokhtar-reveals-inner-workings-of-terrorist-group.html> (accessed August 17, 2013).
 23. Medina, "Al-Qaeda Employee Is Chewed-Out."
 24. Marwan Shihadah and Muyassir al-Shamri, "Al-Maqdisi to Al Hayah: Bin Laden Refused Al-Zarqawi's Request to Teach My Books to His Supporters," *Al Hayah*, July 10, 2005.
 25. Oriana Zill, "A Portrait of Wadih El Hage," *Frontline*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/elhage.html> (accessed April 19, 2008).
 26. Ibid.
 27. Benjamin Weiser, "Defense Attacks Reliability of Witness in Terror Case," *New York Times*, May 4, 2001, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE7D71338F937A35756C0A9679C8B63> (accessed April 19, 2008).
 28. "Uzbek Radio Interviews Jailed Islamist Azizbek Karimov," *Tashkent Uzbek Radio*, September 4, 2003.
 29. Ibid.

7

Breaking Relationships between Groups

In addition to playing down sectarian differences, Zawahiri has tried to breakdown inter-group barriers that derive from each group's pride and concern for its organizational independence and sovereignty.

—Michael Scheuer¹

Well, al-Qaida in Iraq still exists in Iraq, and that's what it's called. However, in Syria it's rebranded itself and called itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, thus claiming authority to extend Sharia law from, in their view, hopefully Iraq, across the Levant to the Mediterranean and thereby enabling them to more effectively compete with Jabhat al-Nusra, the stand-alone al-Qaida entity in Syria.

—Bruce Hoffman²

This chapter focuses on the relationships between groups in the network and builds on the campaign of identifying individual and intragroup fissures. Relationships between groups are also the third and final breaking points discussed in this book. The key to breaking the network at the intergroup level is to identify the fissures between groups and exploit them. Where no fissures exist, dissension should be created. Thus, an informational influence campaign needs to exploit existing dissension or cause it between the groups.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GROUPS

There are some basic psychological assumptions that were made with regard to intergroup relationships.³ Social psychologists maintain that merely categorizing groups leads to an in-group–out-group dichotomy. Thus, groups by their very nature have in-group bias; that is, they have to believe that their group is better, of higher status, than other groups. Other groups that are not part of the in-group are therefore out-groups. In-groups discriminate against out-groups and are in favor of the in-group “whenever they are in a situation in which intergroup categorization is made salient and relevant.”⁴ The foundation of this thinking is the work of Henri Tajfel and became known as social identity theory.

In his work, Tajfel conducted a series of path breaking experiments with its foundation in the “minimal group paradigm” to test his assumptions. During the experiments, individuals were randomly assigned two groups. Martha Cottam and coauthors summarized the experiment and findings.

In one typical experiment, assignment to a group was based on whether individuals tended to overestimate or underestimate a series of dots presented on a screen. Individuals participating in the experiment were then assigned to either the overestimator or underestimator group, presumably on the basis of their estimating tendencies. In reality, this assignment was purely arbitrary; the tendency to over- or underestimate was in no way related to accuracy. This arbitrary assignment procedure proved to be important and necessary for several reasons. First, it ensured that there was no personal reason for one group to discriminate against the other group. An individual presumably had nothing to gain personally by discriminating against the other group. Second, the procedure ensured that there was no existing hostility between the groups. Prior to categorization, individuals never thought of themselves as being a member of a group that tends to underestimate, or that other individuals are members of a group that overestimate, for example. Further, there was no chance for the groups to interact with one another, thus eliminating any possibility that group members would come to like the in-group or dislike the out-group. Third, such a procedure ensured that individuals had no conflicts of interest. There was nothing inherently valuable about being a member of a group that under- or overestimates.⁵

After categorization, the subjects in the groups were asked to allocate money to two other group members who were anonymous but not to themselves. The results proved very interesting. Those in the in-group received more funds than members of the out-group, suggesting in-group

favoritism was at play. This occurred “even though these individuals were assigned to a group on the basis of unimportant and seemingly meaningless criteria, they still acted in a discriminatory or competitive manner.”⁶ Ultimately, group members believe their group is better than other groups because it makes members of the group feel good about themselves.

This discussion sets the tone for understanding the al-Qaeda network in particular. It is a network of many different groups—of in-groups and out-groups. These groups have their own identities, and there are differences among them. The groups in the network may be perfectly happy with their relationships, and there may not ever be dissension between them. However, psychologists note that relationships between groups demonstrate further complexity.

On occasion, a group compares itself to another group and finds that the other is higher in status. When this happens, there are three options.⁷ The first is individual mobility where individuals can dissociate themselves from the group, moving to the higher status group, thus trying to achieve social mobility. But it does not always happen because of difficulties when there is group pressure not to leave, or when membership is viewed to be based on exclusive attributes.⁸ For the purpose of creating intergroup dissension for an information influence campaign, one of the key lessons is to identify their differences; these exclusive attributes and pressures that would stop members from leaving one group and joining another. The point is not to prevent members from doing so but to identify factors to see if fissure points can be exploited.

When faced with a comparative status issue, the second option for groups is social creativity. This involves a redefinition or alteration of the comparison on some new dimension, reverse the values assigned to group attributes so that what was once seen as negative becomes positive, and cease comparing themselves to the out-group.⁹ Thus, all is well between groups if members change their basis for comparison. Here the strategy for creating intergroup dissension is a bit different; that is, the social creativity option needs to be taken away from groups by reinforcing marked differences between them. In the end, there will be less to redefine, leaving only notable differences.

When mobility and creativity are not achievable, the final option for groups in the face of an insecure social comparison is social change. This is when the in-group seeks to compete with the higher status out-group, and if the out-group perceives this as a threat, competition can result.¹⁰ This explains why groups begin to compete with each other leading to

conflicts, wars, insurgencies, and at times genocide. This is the desirable place for groups in the network to reach. Thus, reinforcing fissures and introducing elements of threat can drive groups into competition and conflict with each other.

FISSURE POINTS

In this chapter several exploitable fissure points were identified. For illustration purposes, the focus in this chapter is on fissures between the core of the network and other groups, although this certainly can be applied to other intergroup situations. As outlined in Chapter 1, Ayman al-Zawahiri and his circle of trusted individuals make up the core of the network. Many members of the core were with the group during its inception. They are a node where direction, information, and support flow back and forth between other groups in the network. Intergroup conflict in the network can be exploited by turning the regional groups against the core. Where no exploitable fissures exist, they are created. The fissures identified between the core and other groups were characterized as the following: (1) diverging goals and ethnic differences, (2) security risks, (3) leadership and authority differences, and (4) competition over resources. Each of these fissures is examined in more detail next, drawing on specific examples for illustration.

DIVERGING GOALS AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES

Some individuals and groups choose to join or stay with the core of the network. Although Usama bin Laden called for the removal of corrupt Arab regimes, his primary focus was on the destruction of the United States. Thus, for individuals who join the al-Qaeda core, especially those with membership in groups focused on their own enemy, the United States becomes their new enemy. For some groups and individuals, this change in focus does not pose a problem and is an opportunity to expand their resources and influence.

A telling example occurred in 1998 when al-Zawahiri and his group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (IJ), merged with Bin Laden. As explained in Chapter 5, al-Zawahiri saw the merger as an opportunity to expand his personal influence and to place Egyptians in command of al-Qaeda. Until this point, al-Zawahiri and the IJ's primary goal was to overthrow the

Egyptian regime. With the merger, their focus turned from the Egyptian government to the United States. Although the Egyptian regime was still a concern, striking a blow to the United States became the primary focus. As previously ascertained, Bin Laden's 1998 fatwa reflected both his and al-Zawahiri's views. In it they called for an international war against the United States.¹¹ But as explained in the previous chapter, not all were obviously on board as indicated by the statement made by the leader of the Islamic Group that rejected the merger. This rejection happened again in 2006 when al-Zawahiri claimed that the Islamic Group and al-Qaeda formally merged. Some members of the Islamic Group were not too pleased with this announcement.¹²

The important thing here is that while some groups integrated with the core, they are in the minority.¹³ As such, many members of the regional groups identify first as part of their regional group. They have their own goals, tactics, values, ethnic composition, operating procedures, leadership structure, and so forth. In short, they have their own identities. One common thread they all share is that their first goal is to overthrow the governing regime in their geographical areas and replace it with an Islamic state. Their fight ultimately remains with their own enemy. These aspects of identity conflict are fissure points. This is further illustrated by two elements: goals and ethnicity.

Implementing an informational influence campaign may appear challenging at first glance. Bin Laden (before his death), al-Zawahiri, and others that form the core frequently condone attacks that regional groups in the network carry out. They may even provide some level of financial, propaganda support, or strategic guidance. However, ultimately the core's focus is on the United States. This key distinction in targeting must be reinforced to regional groups. Put another way, regional groups need to be shown that the core wants al-Qaeda groups to focus on hitting the United States, and they are essentially exploiting regional efforts for their own propaganda purposes. An example of a fissure to play upon was illustrated with the Somali conflict and the group al-Shabab. During an interview, in 2007 a member of al-Shabab noted the difference between the local Somali conflict and the dictates of al-Zawahiri. He was asked, "What do you make of Ayman al-Zawahiri's call for Somalis to rise up against Ethiopia?" He responded with the following:

We are not a special group. We are the Somali people. What we're doing is in the interests of all Somalis. ... People think our group is something

else—al Qaeda. We're not. We fight for the people. We fight for Somalia. If this government understands that its people need security, then that will be OK. But security has to come. And if al-Zawahiri says the people should do this or that, it could be wrong. He is not from here.¹⁴

The group is part of a long history of challenges to the Somali government. Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys is a key player in this history. A former officer in the Somali military, Aweys left to establish al-Ittihad al-Islami, but the group was crushed in 1996 by the intervening Ethiopian army. Ten years later, he helped form the Union of Islamic Courts that again was crushed by the Ethiopian Army. He then formed the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia. "The ARS was Aweys' most ambitious project, as it comprised Islamists, secular politicians, nationalists, diaspora leaders and traditional elders."¹⁵ But political events changed when moderates within the group negotiated with the Somali government in 2008. Aweys then created Hizbul-Islam to rival al-Shabab.¹⁶ Still, another change occurred with Aweys maintaining he was forced to join al-Shabab. Abdi Aynte discussed these changes.

But al-Shabaab was determined to gobble up its rivals. By late 2010, Aweys was forced to sign a contract under duress and merge with al-Shabaab. In taking this decision, Aweys told a close associate that he had three "disastrous options and a bad option." Firstly, to refuse joining the Shabaab and be killed. Secondly, to impose a self-exile, which at his age and with "the terrorist brand" hovering over him, was an impossible option. Thirdly, to join the Somali government, which is "categorically much worse humiliation than joining al-Shabaab." He took the bad option and surrendered to the Shabaab.¹⁷

However, Aweys wanted the title of supreme leader but instead the leader of al-Shabab, Ahmed Abdi Godane relegated him to holy warrior, causing yet another split in February 2012 when the group joined al-Qaeda.¹⁸ Clearly, Aweys had been repackaging himself along the way. Further splits were reported between Godane and more moderate elements due to the relationship with al-Qaeda.¹⁹ Talk then surfaced of Aweys leaving areas that the militants control due to he and his other officials being hunted by "death squads" and surrendering himself to the Somali government in June 2012, and then possibly being released in August.²⁰ Omar Hammami posted a video that he feared for his life, was being targeted by members of the groups. He even tweeted about an assassination attempt.

As Dana Shuster explains,

Last Thursday, Hammami live-tweeted what he claimed was an assassination attempt in which an al-Shabab gunman shot him in the neck in a coffee shop (he quickly posted pictures of blood running down his neck and soaking his shirt). Then his hideout was assaulted by militiamen who, after a shootout, reportedly hauled Hammami before an al-Shabab tribunal. According to Hammami's account on Twitter, the tribunal released him and several members of al-Shabab's leadership issued a fatwa protecting Hammami, but others in the organization still promised to pursue him. Yesterday, as Shabab-affiliated forces closed in around the village where he remains in hiding, Hammami seemed to think he could be killed shortly.²¹

Hammami claimed that the group found the role of foreigners in the group problematic and he disagreed with how the group was treating its foreign fighters. As is evident, relationships and events change, but what holds true is that some within the organization will negotiate with governments, internal struggles abound, and as is the case with other groups, some members do not like to be dictated to by outsiders. When Hammami was killed by al-Shabab in September 2013, the group perpetrated a terrorist attack in Kenya and declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda shortly thereafter. The groups have a long and complicated history and the splits in al-Shabab indicate just how powerful fissures are debilitating the group.

In order to create a fissure or build on existing ones, their group differences need to be reinforced. They must be shown how regional groups compromise their goals and part of their identity when they align themselves with the core to work. By doing so, regional groups invariably will spend the bulk of what they do, including depletion of precious resources, on pursuing Western targets and pet projects on behalf of al-Qaeda's core. They will be following the core's dictates and not their own. Thus, the core is not honoring the reciprocity rule. If regional groups view the core as a rival group, one that threatens their own identity, then they may start to see regional groups beginning to make moves to break those ties, and even dissolve into factions due to dissension over what their real goals should be.

An example can help put this into context. The goal is to create conflict between the satellite groups of al-Qaeda and the core run by al-Zawahiri. Many groups aligned with the core and expanded their campaigns to satisfy the core. Chapter 5 noted numerous public statements made by al-Zawahiri clearly showing he has his own agenda and goals. The release of the fictitious letter on behalf of al-Zawahiri also can help fan the flames

of intergroup conflict between the core and its satellites. Recall that in the fictitious letter, al-Zawahiri complained about the regional groups, their inability to carry out his vision, and that they should do the bidding of the core and not pursue their own agendas. This letter also stated that he would mention the regional groups for propaganda purposes, but the precious resources of the core should only be given if they support his vision. The fictitious letter also keyed in on another very important element of group identity, that of ethnicity.

The ethnic pecking order the core seeks to perpetuate can be used. As already noted, it is not a secret that al-Zawahiri put his loyal Egyptian friends into key positions. He believes that Egyptians are the elite of the organization. However, other reported ethnic fissures were described as Arabs versus other ethnicities, such as Uzbeks, and between Arabs, such as the Egyptians and Saudis and the Africans. The following example illustrated the possibility of more fissures and problems that can occur between ethnic groups—this time described as Uzbeks versus Arabs. An article in the *Belgravia Dispatch* outlined these tensions.

The Uzbeks and other Central Asians found themselves competing with Arab members of al-Qaeda for hideouts and resources with Arabs having the political and economic advantage. Adding to the tensions was a lack of trust by senior al-Qaeda figures in the Central Asian fighters, said a senior Pakistani Interior Ministry official. Another Pakistani security agent said the Central Asians “were al-Qaida’s foot soldiers, but they were never promoted. They felt ignored. The Central Asians were not happy,” he added. “Usama bin laden and (his Egyptian deputy) Ayman al-Zawahiri only trusted Arabs.”

Increasingly, the two sides began operating independently, often competing for the same money, weapons and dwindling areas of influence among the Pakistani tribesmen. Captured Uzbek, Chechen and Tajik fighters felt far more loyalty to Yuldash [Uzbek leader] than to the Arab al-Qaeda men. The Pakistani intelligence official said it was difficult to get captured Uzbeks to talk about Yuldash, “but it was a lot easier to grill them for clues about the Arabs and their possible hideouts. They felt far less loyalty.”²²

Thus, other ways can be devised to further exploit ethnic differences at the group level. The example used in Chapter 5 is one such way. If their identities are being threatened, members may just rethink their connections to the core and perhaps turn them against each other. Somalia is a case in point. Another added intragroup effect could occur because

those who disagree with the current course of doing al-Qaeda's bidding may challenge the current thinking of the group. Remember, busy groups focused on each other or on internal matters are better than busy groups focused on the United States, its partners, and allies.

An excellent example of the impact this can have on the credibility of the network is Sayyed Imam al-Sherif (Dr. Fadl). As explained in Chapter 5, currently imprisoned in Egypt, al-Sherif wrote and released the book *Revisions to Jihad in Egypt and the World* in 2007. Al-Sherif was highly critical of the al-Qaeda network and took issue with al-Qaeda's tactics. He wrote in part:

There were several different ways in which modern-day Muslims seeking Islamic law in modern days chose to respond to these countries in power. Some Islamic groups have resorted to clashing with the ruling authorities in the country or countries in the name of jihad in the way of Allah Almighty in order to spread Islam. These clashes have spread to different countries from the far east to the far west.

But these clashes have included many violations of Islamic law such as murder, murder because of a person's skin or hair, the murder of Muslims and non-Muslims, using people as shields, wasting of money, damage to property, and others.

These violations of Sharia bring nothing but the resentment and indignation of God.²³

The news of the release of this book quickly spread and many responded. Most important, however, was that al-Zawahiri responded and asked whether the Egyptians were now providing fax machines to prisoners. Obviously, al-Zawahiri's position was Egyptian intelligence contrived this (and again he could not let it slide). At the same time, according to individuals closely connected to the network members, Bin Laden convened a number of meetings about it and knew there would be significant fallout from the publication of the book. This represented a serious challenge to the network.²⁴ The challenge came from one of the most respected thinkers on jihad and put al-Qaeda in a defensive position.

Many negative and personal statements and written works could be crafted and released on behalf of trusted members of the core in authority positions. Some other examples of already prolific individuals include Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, formerly Bin Laden's financial advisor and now al-Qaeda's liaison to the Taliban, and Abu Yahya al-Libi, a very visible member who appears in many al-Qaeda videos (released posthumously).²⁵ Saif al-Adl, an Egyptian, is another example. Other

key operational commanders and thinkers could be chosen. As already addressed in Chapter 3, al-Qaeda members definitely like to write books and get their views and philosophies disseminated, so the release of yet another book on their philosophy and thinking will not be considered outlandish. Remember, everyone has an opinion.

These statements and written works can exploit any of the ethnic fissures.²⁶ Wide dissemination of this type of thinking is essential. Some of these need to be locally distributed and others made to seem as intended for public use, such as chat rooms and forums. Twitter can spread the information. Either way, scarcity and social proof would be in play. For example, the fictitious statements crafted for key members can be compiled and put into the format of a book on al-Qaeda's "thinking." This compilation can be published locally in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The book could later appear on the Internet. Picking up here again on the scarcity and social proof rules, once someone has this controversial book, everyone else will want it too. Another option is to release a series of statements in chat rooms, using rumor campaigns to disseminate them, and planting the seed with commentators such as Montasser al-Zayyat and others, leading them to publicly discuss the implications of these statements. If these issues with illustrations become widely disseminated, it would deal a blow to the core, the core that is trying to maintain its role as the supreme council of the jihad movements across the world.

SECURITY RISKS

Another way to pit regional groups against the core is to demonstrate that their association with the core will put their group's security at risk, yet another threat to their identity. Al-Zawahiri and other core members are hiding out in the Afghanistan/Pakistan tribal regions making their statements and giving direction, while not participating in the fight. Inevitably, when the core makes a threatening statement or a regional group proclaims its support for Bin Laden, governments step up their counterterrorism efforts.

There are several examples of this and one was highlighted in Chapter 5. Al-Zawahiri's focus on Pakistan caused some of those operating in this region to claim that he is bringing the wrath of the security services, disrupting their activities, and threatening their security. Then

a few weeks later Usama bin Laden also released a statement in which he threatened the Pakistani president and called on jihadists to overthrow his government.

As another example, in North Africa is AQIM's wider focus on attacking in the name of al-Qaeda. According to Rohan Guanaratna, "traditionally the North African groups have been important, but now they have increased importance because they have an alliance [that facilitates] an exchange of personnel, technology, and financing."²⁷ The security forces in Algeria perceive the affiliation of AQIM with al-Qaeda as a sign of a more ominous threat and, in response, stepped up their counterterrorism efforts.²⁸ That same is true of other North African countries such as Tunisia, which called for regional unity to confront the growing threat of terrorism.²⁹ At the same time, since AQIM is attempting to integrate other North African groups under their tutelage, other groups are put at risk because of their association with AQIM and the core. This presents another opportunity to create dissension between AQIM and the other Maghreb groups in Morocco and Tunisia.

The relationship between the IG and the core is another example. As discussed in previous chapters, al-Zawahiri was imprisoned in 1981 with many IG members, including Shaykh Abdul Rahman, who is currently incarcerated in the United States. In 2003, the Egyptian government released over one thousand members of the IG from prison because of the group's "commitment to rejecting violence."³⁰ The IG renounced violence since 1998 and has a ceasefire with the Egyptian government. In August 2006, al-Zawahiri announced that the IG merged with al-Qaeda. Again, some members of the group supported this decision, but others outright rejected al-Zawahiri's claim. As a result, a debate was sparked between al-Zawahiri and some members of the IG who rejected al-Zawahiri's contention. In fact, Karam Zuhdi, the president of the IG's consultative council, rejected the claims of the video and accused al-Zawahiri of lying. He further argued this was not a group merger but a merger of certain individuals with al-Qaeda.³¹ Again, some group members supported this decision, but others outright rejected al-Zawahiri's claim. This debate is another illustration of a serious fissure point because it strikes at the heart of security. Many members in the IG do not want to employ violence, but with the release of this video, they are being drawn into a security showdown with the Egyptian government, known for its strong and proactive counterterrorism responses to violent groups. Those who do not reside in Egypt are now on the radar of other governments. Al-Zawahiri and his supported

faction within the group put those who did not see the group working on behalf of the network on the radar of the security forces.

One way to drive home the connection between association with the core and the threat to security could be to coordinate and release a statement by the core in support of one of the regional groups, with a large campaign by the security forces. For example, a statement by AQIM with regard to its new and formal alignment with the Maghreb groups and with their promises of attacks to come could be released. The connection then would need to be made between links with al-Qaeda and between AQIM and other groups in the Maghreb, and the response of the pouring of resources into government counterterrorism efforts and actions against these groups.

Here again relying on the scarcity and social proof principles, this connection needs to be widely disseminated, well publicized, and discussed through the various venues already mentioned, such as the Internet, on the ground rumor campaigns facilitated by Twitter, and planting the seed with commentators so that they discuss the implications of these statements. The areas where the militants operate also need to be targeted. This alone will not sever links, but when added to the growing list of issues pointed out between the core and other groups can contribute to the end of the relationship.

LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY

Another intergroup fissure point deals with leadership and authority. Regional groups have their own leadership structure, and these leaders, for the most part, have the authority to lead the group. When authority wanes or intragroup rivalry occurs, leaders are replaced and factions emerge. Although Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri acknowledge their strategic role and the need for regional leadership to run their own affairs, they still want regional groups to recognize their ultimate authority. This can obviously cause contention because the regional groups believe that they are in charge and should be responsible for running their own affairs. Therefore, they do not want to have the core dictating to them.

What the regional groups believe and what the core believes may be two different matters. For example, as already discussed, a problem emerged between the core and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) when al-Zawahiri wrote a letter with very specific guidance that he expected al-Zarqawi

to follow.³² While al-Zawahiri praised al-Zarqawi for leading the jihad in Iraq, he criticized some of al-Zarqawi's group tactics, specifically his public slaughtering of hostages. Al-Zawahiri wrote in part:

Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable—also—are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages. You shouldn't be deceived by the praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of you as the shaykh of the slaughterers, etc. They do not express the general view of the admirer and the supporter of the resistance in Iraq, and of you in particular by the favor and blessing of God.

And your response, while true, might be: Why shouldn't we sow terror in the hearts of the Crusaders and their helpers? And isn't the destruction of the villages and the cities on the heads of their inhabitants more cruel than slaughtering? And aren't the cluster bombs and the seven ton bombs and the depleted uranium bombs crueler than slaughtering? And isn't killing by torture crueler than slaughtering? And isn't violating the honor of men and women more painful and more destructive than slaughtering?

All of these questions and more might be asked, and you are justified. However this does not change the reality at all, which is that the general opinion of our supporter does not comprehend that, and that this general opinion falls under a campaign by the malicious, perfidious, and fallacious campaign by the deceptive and fabricated media. And we would spare the people from the effect of questions about the usefulness of our actions in the hearts and minds of the general opinion that is essentially sympathetic to us...

I say to you: that we are in a battle and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma. And that however far our capabilities reach, they will never be equal to one thousandth of the capabilities of the kingdom of Satan that is waging war on us. And we can kill the captives by bullet. That would achieve that which is sought after without exposing ourselves to the questions and answering to doubts. We don't need this.³³

Al-Zawahiri clearly saw the negative impact that al-Zarqawi's public killings had on Iraqi support for al-Zarqawi's group. Al-Zawahiri ended this section of his letter with "we don't need this," suggesting that al-Zarqawi's actions were causing credibility problems for the entire network, especially the core. Al-Zawahiri then took a more authoritative tone and laid out explicit directions he expected al-Zarqawi to follow.³⁴ Al-Zarqawi, it seems, should be obedient to a higher authority than his own leadership.

It was also al-Zarqawi's suggestion to put an Iraqi in charge. Furthermore, he directed al-Zarqawi to defend his position. This demonstrates that al-Zawahiri believes that the regional groups are beholden to the core. However, al-Zawahiri did not stop there. He directed al-Zarqawi to report back to him on a number of issues, including details of what was taking place on the ground. This is further evidence that al-Zawahiri saw himself in a position of authority over al-Zarqawi and his group, and desires to not only have a say but be reported to. Al-Zawahiri wanted al-Zarqawi to obey his authority.

Another letter to al-Zarqawi surfaced, this time from a member with the nom de guerre Abu Atiyah, a member of the network that fought in Algeria in the early 1990s.³⁵ Like al-Zawahiri, Atiyah wrote about the violent activities of al-Zarqawi's group and the negative effect on the group and the wider jihad movement. In other words, ignoring the core's directives threatens the status of the core.

My dear brother, today you are a man of the public. You have attracted people's attention, and your actions, decisions, and behavior result in gains and losses that are not yours alone, but rather they are for Islam, and [they affect Islam, Muslims, and especially the mujahidin, the faction waging jihad, on the ground today. This, even though it may be a blessing from God in some ways, is a trial, a burden, and a great test in other ways ... your actions have come to impact the entire world, and they are monitored and analyzed. It is hard for you, my brother to bear the burden of this position and carry it out. Perhaps you have been remiss in it, or been unable to do it. Perhaps you thought, because of some influencing factors, that you are doing something good, while you are going afoul and making mistakes in important and grave things sometimes. Because of this, corruption and havoc, which God wouldn't have intended are taking place.³⁶

Atiyah then advised on a number of issues and reminded Zarqawi that he was ultimately beholden to the leadership of the core. He should, therefore, listen to their directives and follow their strategy, not his own.

On the whole, I will advise you on a number of measures in this arena: that you abstain from making any decision on a comprehensive issue (one with broad reach) and on substantial matters until you have turned to your leadership; Shaykh Usamah and the Doctor, and their brothers there and consulted with them.³⁷

In June 2006, al-Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. airstrike, and Egyptian-born Abu Ayyub al-Masri became AQI's new leader. Later in November

2006, in a move to expand its authority and influence in Iraq, AQI's leadership announced the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and its leader Abu Omar Baghdadi.³⁸ Abu Ayyub al-Masri was identified as the group's minister of war, making AQI its operational arm. The idea behind the ISI was to publicly unify Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq with AQI under one banner, while in reality putting AQI in a position to direct operations. The ISI identified Baghdadi as its leader as part of a strategic move to show other Sunni insurgent groups that an Iraqi was now in charge. They quickly adopted the position that Sunni insurgent groups either fully accepted ISI's rules or be viewed as an enemy.

This strategy backfired on the ISI, and conflict ensued between several Sunni insurgent groups and ISI. It reached the point where AQI, acting on behalf of the ISI, began to focus its targeting on these Sunni insurgent groups. For example, AQI killed members of the 1920 Revolution Brigades, Army of the Mujahideen, and Ansar al-Sunna.³⁹ AQI did not seem to heed the core's advice against targeting Sunnis and threatening its support base, suggesting that despite a change in leadership, AQI had its own strategy and was still disregarding al-Zawahiri's directives. This created bad press for the core.

There are numerous ways to exploit such struggles over authority. Obviously, existing issues could be exploited. However, by drawing on the al-Zarqawi examples, fissures can be manufactured to make it appear as though there are authority struggles between groups. This evidence can come from a variety of sources, such as statements, written letters, and other written sources. Here distribution of materials in local networks and rumor campaigns to further exploit the fissure could be employed. And as with other cases, the scarcity and social proof weapons can take over from there.

COMPETITION OVER RESOURCES

Every group has a finite amount of resources available. In the al-Qaeda network, this is also true. Groups in the network have different priorities and goals and therefore needs. They also have different resource requirements to meet those needs. In the past, securing financial support was not an issue for the network. It is well known that Bin Laden used his personal fortune to support the mujahideen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, and then in the mid-1990s, he invested in the Sudanese government in

exchange for the ability to operate out of Sudan. Bin Laden's financial assets undoubtedly helped the network get where it is today. The network also continues to evolve and grow, and the core cannot realistically be viewed as a consistent source of financial support for the regional groups in the network. The fissure here is to reinforce that the core must be more selective about which groups receive funding. Competing for funds could create dissension between groups that receive funding and those that do not. Those who do not receive funds or believe their share of the pie is smaller than other groups may inevitably ask why.

This is where the information campaign comes in. Certain groups will need to be told why they are not being funded. Building upon some of the tactics already used, the decisions about financing add fuel to the already burning fire regarding goals, ethnicity, security, leadership and authority, and now resources. The tactic is to expose the al-Qaeda core's accounting practices. Captured documents established that certain groups in the network, just like any business, have very detailed accounting methods. For example, a captured document revealed the existence of employee contracts, vacation policies, sick leave, and salaries for members.⁴⁰ First, detailed accounting books should be created. The accounting books need to clearly state not only the amount of money spent on certain groups but also for what purpose. Also, an accounting "note" should be put in each entry, which states the reasons why this money is being given to one group over another. Also, a section on the falsified books needs to be dedicated to which groups will get the cut if they do not comply with the core's rules and regulations. This aspect of the information campaign that focuses on financial matters serves two purposes: it can cause the network groups to question the demands of the core, and it can foster competition between groups in the network. The competition created should be between groups already in close proximity to each other in order to facilitate them turning on each other to gain scarce resources. For example, this can be done between groups in North Africa or factions within them, or between groups operating in Europe or in Pakistan. In times of scarce resources and government crackdown, money is a great motivator and can turn the best of friends into enemies.

The next step is the "discovery" of the accounting books. A distribution option could be that the book could be passed to an unwitting and purportedly unbiased member of the international news media along with some contrived tale of how it was found in a safe house raid, which happens on a regular basis. The scarcity and social proof take care of the

spreading of information to numerous local and Internet news sources. Ideally, the financial records then need to be widely and locally disseminated in the countries in which the chosen groups operate.

OTHER EXPLOITABLE SITUATIONS

As illustrated at the beginning of this chapter, these tactics can be applied to any intergroup situation. There are several issues between groups that are evidenced in 2013 that also provide good examples of exploitable fissures. For example, there is a complicated situation in Syria that involves two groups and Al-Zawahiri as apparent mediator. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant wants to expand its power and broaden goals into Syria. Changing its name from al-Qaeda in Iraq, moving into Syrian territory, namely Aleppo, and stepping out activities were reported. Yet, all was not well with the relationship with Jabhat al-Nusra, which already operates in Iraq. The move, led by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, it seems, was not transmitted to Abu Muhammad al-Golani, the leader of al-Nusra. Bill O'Reilly discusses the findings of a *STRATFOR* assessment.

Two days after al-Baghdadi's announcement, it became apparent that he had not coordinated with Jabhat al-Nusra's leader, Abu Muhammad al-Golani, and that the union of the organizations was more akin to a hostile takeover than a friendly merger. In his own audio message, al-Golani acknowledged the assistance that Jabhat al-Nusra had received from the Islamic State of Iraq in the struggle against the Syrian regime, but he stated that he had not been consulted about the merger and learned about it only through the media. Al-Golani then repudged his allegiance to Zawahiri and noted that his organization would remain independent from the Islamic State of Iraq.⁴¹

The announcement led to the desertion of fighters in his organization to the Islamic State in Iraq. At this point, al-Zawahiri weighed in. First, he maintained that al-Baghdadi should have consulted the al-Qaeda leadership about the merger and also that al-Golani erred by making his disagreement known and announcing the merger with al-Qaeda. His solution was to tell the Islamic State of Iraq to go back to Iraq and they should pursue a cooperative relationship. This did not sit well with al-Baghdadi. O'Reilly described the response.

Al-Baghdadi's response to Zawahiri's admonition was sharp and quite clear. In the audio message released June 15, a man who appears to be

al-Baghdadi rejected al-Zawahiri's order, stating that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant would remain and that he and his followers would not compromise or back down as long as they live. Regarding the instructions in al-Zawahiri's letter, al-Baghdadi said he had been forced to choose between God's command and an order that contravened it. Al-Baghdadi said he chose the order of God over those of al-Zawahiri. This was clearly a shot at al-Zawahiri's legitimacy and authority—and a very public one.⁴²

The Islamic State of Iraq continues to carry out its activities in Iraq. These relationships are ripe with fissures that could be exploited, especially those encouraging situations where the groups turn on each other.

In another example, recall that Mokhtar Belmokhtar who was a key operational leader for AQIM, reportedly left the group in 2013 due to internal conflicts, forming an affiliated group called the Khaled Abu al-Abbas Brigade. He left under very contentious circumstances having been called a "bleeding wound" by the groups ruling Shura Council. This is another competitive relationship that is also ripe for exploitation.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provided several ways in which to use information to exploit relationships between groups in the network, particularly between the core and other groups. It was one of three chapters dealing with fissures. The final discussion of the information campaign is discussed in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. Michael Scheuer, "Is Zawahiri Striving for Islamist Unity in Preparation for New Attack?" *Jamestown Foundation*, July 17, 2007, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373554> (accessed April 20, 2008).
2. "Al-Qaeda Surges into Syria," *Here & Now*, August 15, 2013, <http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2013/08/15/al-qaida-syria> (accessed August 27, 2013).
3. This is referred to as social identity theory. For further discussion, see Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, *Social Identity Theory Constructive and Critical Advances* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990); Michael Hogg and Dominic Abrams, *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes* (New York: Routledge, 1988); Henri Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

4. Martha Cottam, Elena Mastors, Beth Dietz-Uhler, and Tom Preston, *Introduction to Political Psychology* (New York: Psychology Press, 2010), 47.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 47–48.
7. Ibid., 47.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. "Online News Hour: Al Qaeda's 1998 Fatwa," PBS, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html (accessed August 17, 2007).
12. Karam Zuhdi, "Interview," *Al-Jazeera*, August 6, 2006.
13. "Pakistan Seizes al-Qaeda No. 3," CNN, May 5, 2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/05/04/pakistan.arrest/index.html> (accessed September 8, 2007); Robert Windrem, "Is North African Militants the New Face of al-Qaida?" *MSNBC*, May 30, 2007, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18942722/> (accessed August 17, 2007). While the former Egyptian IJ members played a dominant role in the core of the network, individuals from other regional groups also make up the core. For instance, there were and still are several Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) members that occupy important roles in the core group. Abu Yahya al-Libi, originally a member of the LIFG, thought to be operating out of Afghanistan plays a key role in al-Qaeda's propaganda efforts. Another prominent LIFG/core member was Abu Faraj al-Libi. Until his arrest in May 2005, Abu Faraj al-Libi served as the core's third highest ranking leader and as a key operational planner.
14. Alex Perry, "A Somali Jihadist: We're Not Al-Qaeda," *Time*, January 10, 2007, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1576099,00.html> (accessed May 19, 2009).
15. Abdi Aynte, "Somalia: Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and the Politics of the al-Shabaab Split," April 4, 2012, <http://africanarguments.org/2012/04/04/somalia-sheikh-hassan-dahir-aweys-and-the-politics-of-the-al-shabaab-split-by-abdi-aynte/> (accessed August 19, 2013).
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. "Somalia's al-Shabab Leader Aweys 'Not Surrendering,'" *BBC News*, June 28, 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23095129> (accessed August 19, 2013).
20. "Somalia: Federal Govt 'Plans to Release' Terror Chief Aweys," *Garowe Online*, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201308191025.html> (accessed August 19, 2013).
21. Dana Stuster, "Rapping Jihadist's Tweets Showcase al-Shabab's Internal Divisions," *Foreign Policy*, April 30, 2013, <http://blog.for->

- eignpolicy.com/posts/2013/04/30/rapping_jihadist_s_tweets_showcase_al_shabab_s_internal_divisions (accessed August 19, 2013).
22. "Fissures within Al-Qaeda?" *The Belgravia Dispatch*, May 11, 2005, <http://www.belgraviadispatch.com/archives/004553.html> (accessed August 17, 2007).
 23. Lara Mansfield, "Revisions to Jihad in Egypt and the World: Zawahiri's Mentor Changes His Mind," *Mansfield Report*, http://www.lauramansfield.com/subscribers/20071201_revisions.asp (accessed March 5, 2008).
 24. Ibid.
 25. Craig Whitlock, "The New Al Qaeda Central," *Washington Post*, September 9, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/08/AR2007090801845.html> (accessed September 12, 2007).
 26. The most cited example of obedience to authority comes from a series of experiments done by Stanley Milgram that was covered in Chapter 4.
 27. "How Did Al Qaeda Emerge in North Africa?" *Christian Science Monitor*, May 1, 2007, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0501/p12s01-wome.htm> (accessed September 20, 2007).
 28. Ibid.
 29. Andrew Borowiec, "Al Qaeda Threat Spurs Call for Regional Unity," *Washington Times*, November 16, 2007.
 30. "Al Zawahiri: Egyptian Militant Group Joins Al Qaeda," *CNN*, August 5, 2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/08/05/zawahiri.tape/index.html> (accessed September 21, 2007).
 31. Zuhdi, "Interview."
 32. ODNI, "English Translation of Ayman al-Zawahiri's Letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," October 11, 2005, <https://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/dni101105.html> (accessed September 23, 2013).
 33. Ibid.
 34. Ibid.
 35. Karen DeYoung, "Letter Gives Glimpse of Al Qaeda Leadership," *CNN*, October 2, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/01/AR2006100101083.html> (accessed September 21, 2007).
 36. Ibid.
 37. Ibid.
 38. "Jihadist Video Announces Islamic State of Iraq," *Anti-Defamation League*, November 16, 2006, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/caliphate_voice-Channel.htm (accessed September 3, 2007).
 39. Lamis Andoni, "On Whose Side Is Al-Qaeda?" *Al-Ahram*, April 26–May 2, 2007, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/842/op6.htm> (accessed August 25, 2007).
 40. "The Al Qaeda Employee Contract," *CNN*, February 16, 2006, <http://edition.cnn.com/video/#/video/world/2006/02/16/starr.al.qaeda.documents.affl> (accessed September 20, 2007). The Combating Terrorism Center hosts many

captured documents, one of which is AQI's "The Financial Report for the Organization or Individual," <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/sinjarz.asp> (accessed April 15, 2009).

41. Bill O'Reilly, "Stratfor.com Security Weekly: A Revolt within the Al Qaeda Movement," June 24, 2013 (accessed August 22, 2013).
42. *Ibid.*

8

The Final Break

The organization, which had begun life as a free-wheeling, rule-breaking, and eclectic mix of “amateurs” in 1942 had calcified into another large, ponderous federal bureaucracy.

—Charles Faddis¹

The fact that a catastrophic attack against America comparable to 9/11 has not occurred over the past 11 years should not suggest that a future one is not being planned.

—Joshua Sinai²

In 1996, Usama bin Laden issued a fatwa titled “Declaration of War against Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.” His disdain for the United States was evident and his belief that the United States is the embodiment of evil was clear. His solution to this hatred was violence against the United States. Subsequent statements, by him and Ayman al-Zawahiri, drove home this belief. Attacks against the United States took place, notably in Kenya and Tanzania and Yemen. 9/11 was well planned. Lack of interagency cooperation coupled with the inability to imagine an attack such as this resulted in the deaths of over three thousand people.

Al-Qaeda is not a group but interconnected network. As noted by Ted Gistaro, “Al-Qaeda’s ability to establish and manage links to other affiliated terrorist groups and facilitation networks is a key indicator of its organizational health. These links help bolster it’s operational and propaganda reach.”³ The groups that identify as part of the network adopt the overall philosophy of its original founders and may or may not act on its

behalf, and also pursue their own strategies, tactics, and goals, especially with regard to the governments they seek to overthrow.

Al-Zawahiri and his close circle continue to guide and support the core of the original al-Qaeda; “al-Qaeda Central” operates from Pakistan. Groups that already cooperated with al-Qaeda before 9/11 continued to do so. Some groups that only had a country or regional perspective formally joined with al-Qaeda to pursue attacks in the spirit of global jihad. New groups were created and affiliated with the network or existed and formally affiliated later. Clearly, the network is constantly changing—alliances come and go, cooperation and affiliations change, groups disintegrate or are created, and the names of the groups simply change.

THE LEARNING PROCESS

As already argued that members of the network are not crazy and cannot be dismissed as such. The reality is that in general, these individuals are just like us. They have beliefs. They all are not the same either. Demographic profiles vary from individual to individual. Additionally, these individuals, like anyone else, join groups. They are motivated to join the network in part because of mundane reasons. The only difference is that network members belong to groups that violate most Americans’ values. Network members covet violence and seek the ultimate destruction of all who do not subscribe to their beliefs. Their enemies are infidels to be killed—nothing more, nothing less.

What do they believe, and how are these beliefs portrayed? To truly understand the reasoning of individuals in the network, it is imperative that their writings or other ways of disseminating information be read, analyzed, and understood. How the network propaganda defines its beliefs and the types of products it uses to perpetuate them is important. A wide variety of products from videos to sermons are used, and they are disseminated in a variety of venues, to include local networks and the Internet.

The United States is blamed for problems throughout the world and hated by all of these groups. This is not going to change. Israel is demonized. This is also not going to change. Nor is the fact that any country that irks the network is on the path of destruction. The Danish found this out when their embassy was bombed due to the publication of a cartoon. Countries need to take a serious look at their accommodation strategies. Al-Qaeda cannot continue to claim it influenced the outcome of an election

as in Madrid. The network cannot be allowed to plan within democratic borders. The network is engaging in a protracted war with the United States and others both from inside and outside their borders.

The network groups do not seriously negotiate—they vilify. They want the ultimate destruction of the United States. They are not interested in integration, nor are they interested in negotiation. They are, however, interested in a country run by an insular form of Islam, embodied in their interpretation of Shariah law.

THE FINAL PIECE

In addition to already existing efforts by numerous agencies, the United States should adopt a nonkinetic informational influence campaign. This approach would complement others already in place. The information campaign must be comprehensive and coordinated. This long-term approach requires patience and innovative, imaginative, and inspired practitioners. As one former operator put it, “It’s all about getting into the head of the people you want to manipulate, and having the guts to then go about the dirty business.”⁴

The information campaign specifically focused on three breaking points: individuals, groups, and relationships between groups. Psychology leads to the fissures within them. Psychological influence tools together with operational techniques put the information campaign into play. In the chapter on individuals, the first breaking point was illustrated with a case study of al-Zawahiri. He is just one example of numerous individuals who can be targeted. Provided was a framework that aided in the understanding of individuals and identifying fissure points. This framework is important because it focused attention of attributes specifically related to influence. While certain individuals can exhibit similar traits, individuals are different, and they must be thoroughly analyzed.

The second breaking point focused on the group. Here three fissures were examined: personal conflict and mistrust, deviant group members, and disagreement over policy and procedure. A variety of examples illustrated ways to exploit these fissures.

The third breaking point took place at the intergroup level. Discussed was that group categorization leads to in-group and out-group distinctions, creating the basis from which intergroup relationships can be exploited. The fissures identified were diverging goals and ethnic differences,

security risks, leadership and authority differences, and competition over resources. The examples provided focused on the relationship between the core and the wider network although it can be applied to any groups.

But before this can even be considered, many hurdles must be overcome.

HINDERING CHANGE

American policy makers cannot continue to be risk adverse and therefore strangle the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from doing its job. The CIA has unfortunately been severely beaten down for a variety of “intelligence failures” including 9/11; Iraq and the failure to find WMD; and the attack on the diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya, in which Ambassador Christopher Stevens was killed. The political decision to rely on technological collection and not human collection severely hampered the agency’s ability to hit the ground running after 9/11. What’s done is done. The agency now needs to move forward with a mandate to get down on the level of the enemy that seeks the ultimate destruction of the United States. It has been many years since 9/11, and bureaucracy is still overcoming real change. As Chris Faddis argued:

It has been seven years since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and Usama bin Laden remains at large. Within the CIA nothing fundamentally has changed. New bureaucratic entities have cropped up. More lines have been drawn on wiring diagrams. More requirements for coordination have been put in place. Meetings and PowerPoint presentations have multiplied.⁵

There is obviously significant frustration with getting the policy makers to work against al-Qaeda effectively. However, the good news is that there is not a lack of dedicated people who want to do more. As Faddis further noted, “The issue is not sloth. Nor is it lack of dedication. The CIA continues to attract large numbers of resolute, patriotic Americans.” Rather, “the organization has degenerated into a stiff, risk adverse bureaucracy due to abysmal senior leadership and a lack of political support.”⁶ The internal report mentioned in Chapter 1 determined that the risk adverse and poor leadership is indeed still setting the tone for the agency.

There is also an absolute necessity to focus collection on the breaking points and the fissures that can be exploited. An informational campaign

cannot be done without it. The operators should decide what type of collection is important for such a campaign, not policy makers. And keen analysts, not insular ones wedded to old ways, should know what to look for.

It is also imperative that information be fully shared. Agencies still hanging onto the coveted information hinder progress against the network and more important may even be the cause of not preventing further attacks. The problems that still exist with regard to intelligence sharing cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, as noted in Chapter 1, “knowledge is power” continues to rear its ugly head.

The intelligence system was wrought with major difficulties, especially with regard to intelligence sharing. A key recommendation from the 9/11 Commission Report was the need to solve this information-sharing problem.⁷ To address this serious problem, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was created. Within ODNI fell the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).

Even with the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) all is not well, eight years since September 11. The organization itself is staffed with representatives from agencies still in competition with each other, each striving to positively represent their group at the expense of others. Individuals, despite being assigned to NCTC, are still loyal to their own organization to which they must return after a stint at NCTC. Returning to social identity theory, outlined in the previous chapter, in-groups and out-groups are a part of intergroup relations. Remember, group members believe their group is better than other groups because it makes members of the group feel good about themselves. Sharing with other groups obviously would affect this positive evaluation of the in-group. Members can leave for sure, exercising their social mobility option and leave. But, the agencies and their fiefdoms are still left standing. The way to break this situation is to dismantle existing groups and create one with a superordinate goal, loyal not to particular agencies but to ODNI. The latest discussion focused on the lack of information sharing between the CIA and FBI with regard to the Boston Marathon bombings (Figure 8.1). Of course, added to this is the steady stream of criticism about lack of sharing between law enforcement bodies such as the FBI and state and local law enforcement.

Organizational change in the government with entrenched bureaucracies will be difficult because there is always resistance to change. Those who cannot move forward should not be rewarded with continued employment. They should be moved out precisely for this reason.



Figure 8.1 While the coordination and execution in manhunt for the Tsarnaev brothers was unparalleled in scope and execution, could proper communication among intelligence agencies prior to the Boston bombings have prevented them? Clockwise from top left: Photos of the exploded pressure cooker, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and shrapnel from the device. (Courtesy of FBI.)

CONCLUSION

The United States needs to act now to build a comprehensive campaign against the network. The issues highlighted herein have to be overcome. Band-Aid approaches are an option. Sling shot tactics ultimately fail in the long run. Furthermore, the United States simply cannot tackle terrorism alone. The network is global. After 9/11, the country stepped up cooperation, such as information sharing and joint training, and material support to our partners and allies. This is exceedingly important to the country. When necessary the bully needs to step back and appreciate that other countries have their own way of operating, and the United States cannot dictate everything.

Of course, doing nothing and continuing to conduct business as usual is an option. However, more and more terrorists are being born. The evidence is in the recruitment taking place all over the world. This is not a fictional play. Americans need to wake up from their post-9/11 slumber.

NOTES

1. Charles Faddis, "CIA Must Return to Its Roots to become Effective Again," *National Defense Magazine*, March 2009, <http://www.thefree library.com/Lost+age ncy:+CIA+must+return +to+its+roots+to+beco me+effective+once ...-a019574 3973> (accessed May 14, 2009).
2. Joshua Sinai, "Al Qaeda Threat to U.S. Not Diminished, Data Indicates," *JINSA*, March 11, 2013, <http://www.jinsa.org/fell owship-program/joshua-sin ai/al-qaeda-threat-us-not- diminished-data-indicates> (accessed August 28, 2013).
3. Ted Gistaro, "Remarks by Mr. Ted Gistaro, National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Transnational Threats," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, Washington, DC, August 12, 2008. Gistaro was appointed NIO in November 2006 after nearly two decades of service with the Central Intelligence Agency. His speech discussed the current state of al-Qaeda as well as the current threats facing the United States homeland; see http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20080812_speech.pdf (accessed September 15, 2008).
4. Author discussions with retired American intelligence officer with significant operational experience.
5. Faddis, "CIA Must Return."
6. Ibid.
7. The 9/11 Commission Report is available at <http://www.9-11com mission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>.

... there is a need for a very hands-on, up-close, and personal engagement to dislodge the radical Islamist ideology once it takes root. Dr. Mastors' work fills this gap between the psychological and tactical approaches to defeat al-Qaeda.

—Colonel Jennifer L. Hesterman, United States Air Force (retired)
and author of *The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus*

Breaking Al-Qaeda: Psychological and Operational Techniques, Second Edition explores the background and history of al-Qaeda, covers recent developments, and explains how, why, and where the al-Qaeda network is expanding. The author examines the current state of the terrorist network and describes what groups in the network are doing to recruit, plan, and carry out attacks worldwide.

The book reports on intelligence and counterterror methods being used to garner information on al-Qaeda. It describes how the destabilization of Arab countries has led to opportunities for terrorists to capitalize on that instability and gain a foothold in countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Somalia, and Syria.

- Addresses information collection and analysis
- Provides an overview of the business of informational influence
- Explains how psychology can be used to understand and exploit individuals in terrorist networks
- Explores the relationships between the core of al-Qaeda and other groups

Illustrating the message and ideology of al-Qaeda since the death of Usama bin Laden, the text explains the steps being taken to counter this threat. It also details psychological and operational techniques that can be used to counter network groups and fracture relationships between groups.



CRC Press
Taylor & Francis Group
an **informa** business
www.crcpress.com

6000 Broken Sound Parkway, NW
Suite 300, Boca Raton, FL 33487
711 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017
2 Park Square, Milton Park
Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN, UK

K22645

ISBN: 978-1-4822-3011-6



www.crcpress.com

